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Abstract 
Policy implementation is a complex, technical and political process. It is 
shaped by the capacity of the government, political patronage, influence of 
diverse actors, power relationships, role of the state, nature of the political 
systems and their mechanisms for participation in the policy subsystem. 
Tackling the implementation gap is a health policy concern in Low and Middle 
Income Countries (LMICs). In these countries, governments frequently fail to 
achieve effective policy implementation. The government of Pakistan has 
over six decades introduced many health initiatives and plans to improve the 
health status of its population. Still, the implementation process remains 
arduous.  
 
To identify the implementation gaps and their drivers, forty-two semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the key policy actors from general 
political sphere and health policy subsystem in Pakistan, to explore their 
knowledge, perspectives and experience. The key informants were mainly 
politicians, bureaucrats, health ministry officials, and technocrats from 
Islamabad, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sind provinces in Pakistan. 
The data was analysed using thematic analysis. This qualitative exploratory 
study using an inductive approach draws on the concepts of power, policy 
networks and path dependency. 
 
Findings suggest that the factors influencing the policy-action relationship in 
the health sector in Pakistan operate at two levels: actors and institutional or 
structural. Political history as a part of the structure plays an important role as 
well. The power relations within the health sector are a complex interplay of 
ideas, interests and incentives resulting in policy networks or iron triangles at 
different levels. The underlying power relations remain the same and  policy 
implementation process is path dependent. Due to this, most health policies 
remain in long periods of stasis or equilibrium. The stalemate over these 
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policies was seen because of the elitist system of interest groups’ hold over 
policy choices. Frequently, policies are caught in a web of interests. 
 
Key words: Power, policy, health, implementation, actors, low and middle 
income countries, policy networks, health systems and Pakistan.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1Rationale 
The implementation of policy is a complex, technical and political process 
(Antunes, 2013). Tackling the implementation gap is a health policy concern 
in Low and Middle income countries (LMICs). Limited attention has so far 
been paid to the influence of power relations over this gap (Gilson et al. 
2014). The role of power in policy implementation processes is an under-
researched, yet crucial; aspect of understanding implementation (Lehman 
and Matwa, 2008).Policy implementation is multi-disciplinary, multi-level and 
multi-focus in nature. Policy implementation as a construct is understood in 
many different ways (Kipo, 2014). 
 
There is fluidity in the definition as well as the conception of policy 
implementation. Due to its multi-disciplinary nature, some scholars and 
students face challenges of explaining policy implementation. This complexity 
of policy implementation is supported by the observation of Pressman and 
Wildavsky “if implementation is everywhere, as one of the authors suggested 
in another connection, is it ipso facto nowhere?” No doubt this is why 
students of implementation complain that the subject is so slippery; it does 
depend on what one is trying to explain, from what point of view, at what 
point in its history” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).  
 
Beside this, there are other dilemmas as to what theoretical approaches or 
perspectives to adopt in studying policy implementation. The question of 
whether to adopt top-down, bottom-up or mixed approach is keenly debated 
among scholars. The area between agenda setting and policy 
implementation is relatively neglected in the literature, yet crucial to policy 
design and in determining whether the policy will achieve its intended 
purposes (Berlan et al. 2014).  
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Moreover, questions of policy implementation are often translated into the 
language of power, a concept that theorists have debated for centuries 
(Wang, 2010). The use of power in the policy process is subtle and complex.  
It is important to understand how power is exercised or distributed in the 
policy process within a complicated political environment (Kipo, 2014).  
 
Findings from some recent case studies in Low and Middle Income Countries 
(LMICs) have shown that political judgment pre-dominated policy 
implementation and was influenced by political interests, insistence, values 
and opinions of policy makers. Policy implementation reflected the “quick-fix” 
mentality of policy makers, with little regard to evidence and skilled opinion. 
Most of the policies were made in a top-down and non-participative 
approach. These influences on policymaking and weaknesses in 
implementation contributed to policy failure (Jardali et al. 2014). 
 
The implementation process can affect the outcomes of any intervention, and 
is concerned with the influence of actors, power and contestation over 
implementation (Erasmus et al. 2014). At the core of these questions is the 
central issue concerning the distribution and control of the resources, forms 
of formal and informal power, and how they interact across different 
institutional spheres to promote or hinder development policies and practice 
(Leftwich, 2007). Ideas, interests and power of different actors and 
stakeholders shape the implementation of policy (Gilson and Raphael, 2008). 
Inadequate attention to power, interests and values is a common precursor to 
unintended consequences and unsuccessful implementation of policies 
(Agyepong, 2012). 
 
Policymaking and policy implementation should be understood as processes 
shaped by historical legacies, context and timing (Johnson, 2015). Health 
policy analysis in LMICs is attracting increasing attention. The bulk of 
research has focused on policy content, particularly evaluating the technical 
appropriateness. However the nature of the processes (how policies are 
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made, and by whom) leading to these policies affects their relevance and 
often their implementation.  
 
Study of the processes through which ideas, knowledge, interests, power and 
institutions influence decision-making is primarily concerned with public 
policy and pays particular attention to how problems are defined, agendas 
are set, policy is formulated and re-formulated, implemented and evaluated 
(Parsons, 1995). It is based on the understanding that the policy is a product 
of, and constructed through, political and social processes. Studies have 
shown that even when ample resources are available, the policy has well 
defined objectives, good communication with a clear chain of command and 
monitoring systems is operative, policies can be implemented in a totally 
different way as they were intended (Buse et al. 2005). 
 
Most of the discussion in policy issues is centred on the formulation of policy. 
However, it must be realized that policy issues do not end with the formation 
of the policy; it is, in fact, only the beginning of the policy-to-action continuum 
(Bhuyan et al. 2010). On the other hand, a higher emphasis is given to 
research focusing on whether policies have achieved the goals and finding a 
list of reasons of poor implementation like poor funding, infrastructure, lack of 
staff, etc. There is a need to highlight that understanding the nature of policy 
implementation is also important, because evidence shows that policies, 
once approved, are not always implemented as planned (Calista, 1994).  
 
 A focused research is needed for people involved in the implementation 
process as their views, goals, strategies, interests and commitment to policy 
determine how they will deploy the political resources (Buse et al. 2005) and 
why many policies fall short of implementation. This kind of research is of 
particular importance in low and middle income settings like Pakistan where 
most of the policies with a few exceptions are either partially implemented or 
not implemented at all.  
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1.2 Clarifying Concepts and Definitions  
This study revolves around policy, implementation, actors, power, policy 
networks and path dependency. There is not a single definition of all these 
terms, but these would be defined as they are used in the context of this 
study and discussed in the subsequent chapters. Barrett and Fudge (1981) 
pointed out: 
‘The policy does not implement itself.’ 
They furthermore believed that implementation was about a policy-action 
continuum, about interactions and negotiations between actors: between 
those seeking to put the policy into effect, and those upon whom action 
depends.(Ibid.) ‘To implement’ implies process; it also implies ability: the 
ability to convert the ‘state’s policy promises into the state’s policy products’ 
(Bodkin, 1990). 
 
The following are key issues in understanding, implementation processes: 
• Multiplicity and complexity of linkages 
• Questions of control and co-ordination 
• Issues of conflict and consensus 
 
The above issues are not mutually exclusive conceptualizations but rather 
complementary approaches to understanding the policy-action relationship 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981). It is further suggested that the policy-action 
relationship needs to be considered in a political context and as an 
interactive and negotiating process taking place over time between those 
seeking to put the policy into effect and those upon whom action depends. 
Implementation has its tendrils throughout the entire policy process 
(Tasmanian and Sabatier, 1983). The founding fathers of implementation, 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have stressed the complexity of policy 
implementation. 
 
O’Toole (2004) defines policy implementation as what develops between the 
establishments of an apparent intention on the part of government doing 
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something or stop doing something and the ultimate impact of world of 
actions. More concisely, he remarks that policy implementation refers to the 
connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual 
results (O’Toole et al. 1995). As part of policy cycle, policy implementation 
concerns how governments put policies into effect (Howlett et al. 2003). 
 
Thus defined, implementation is a complex process in which there is a 
tendency for it to be problematic, as policy objectives are not always clearly 
expressed (and, occasionally, are even conflicting) and that the process must 
often be delivered within a multi-organisational setting, requiring detailed 
negotiation. Negotiation is vital in the implementation process, allowing the 
solution of conflicts of interest and the promotion of a collaborative 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, which can develop over 
time (Antunes, 2013). 
 
The word actor is often used to symbolise individuals, organisations and 
governments who influence policy (Buse et al. 2005). For the purpose of this 
study politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats, media, donors and other interest 
groups came up as the key players in the health policy sphere in Pakistan. 
Bureaucrats are the civil servants who are inducted through the public 
service exam, technocrats are not the civil servants, but health experts who 
have entered the government service, as a lateral entry, or are the 
professionals working in different non-government organizations. Some 
technocrats are also a part of different ministries on either contract or 
permanent basis. Media refers to both the print and electronic media. Interest 
groups could be either the civil society or other hidden elements with a strong 
linkage with the politicians or the bureaucrats. 
 
As this study revolves around the power relations between the key policy 
players, it is important to look at power from different angles. The concept of 
power is essentially contested (Luke’s, 1974; Baldwin, 2002). It seems as if 
there are as many definitions and approaches as there are power analysts. 
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The concept of power and its various forms are described (in detail in chapter 
four) but we take Weber (1946) and Giddens’ definition of power as the 
starting point. Giddens define power as: ‘the capacity of agents to achieve 
outcomes in social practices’ (Giddens, 1984). 
 
Weber (1946) defined power as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. While he understood 
such power as pervading all human interactions, he was fascinated with how 
certain structural positions were allocated the right to expect compliance by 
others or “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons”. 
 
Obviously, different political processes raise different power games, either 
transitive or intransitive. The power concept used in this study is definitely 
multi-layered. It could also be defined as: power is the organisational and 
discursive capacity of agencies, either in competition with one another or 
jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a capacity, which is however 
co-determined by the structural power of those social institutions in which 
these agencies are embedded. (Arts and Tatenhove, 2004). Power is 
recognized as a key influence over the development and implementation of 
health policies. 
 
A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and its boundary. It 
contains relatively stable set of stable public and private actors. The linkages 
between actors serve as channels of communication and for the exchange of 
authority, resources, expertise and trust. The boundary of a given policy 
network is not in the first place determined by formal institutions but results 
from a mutual recognition dependent on functional relevance and structural 
embeddedness. Policy networks should be seen as an integrated hybrid 
structure of political governance (Kenis and Schneider, 1991).  
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The tendency towards policy inertia and the role played by actors, historical 
events and contextual factors in constraining future choices is described as 
path dependency (Bertone et al. 2014). 
 
1.3 Aims and objectives 
Aim 
This thesis aims to examine the concept of power in the Pakistani health 
sector with a special focus on the role of key actors and implementation in 
order to understand the factors underlying them. 
                 
 Objectives 
 To explore the views, perceptions and experiences of the policy actors of  
policy implementation process in general and health sector in particular. 
 To identify implementation gaps, their drivers and recommendations for 
closing the gaps. 
 
 Research Questions 
 
1. What role do power relations play in policy implementation? 
2. What implementation gaps and their drivers can be identified at 
national, provincial and district level? 
3. Where does the actual power of implementing policies lie? 
 
1.4 Background to researcher’s interest in the topic 
Having served as a young doctor in the capital city of Islamabad, the 
researcher noticed that the medics and the top administrators on the clinical 
side lacked the knowledge of national health policies. They were never 
invited to the policy formulation meetings. Only when the whole policy was 
drafted, a copy was sent to all the hospitals. Later, in her role as a research 
co-ordinator in the Ministry of Health, she observed that Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) were signed between the heads of departments only if 
they were friends or have political connections. All the top slots in the ministry 
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were political. The subordinates were sent to capacity building courses and 
conferences only if they managed a phone call to the superiors. Having 
observed all this the researcher developed an interest to know further what 
actually goes on during different stages of the policy implementation process 
and why certain policies were favoured and others not.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis begins with the rationale, aims /objectives and definitions, 
followed by background information on Pakistan, country’s political history, 
health policies and health systems. The thesis then explains the details of the 
research methodology, study design, conceptual framework, different stages 
of data analysis, ethical considerations and limitations of the study. The 
literature review chapter describes different implementation theories, 
theoretical frameworks, power and its theories, policy networks, models of 
path dependency and the empirical studies from low and middle income 
countries on the related subject. The findings chapter presents the data 
based on thematic analysis of the forty-two interview transcripts. The main 
emerging themes and their sub-themes are discussed. The discussion 
chapter then draws together the main elements of this study and discusses 
the core argument of the study. The theoretical frameworks selected are 
applied to the results of the study. The final chapter concludes the thesis and 
gives some recommendations and ideas for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Background 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the country profile of Pakistan, including its geography, 
political history and demographics. It gives an overview of its health systems, 
actors in health, donor assistance, health policy trajectory and examples of 
some failed health policies. A comparison of the country’s health indicators 
with other countries in the region is also given. 
 
2.2 Geography 
Pakistan, the sixth most populous country in the world, is situated in South 
Asia with a population of 185 million (National Institute of Population Studies, 
2012). It is administratively divided into four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, 
Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP). Moreover, it has two 
centrally administered areas (Azad Kashmir and Gigli-Baltistan (former 
Northern Areas)), one territory (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), and 
one capital territory, Islamabad (Law, 2010). Provinces are further divided 
into districts, which in turn are divided into tehsils and then to union councils 
at a basic level. The population distribution is uneven in Pakistan with 78.6% 
in the eastern provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Baluchistan, though the largest 
province by area (44%), has only 5% of the population (Pakistan, 2003). The 
map of Pakistan is shown in Figure 1 on the next page: 
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Figure 1: Pakistan map with administrative borders (http:// digital-vector-
maps.com/country-maps) 
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2.3 Political History (1947-2015) 
Pakistan has faced authoritarianism since its inception. Authoritarian rule has 
also affected media freedom in the country, with negative effect on 
democracy. Pakistan failed to make a viable transition to democratic rule 
after emerging from the debris of British colonialism. The colonial state was 
quickly replaced by authoritarian rulers, whether civilian or military (Jalal, 
1995). 
 
It is widely believed that not more than 200 families have shared political 
power in Pakistan since independence. These politicians have exploited the 
country in every era. Lust for power has proved to be disastrous for Pakistan. 
“Masters of the new nation, the bureaucrats had little interest in organising 
elections, and political developments following Jinnah’s death can only be 
described as chaotic. There were no fewer than seven prime ministers in ten 
years. Liaquat Ali Khan (50 months in office) was assassinated. His 
successors, Khawaja Nazimuddin (17 months); Mohammed Ali Bogra (29 
months); Chaudry Mohammed Ali (13 months); Shaheed Suharwardy (13 
months); I.I. Chundrigarh (2 months); and Feroze Khan Noon (11 months), all 
became victims of palace intrigues. Throughout the 1950s, two classic 
bureaucrats, Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza, brazenly abused their 
powers as head of state to make or break governments. In April 1953, 
Ghulam Mohammed set an unfortunate precedent when, citing the 
government’s failure to resolve ‘the difficulties facing the country’, he 
dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin and installed Bogra in his place. When 
Bogra responded by trying to limit the governor general’s power, Ghulam 
Mohammed dismissed him too. And so it went on.”(Jones, 2000). 
 
Politics in Pakistan is characterised by two central features: chronic instability 
and repeated military interventions. These are linked by a structural tension 
between the elected and non-elected arms of the state. Since Independence 
in 1947, there have been several cycles of civilian rule, growing political and 
economic instability, followed by military intervention. Military rule has 
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invariably been accompanied by measures (in the form of constitutional 
amendments and special ordinances) that concentrate power in the 
executive at the expense of the legislature, and devolve power from 
provincial to local governments. This reflects a deliberate strategy of 
weakening legislative government at the federal and provincial levels while 
seeking to build up some degree of popular legitimacy in local councils. 
Civilian regimes have generally reversed measures designed to strengthen 
the discretionary powers of the President and reduce the powers of the 
elected Prime Minister (Cheema and Mohmand, 2003). 
 
Repeated cycles of military and civilian rule have not significantly changed 
the underlying constitutional fabric of the country since the introduction of the 
1973 Constitution under the Zulfiqar Ali  Bhutto. There remains a significant 
measure of agreement across the political divide that three essential features 
of this Constitution remain immutable: the Islamic character of the state, 
federalism, and parliamentary democracy. Successive military and civilian 
regimes have promulgated constitutional amendments and special 
ordinances, but without challenging these basic features. Even under military 
regimes, the institution of parliament has been left intact, even if substantially 
weakened, perhaps as a means of legitimising military rule, but also in 
recognition of the constitutional legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty 
(Gazdar and Sayeed, 2003). 
 
Pakistan’s political history could be easily and logically divided into seven 
distinct periods from 1947-1958, 1958-1971, 1971-1977, 1977-1988, 1988-
1999, 1999-2007, 2008-2013 and lastly 2013 onwards. The figure on the next 
page illustrates diagrammatically the time line of different political eras. 
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Figure 2: Brief timeline of Pakistan’s regime change 
Source: Bhave and Kingston, 2010. 
 
 2.3.1 First Period (1947-1958): The Flat Fifties 
The first period, covering the initial eleven years from 1947-58 was a period 
of formation in Pakistan. The British controlled provinces of Punjab and 
Bengal were divided into two parts. East Punjab and West Bengal formed 
part of what is now India. West Punjab and East Bengal, along with three 
other provinces formed Pakistan. The physical separation between eastern 
and western Pakistan, with Indian Territory in between, put Pakistan at a 
serious advantage from its inception (Sayeed, 1968; Siring, 1997; Mahmood, 
2000; Yusuf, 1999 in Hussain, 2009). 
 
The untimely death of Quaid-e-Azam, M.A. Jinnah, in September 1948 was a 
great loss to Pakistan, which was still in a phase of state-building. The 
biggest landmark during this period was the adoption of the first constitution 
in 1956. This period ended in a prolonged crisis and the first military coup, in 
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the autumn of 1958 (Vyacheslav, 2013). Scholar Keith Collard termed this a 
‘governor-general’s coup” (Callard, 1968 in Hussain, 2009). 
 
Some authors have called this period as ‘Flat Fifties’. The political 
atmosphere was vitiated and political instability was acute. The challenges of 
setting up the organs of a new state were huge. The influx of millions of 
refugees from India was very demanding. As a result economic management 
took a back seat in the formative phase of Pakistan’s life (Haqqani, 2006). 
 
2.3.2 Second period (1958-1971): The Golden Sixties 
Ayub Khan, the first military dictator of Pakistan, assumed complete control 
of the state in October 1958. The initial four years of his rule deserve special 
attention. The ruling circles consisting of military and civil bureaucracy saved 
the state and initiated institutional reforms in social and administrative fields 
(Vyacheslav, 2013). This period has been termed as the golden period of 
Pakistan’s economic history (Gather 1994; Rizvi, 2000; Shaft, 1997; Becher, 
1972 in Hussain, 2009). With the help of Harvard advisors, Khan 
implemented the Planning Commission on economic Management and 
Reforms with impressive results (Burke, 1984 Papain, 1967; Falcon, 1971in 
Hussain, 2009). Governance improved with a major expansion in the 
governments’ capacity for policy analysis, design and implementation, as well 
as the far-reaching process of institution building. 
 
By 1969, Pakistan’s exports were higher than the exports of Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia combined (World Bank, 2002). According to one 
view, had the economic policies and programs of the Ayub’s regime 
continued over the next two decades, Pakistan would have emerged as 
another miracle economy. One of the analysts accused Ayub’s regime of 
reducing the east to an internal colony which led to the separation of East 
Pakistan in 1971 (Vyacheslav, 2013). This is described in detail below. 
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Any authoritarian regime, which is devoid of legitimate political power uses 
the instruments of state power to win or maintain coalitions, builds up new 
alliances or take coercive measures. Ayub’s attempt to win legitimacy caused 
his regime a loss of popularity and credibility. The disaffection of the military 
regime was exploited by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League 
party (Hussain, 2009). The arrest and trial of Mujib under the Agarwal 
conspiracy case turned him into a popular leader in East Pakistan. His six-
point agenda of autonomy became the manifesto of the Awaji league, which 
swept the 1970 elections in East Pakistan with a resounding majority 
(Vyacheslav, 2013). The re-imposition of martial law and transfer of power to 
the Army chief, Yahiya Khan, exposed the fragility of the democratic system. 
 
Yahiya Khan’s reluctance to transfer  power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
elected majority leader, reinforced Bengali suspicion and mistrust towards 
the Pakistan Army and West Pakistan. These events led to a civil war, which 
was backed by India and ended with the emergence of the independent state 
of Bangladesh (Hussain, 2009). 
 
2.3.3 Third period (1971-1977): The Socialist Seventies 
This period consisted of the direct military rule by General Mohammad 
Yahiya Khan and the follow up civil regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It saw the 
dismemberment of the country and the creation of Pakistan in its present day 
territorial shape. This period has been labelled as ‘Socialist seventies’ by 
some analysts (Haqqani, 2006). The third constitution adopted in 1973 during 
Bhutto’s regime, proved to be the most durable and effective, in spite of the 
long periods of its suspension and amendments. It changed the model of 
government from a parliamentarian to a presidential one. 
 
 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took advantage of the resentment against Ayub’s 
economic policies and promised to restore the principles of equity and justice 
to the forefront of Pakistan’s development strategy under the slogan of 
Islamic socialism (Shaikh, 2000). Critics of Bhutto’s policies argue that his 
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populist policies of nationalizing industries, banks, insurance companies, 
educational organizations, derailed Pakistan’s journey towards modernization 
and  economic development. This setback hit Pakistan so badly that the East 
Asian countries that were lagging behind Pakistan overtook it in growth and 
economic indicators. At the same time, income inequalities rose compared to 
the previous period. Historians are of the view that the lesson learned from 
this period was that good populist politics are bad for the economy (Hussain, 
2009). 
 
Bhutto’s short era came to an abrupt end after the military coup d'état on July 
5th 1977. It was led by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, who remained 
eleven years in power. 
 
2.3.4 Fourth period (1977-1988): The Revivalist Eighties 
General Zia-up-Haq, a right wing military leader overthrew the Bhutto 
government in a military coup in July 1977 and halted the socialist 
experience. Political party activity was banned and political participation was 
limited to the local level only (Malik, 2001 in Vyacheslav, 2013). Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto was first arrested and then hanged on 4 April, 1979, as the new 
military regime in Pakistan turned into the longest in the country’s history. Zia 
used religion to provide legitimacy to his takeover. The nexus between the 
military regime and Jamaal-I- Islamic engulfed the Islamic militant groups that 
participated in the Afghan war against the Soviets. 
 
Large amounts of military and economic assistance flowed from the United 
States into Pakistan. Zia benefited from participating in the campaign to 
overthrow the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan had to pay a 
heavy cost in the longer term. The spread of Kalashnikovs and drug culture, 
ethnic and sectarian violence, the smuggling of goods and the emergence of 
Jihadist parties can all be traced back to this period (Aric, 1995; Burke and 
Baxter, 1991; Waseem, 2002 in Hussain, 2009). 
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2.3.5 Fifth period (1988-1999): The Muddling Nineties 
Nine different governments (four interim-appointed, four elected and one 
following the military coup of October 1999) ruled Pakistan in this period 
(Baxter, 2004 in Hussain 2009) The fifth period of exactly eleven years began 
after the death in a plane crash of General Zia-ul- Haq in 1988. This period is 
noticeable for the quick changes in civil governments and caretaker cabinets. 
The law and order situation worsened during this period and the tussle 
between different elite groups intensified (Ziring, 2004).  
 
Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto was the youngest premier in Pakistan’s 
history and the Muslim world’s first woman to become the prime minister. 
She was sworn into power in December 1988, but it lasted for only eighteen 
months. In November1990, Mian Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan 
Muslim League, became the head of the government. However, his 
government was dismissed in 1992 and once again, Benazir came to power. 
But new elections were announced in February 1997 and Main Nawaz Sharif 
gained power once again. 
 
An attempt by Nawaz Sharif to free himself from the army’s control provoked 
the onset of another period of military rule. But before this occurred, Pakistan 
had become an open nuclear power in 1998, and suffered a setback in a 
mini-war against India in Kashmir. The Kargill conflict can be regarded as the 
fourth Indian-Pakistani war. The scope, duration and intensity of its 
operations were smaller than those of the previous confrontations. The G-8 
club of high income countries appealed to both India and Pakistan for an 
immediate end to hostilities (Ganguly, 2001).  
 
The Kargill war had a great influence on the political situation in both 
countries. The failed Kargill operation demoralized the army and the society. 
The high-ranking army officers were displeased with the civil prime minister 
for not notifying the military and losing ground under pressure from the 
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United States. The military coup of October 1999 led by General Musharraf 
drew a line under the eleven year period of attempts to establish a 
democratic system in Pakistan. 
 
The army in Pakistan, as a rule, has always come to power during a period of 
sharp decline in economic conditions and political instability. This time, the 
main reason for the military coup d’etat was the confrontation between the 
civil and the military leadership and personal rivalry between Nawaz Sharif 
and Pervez Musharraf (Ganguly, 2001). 
 
 2.3.6 Sixth period (1999-2007) The Reforming Hundreds 
Martial law under Musharraf was not imposed, instead a state of emergency 
was declared. Civilian government officials carried on doing all current work, 
but they executed it under the guidance and observation of military officers of 
the same rank (Khan, 2004). The reaction in the world to Musharraf coming 
to power was critical. International public opinion in general regarded General 
Pervez Musharraf as a ‘power usurper’ and for some time he was persona 
non grata in many capitals. Pakistan’s membership in the British 
Commonwealth was suspended and sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 
connection with its nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 were made more rigid 
(Vyacheslav, 2013). 
 
A new political party came into being during this time, the Pakistan Muslim 
League (PML-Q) taking Quaid’s (meaning leader) initial Q. It was a pro-
Musharraf party and consisted of some dissident members of the PPP and 
the PML-N, mostly of the latter. In the recent elections of 2013, they returned 
to their original parties. The results of the October 2002 parliamentary 
elections demonstrated several important trends. After the defeat in the 1997 
elections, the PPP restored its position of a broad based party with a 
nationwide influence. It was placed second to the PML-Q. For the first time in 
the history of the polls in Pakistan, the leading pro-Islamic parties united in an 
electoral alliance called the Mujtahid Mallis Amal (MMA). The elections 
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showed considerable influence of the pro-Islamic parties in the country. In the 
National assembly the MMA in the 2002-2007 time, occupied the third 
position, having slightly fallen behind its rivals-the PML-Q and the PPP. 
General Musharraf was sworn in as the President in November 2002 
(Vyacheslav, 2013). 
 
During this period, terrorism and extremism were the main threats to 
Pakistan’s security. In the previous years, incidents of violence were limited 
to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. By 2007 they had spread throughout the country. In 
towns and cities, including Islamabad, there were shots and explosions, 
clashes broke out and the police/military forces and suicide bombings 
became widespread. President Musharraf announced emergency in the 
country in November 2007 which was opposed by all political parties. The 
imposition of emergency rule was regarded as a second coup d'état 
Musharraf’s stay in power was concluded and he had to resign from his top 
military post. In the elections held on February 18 2008, the pro-Musharraf 
party, the PML-Q, suffered a setback, losing not only to the PPP but, most 
significantly to the PML-N as well.  Musharraf was seen in the West as a 
modern Muslim ruler who was determined to contain Jihadism and 
fundamentalist religious seminaries, and was steadfast in fighting Al-Qaeda 
(Malik, 2008). 
 
2.3.7 Seventh period (2008-2013) The Rampant Corruption 
In the general elections held on February 18 2008, the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP) emerged as the largest political party in the National assembly, 
riding a wave of sympathy due to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 
December 27, 2007. After more than eight years under General Musharraf, 
the country moved from ‘dictatorship’ towards a fully elected democracy’ 
(Nelson, 2009)  
 
The PPP won the February 2008 elections and came to power. For the first 
time a democratic government completed its five years but this period was 
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fraught with mismanagement, corruption, energy crisis and negligence on 
issues of national importance. But on the other hand, the 1973 Constitution 
was restored to its original form. Under the 18th Constitutional amendment 
the government has given much demanded provincial autonomy to the 
provinces. Some welfare programmes like Benazir Income Support were 
introduced for the welfare of the poor. Critics say that as per the statistics of 
the World Bank and IMF the poverty has increased in the country (Saeed, 
2013). 
 
The elections for the next government were announced to be held on May 
11, 2013.Though the article 38 of the constitution (1973) clearly commits the 
provision of health care to the population the first formal health policy was 
announced in 1990. Before that it was a part of the national five-year plans.  
The historic May 11 polls were held to elect the 272 seat National Assembly, 
the lower house of parliament, and four provincial legislatures. Nawaz 
Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) won a clear majority at the 
national level and captured two-thirds of the seats in the country’s most 
populous province and political power base, Punjab (Gul, 2013). PML-N has 
always been in favour of holding talks with the Pakistani Taliban to bring an 
end to the problem of militancy in the country that has killed thousands of 
people. Some are hopeful his policies may bring peace, but others are 
worried about a possible rise in Islamic radicalism (Gul, 2013).  
 
A senior Pakistani analyst, such as the former chairman of the Senate, 
Waseem Sajed was of the view that in addition to dealing with a serious 
financial crunch, a deepening energy crisis will be a major worry for the new 
government (Gul, 2013). From 2013 till now nothing substantial has been 
done in education or health sectors. The present government is interested in 
political visible projects like motorways, metro and orange trains. Corruption 
is also on the rise. Political priorities are no different from the previous 
governments. 
 
21 
 
The people of Pakistan are still waiting for genuine democracy. The founding 
fathers of the new South Asian states adopted a narrow definition of 
democracy, choosing to govern in the name of the people without involving 
them in the process of governance. That undermined the rulers’ capacity to 
meet the challenges of diversity, except to some extent in the case of India, 
though there too without empowering the masses. There, the dominant elite 
that had led the fight for independence remained united and thus saved the 
democratic structure from collapsing. Elsewhere, the comparable elites split 
and the states chose to rely on extra-democratic underpinnings, such as 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and, later on, Bangladesh (Rehman, 2007). 
 
The so-called democratic rulers themselves are not willing to share power. 
Their parties are based on dictatorial models. Parties are loosely structured 
fiefdoms of political heritage either inherited or usurped through opportunity 
and patronage of the military during intermissions of dictatorships. There are 
two major shortcomings in political parties. First, there are little or no grass 
root structures with genuine participation of the people. Whatever structure, 
there exists by the mark of top-level discretion and preferential appointments. 
The monarchical character of parties depends on personality cults. Change 
of party leadership through grass root, party elections is a rarity. Party heads 
do not encourage independent thinking and ideological debate within the 
party. The most progressive and liberal on the face value, PPP [Pakistan 
People’s Party] has opted for a lifetime president in Benazir. Nawaz remains 
the PML (N) head in absentia. Second, there is no room for democratic 
choices within the parties. Intra-party elections for selecting party officials and 
nominees for elections are not conventional; Byzantine intrigues and string 
pulling is (Mustafa, 1999). 
 
The case of Pakistan clearly uncovers the story of an elite state that is 
clutched in the hands of the military establishment, colonial legacy in shape 
of bureaucracy, politicians motivated by self-interests, capitalistic minded 
industrialist, middlemen or the power brokers and rural feudal. This class is 
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also joined by the foreign trained policy makers, development experts, 
knowledge elites and sect oriented religious authorities. The manipulation of 
religious preaching, top-down tunnel vision on development interventions, 
highly politicization of development initiatives, vested interest groups, local 
power holders and brokers (Cohen, 2005). 
2.4 The State of Health in Pakistan: An Overview  
 While there has been an improvement in the education sector, health 
remains the last on the priority list. With the eighth highest new born death 
rate in the world , one in every ten children born in Pakistan during 2001–07 
died before reaching the age of five years. Women have a 1 in 80 chance of 
dying of maternal health causes during their reproductive life (World Bank, 
2010). Pakistan thus faces a daunting challenge in improving health 
outcomes for children and adults alike. Some of the health developments in 
different eras of the country’s history are mentioned in a tabulated form on 
the next page: 
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Table 1: Political and health developments 
 
 Political developments Health developments  
1947  The federation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
was established as a result of the partition of the 
Indian subcontinent, which also marked the end of 
the colonial rule. Massive bloodshed, millions of 
refugees, a fragile economy, and border disputes 
with India characterised its beginnings 
Adoption of the recommendation of the Bore Committee 
report. Constitutionally, health was a provincial issue 
1950s Rapidly changing fragile governments and the first 
military coup in 1958 
WHO-led initiation of BCG vaccination, malaria 
eradication, and control of sexually transmitted infectious 
diseases 
1960s Pakistan, under the control of a military dictatorship, 
ranked as the second fastest growing economy after 
the USA. Massive assistance received under military 
pacts with the west to contain communism. First war 
with India 
WHO-led initiation of control of tuberculosis and leprosy, 
and eradication of smallpox 
1970s Pakistan turns socialist under a democratic 
government. Economic indicators stall. Partition of 
the eastern part of the country leads to the 
establishment of Bangladesh 
WHO-led initiation of control of malaria and diarrhoeal 
diseases and Expanded Programme on Immunization. 
Lady Health Visitor Programme launched 
1980s Country still under a military dictatorship. During the 
Cold War, Pakistan received massive support as an 
ally in the Afghan jihad, which resulted in the creation 
of the .Taliban 
WHO-led initiation of eradication of rheumatic fever and 
guinea worm, and the initiation of the AIDS programmes. 
Investments in 8000 first-level care facilities in accordance 
with Alma Ata commitments. Donor-led family health 
project launched 
1990s Rapidly changing democratic governments with 
many systemic constraints. Economic sanctions after 
declaration of nuclear capability. Economic 
performance was poor and entry into International 
Monetary Fund Programme. Some important 
economic reforms to open up the market 
National Health Policy 1997. Devolution of health under 
the District Health Government Initiative, which was later 
abandoned. Initiation of social action programmes (World 
Bank led); eradication of poliomyelitis (WHO led), and 
launch of the Lady Health Worker Programme. Support for 
vertical disease prevention and control programmes 
(federally led) by international partnerships (Roll Back 
Malaria, Stop TB, GAVI Alliance, Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) 
2000-06 Military dictatorship becomes a strong ally of the 
west in the war against terror. Change in foreign 
policy in Afghanistan creates internal security 
threats. Robust but unsustainable economic growth. 
Devolution of authority to a local government system, 
which is later undone by the next government 
National Heath Policy 2001. Federally led programmes for 
hepatitis, blindness, safe water, and maternal and child 
health. Provincial investments in health increased but 
health could not be fully devolved to districts. Contracting 
out of first-level care facilities to a parastatal 
nongovernmental organisation through a federal directive. 
Other directly managed reforms initiated in competition 
with the contracting-out model 
2007 
onwards 
Democratic regime. Support of the west because of 
Pakistan’s role in fighting the war in Afghanistan. 
Economic decline, worsening debt, and an energy 
crisis. In an International Monetary Fund Programme. 
The 18th Constitutional Amendment and new 
formula for federal fiscalism accord greater provincial 
autonomy. Governance performance is poor. The 
country has an active judiciary and media 
Ministry of Health abolished under the 18th Constitutional 
Amendment. No federal structure for health with resulting 
fragmentation. Drug Regulatory Authority created. 
National Health Policy 2010 modelled on the Gateway 
Health Policy scaffold, but the rationale for federal policy is 
contested. Huge progress in reforming the health sector is 
not evident. As a result of an active media, attention to 
malpractices in health is increased 
Source: Nishtar et al. 2013  
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The author has just mentioned the health initiatives, which were donor led. 
Various health policy  initiatives, which were introduced earlier in the 
country’s history like Peoples Health Scheme and Pakistan Medical 
Association, have not been stated. Health policies have been formulated in 
some of the political eras without any substantive gains. Political changes 
were not at pace with the development in the health sector which seems to 
be in stasis even with the change in the political regimes. After 2013, the 
health ministry came at the centre with a different name of Ministry of Health 
Services Co-ordination and Regulation.  
 
Given the current level of government expenditure on health, an 
improvement in this sector seems unlikely. The quality of public health 
services saw a downturn over the last few decades, and the rising population 
is increasing pressure on state institutions. This has allowed the private 
sector to bridge the gap between rising demand and public provision of 
health care. The private sector’s role in the provision of service delivery has 
increased enormously. The poor state of public facility's overall has 
contributed to the diminished role of public health facilities. Out-of-pocket 
expenditure as a percentage of private expenditure on health is about 98 
percent, positioning Pakistan among those countries with the highest share 
of out-of-pocket payments (World Health Organization, 2009). 
 
The landscape of public health service delivery presents an uneven 
distribution of resources between rural and urban areas. The rural poor are at 
a clear disadvantage in terms of primary and tertiary health services. They 
also fail to benefit fully from public programs such as the immunization of 
children. Following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the health sector 
has been devolved to the provinces, but the distribution of responsibilities 
and sources of revenue generation between the tiers remains unclear (Afzal 
and Yusuf, 2013).  
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Estimates indicate that about 38 percent of under-five children are 
underweight while 12 percent are severely underweight (Khan, 2013). 
Children represent the most vulnerable group of society, and have not 
benefited much from previous growth episodes and social development. 
Countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh have achieved greater progress in 
their child mortality rates despite similar or worse economic performance 
(See table below). 
 
 
Table: 2 Health indicators South Asia  
Health Indicators Pakistan 
 2010  
Banglades
h 
 2010 
India 
2010 
Sri 
Lanka 
2010   
Nepal  
2010  
Infant mortality rate (per,1000 
live births) 
60 39 49 11 41 
Maternal mortality rate (Per 
100,000 live births) 
260 240 200 35 170 
Under-five mortality rate (Per 
1000 live births) 
74 49 63 13 50 
Immunization (DPT) 
(Among 1 year olds %) 
86 95 74 99 86 
Immunization (Measles) (among 
1 year olds %) 
82 94 72 99 82 
Total fertility rate (births per 
woman) 
3.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.7 
 
Source: World Health Organization,2013 
2.5 Actors in health 
In the context of this study, it is important to mention the actors in the health 
sector. Pakistan’s mixed health system has a strong post -colonial imprint 
with a national health services model operating but with several gaps. This 
health system principally involves three sets of actors-state actors, health 
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providers and beneficiaries (Siddiqui et al. 2009). State actors include 
stakeholders in the public sector within and outside the health system.  
 
In Pakistan’s context, the former category includes the ministers and 
secretaries of health, the civil and technical bureaucracy, other staff at the 
federal, provincial and district levels, and human resource in administrative 
roles in health and related facilities. Then there is the Ministry of Health, the 
provincial departments of health, Executive District Officers (EDOs), 
regulatory bodies and other autonomous agencies. At the political level, state 
actors include committees of parliamentary oversight. Public actors beyond 
the health sector, which have a role in shaping the sector, include the 
Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission, Public Employee Unions, 
Public Procurement and Distribution Agencies and Insurance Companies 
(Nishtar, 2010). 
 
The second set of actors includes health service providers in the state and 
non-state actors. The third set of actors includes beneficiaries; these can be 
classified on the basis of income, location or by the category of services 
needed. Many factors other than conventional actors also influence health 
decision making. The role of media, political parties, advocacy and human 
rights organizations, civil society watchdogs, think tanks, and businesses in 
influencing decision making are well recognized. In Pakistan’s situation, 
particularly in the local government realm, landlords, land mafias exerting a 
hidden sinister influence, religious groups and other factions also shape the 
societal, political culture and hence influence health decisions (Siddiqui et al. 
2009). 
 
All these actors interact in a highly complex manner within various streams of 
health systems. It is important to analyse some health care programs in 
Pakistan to underline specific gaps in public health services and which 
reflects on the health systems in Pakistan. Even though there has been a 
noteworthy increase in national health programs in the last two decades, 
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which has had a positive impact on the healthcare system, their contribution 
could be strengthened. Since its initiation in 1978, Pakistan’s Expanded 
Program on Immunization (EPI) has aimed to significantly improve child and 
maternal health through immunization against tuberculosis (TB), measles, 
tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, hepatitis B, and poliomyelitis. However, many 
targets, such as the elimination of polio and measles, have still not been met 
and WHO figures paint a dismal picture of the situation. Unfortunately, 
Pakistan is observed to have reported more cases of polio in 2011 than any 
other country in the world. Although the number of polio cases had 
decreased overall by 2011, this decrease was offset by the hundreds of 
thousands of cases of measles reported the following year (Afzal and Yusuf, 
2013). The low rate of immunization was the main cause of this epidemic, 
and points to the EPI’s limited outreach in routine immunization coverage. 
Among the crucial barriers to successful routine immunization areas are low 
demand and social resistance to vaccines by certain groups. 
 
Pakistan also has a high TB prevalence—responsible for 5.1 percent of the 
national burden of disease (World Bank, 2010). The government’s National 
Tuberculosis Control Program has initiated advocacy and social mobilization, 
and coordinated with other national health care programs such as the Lady 
Health Workers Program at the community level. This makes it easier to 
identify cases of TB. Additionally, the National Nutrition Program uses the TB 
control program to provide micronutrients to TB patients (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Under the Family Planning and Primary Health Care Program, the Lady 
Health Worker Program had recruited more than 103,000 Lady Health 
Workers (LHWs) by March 2012. Around 76 percent of the target population 
is now covered by LHWs (Khan, 2013), which has accelerated routine 
immunization for children across the country and brought about some 
improvement in antenatal care, contraceptive prevalence, and skilled birth 
attendance in the areas covered. LHWs are trained primarily at basic health 
units (BHUs), to which they also refer their clients. However, absenteeism 
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and an inadequate supply of medicines at the BHUs mean that many patients 
are still denied both preventive and curative treatments. 
2.6 Donor Assistance 
Development assistance has the potential to impact policies, structures and 
planning in Pakistan, not only by virtue of its size and the conditionality it can 
demand as a precondition for funding, but also because of limited capacity 
within the state system, which makes policies to be donor driven. A range of 
multilateral and bilateral donors, the UN system, and global health initiatives 
are currently contributing to assist with healthcare delivery in Pakistan. All 
these development agencies have projects of varying durations in different 
cycles. Resources are released at different times, disbursement and 
expenditure in government and donor systems is often incomplete and 
inaccessible and sometimes non-concordant. It has been shown that donors 
allocate 62 percent of their total allocations on budget ( Siddiqui et al. 2009). 
 
2.7 Decentralisation and Health 
With the promulgation of the 18th Constitutional Amendment and the 7th 
National Finance Commission Award, health has now become a provincial 
subject. The provinces’ newly empowered status renders huge 
responsibilities in terms of formulating policy, streamlining functions, raising 
funds, and ensuring that existing facilities run smoothly. The National Health 
Policy of 2009 is no longer relevant in light of the organizational reforms post-
2010. At present, there is no national health policy to guide the provinces. 
While they are expected to develop their own policies, they will still need 
guidance from the centre, especially the smaller provinces, and Pakistan will 
still require a coherent national agenda for health (Afzal and Yusuf, 2013). 
 
The increased provincial responsibilities require enhanced institutional and 
management capacities, which are lacking at the moment. The provinces not 
only need to formulate their own health agendas, they also require skilful 
execution of these policies and sensitive monitoring systems to gauge 
performance. While the federal government continued to run the vertical 
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programs till June 2013, they were eventually taken over by the provinces, 
and the efficacy of these programs may be threatened by this transition. The 
historic 18th Constitutional Amendment was passed by the National 
Assembly on April 8th, 2010 and by the Senate of Pakistan on April 15th, 
2010. Subsequently, the Amendment signed into law by the President of 
Pakistan on April 19th, 2010 (Bhatti, 2012). 
 
The 18th amendment was supposed to have brought about a set of 
comprehensive structural changes to guide and redefine the nature of 
governance in Pakistan. It was believed that the chronic disconnects 
between the Federation and its constituents have been bridged to a greater 
extent. In this sense of restoring balance between the Federation and 
Provinces, the 18th Amendment was supposed to emerge a landmark piece 
of legislation that could lead to a paradigm shift in Pakistan‘s mode of 
governance and constitutional architecture(Shafqat, 2011).It has been 
analysed by some experts that the general intention of the 18th amendment 
was to amend the power-retentive effects of the previous amendments and to 
diminish the feeling of distrust that the provinces had been concealing for 
each other in absence of any form of power-sharing and autonomy from the 
centre. Some analysts have termed this spirit of reconciliation as the ‘new 
wave of political consensuses’ in Pakistan (Bhatti, 2012).  
 
In the Pakistani federal scheme, the Council of Common Interests (CCI) was 
created in 1973 to harmonize federal-provincial relations and follow the spirit 
of federalism. It was a new approach after bitter experiences of One Unit 
characterized by centralized decision making and denial of provincial rights 
that resulted in East Pakistan tragedy in 1971. Even after this tragic episode, 
the Pakistani federal experience had been characterized by continued 
conflicts and crises between the federation and provinces for greater 
autonomy and control over natural resources (Bhatti, 2012). 
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The 18th Amendment has introduced two major steps: (a) expanding the 
scope of Federal Legislative List-II and (b) revitalizing the composition of the 
Council of Common Interests (CCI). In the new scenario, the Council has 
emerged as one of the most important forums in the revitalized federal 
institutional framework (Rabbani, 2012). However, after about five years of 
the introduction of the 18th Amendment, the process of transition 
management of devolution led by this Amendment is passing through 
teething problems. Provinces are faced with challenges of policy planning 
and strategizing the devolved functions and subjects.  
 
The process of transition management and implementation of the 18th 
Amendment has been affected by a combination of deficits of vision, capacity 
and strategy at the provincial level. There has been a complete disconnect 
between policy formulation and participation of citizens in the process of 
implementing the 18th Amendment. It has been noted that Provinces do not 
have a clear, strategic plan of action and are mostly engaged in bean 
counting and focused on the transfer of assets, liabilities and human 
resources as well as on operational issues relating to the devolved functions 
and subjects (Bhatti, 2012). 
 
2.8 Background to Health Policies in Pakistan  
The efforts to formulate a national health policy secured momentum during 
the 1970s. The Peoples Health Scheme announced by the government in 
1972, called for a vastly increased expenditure for health (Khattak, 1996). 
The policy emphasized on rural health facilities and preventive aspect of 
health care. As part of implementation, new hospitals and medical colleges 
were established. Pakistan Medical Association (PMA) opposed the scheme 
on the grounds that it lacked provisions regarding medical professionals. 
 
After discussions with the government, the PMA came up with an Alternative 
Peoples Health Scheme. This scheme recommended that more emphasis 
should be given to prevention; priorities should be set within the health 
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sector, for example components of primary health care, including child 
health, supply of potable water, sewerage system, etc. In October 1973, the 
Planning Commission set national guidelines, which further emphasized on 
rural health facilities. These guidelines were further influenced by a health 
planning exercise conducted by WHO in 1975 (Khattak, 1996). 
 
The decade of the seventies can be regarded as the starting phase of a 
serious debate and consideration regarding health policy formulation. 
However, not until 1988 were efforts once again made to formulate a national 
health policy. This was after a long period of Martial Law. After detailed 
deliberations, a health policy was presented in 1990 that set its objectives to 
be achieved within ten years. However, after the dissolution of the 
government in 1996, the implementation of the policy could not be 
undertaken. In 1997, the new government announced its health policy for the 
next ten years, however, after two years, the government was dissolved and 
the successive government presented its health policy in 2001, which also 
set its objectives to be achieved within the next ten years. However, poverty 
alleviation efforts of the government backed by the international community 
and critique on the policy have compelled the government to revise the 2001 
policy (Lashari, 2004). 
 
Different versions of health policy could be described in Pakistan’s context. 
The five-year plans have remained strong instruments of policy planning. 
Different reform commissions set up by the government also reinforced the 
five-year plans in decision-making (Lashari, 2004). There are only a few 
documents, which could be considered as separate health policy documents. 
These include the Peoples Health Scheme of 1972 and the National Health 
Policies of 1990, 1997, 2001 and the draft policy of 2009. Pakistan has a very 
centralized healthcare system. Even after devolution, the Provinces are 
looking towards the centre where the Ministry for National Health Services 
Co-ordination and Regulation exists. 
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Although the Federal Ministry of Health is formally responsible for all these 
tasks realizations is strongly dependent from other governmental bodies such 
as Planning and Development Division (P&D Division), the National 
Economic Council (NEC), the Executive Committee of the National Economic 
Council (ECNEC), the Economic Coordination Committee of the Cabinet 
(ECC), and Provincial Developmental Working Party (PDWP). These 
institutions are engaged not only with health affairs, but with other sectors of 
public policy as well. The P&D Division plays an important role in health 
planning in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. The NEC, being the 
supreme policymaking body, has an overall control over planning and 
approves all plans and policies in the country including health. The content of 
National Health Policy 1990, 1997 and 2001 clearly show that the main focus 
in formulating the health policies was on clinical health care (Khan, 2005) 
Such approach may hinder the understanding of more behaviour-related 
health problems and may pay less attention to other determinants of health 
and disease lying outside the biomedical model of health.  
 
At the provincial level, provincial ministries of health in collaboration with the 
PDWP are engaged in health planning. Below the provincial at district (local) 
level, no planning activity takes place. Districts are responsible only for the 
implementation of plans, policies and recommendations of the federal and 
provincial government. Health planning is hardly flexible, participative and 
Integrated with other decision-making processes in Pakistan (Bjorkman, 
1986; Green et al. 1997).  
 
Many studies have stated that health planning in Pakistan has largely 
consisted of the production of planning documents, and the preparation of 
formal documentation for short-term measures (Ali, 2000; Bjorkman, 1986; 
Green et al. 1997). Many observe that health policies and planning 
documents in Pakistan set ambitious targets in the absence of a concern 
about distributional aspects of health status, services, and providing enough 
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details about how objectives will be translated into practice or how realistic 
they are (Ali, 2000; Green et al. 1997; Siddiqi et al, 2004). 
 
It is important to know the history of the national health policies in Pakistan 
so far. Health policy completely neglected many important health issues like 
non-communicable diseases, drug addiction, provision of safe drinking water, 
and health care affordability issues of general public. Overall, the 
implementation of the policy was very limited. At present, after a decade, 
very few targets have been achieved, while some are far behind and for 
some there was no step taken at all (Tarin et al. 2009). The health policy 
trajectory of Pakistan is shown below. It can be seen that there is an 
inconsistent gap between the succeeding national health policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Health Policy journey of Pakistan since its inception 
Source: Masud, 2011 
34 
 
 
 
 
 2.9 Content of health policies 
The first National Health Policy of Pakistan (1990) confirmed high 
commitment to health by announcing an intention to increase governmental 
health expenditures from 2% to 5%. This policy aimed to provide universal 
health coverage to the people in accordance with the Health for All Concept 
(HFA), moreover special attention was given to clean water, sanitation, 
housing and family planning to prevent diseases and to improve health. The 
policy also introduced several programs like maternal and childcare, 
immunization and nutrition (Pakistan, 1990). The announcement of formal 
policy with high commitments was a positive step from the government, 
however in practice this was never realized as health expenditures did not 
increase during the following years (Ali, 2000). 
 
In 1997, the second National Health Policy was announced, due to failure of 
the previous policy to adequately address primary health care outline. This 
policy was based on the concept of health for all, with the aim of making 
health services more responsive to current health needs. A special attention 
was given to HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, (road traffic) accidents, violence 
and crime, tuberculosis and mental health. Several health programs were 
also included in policy like immunization, family planning, maternal and child 
health, reproductive health, malaria control, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and 
cancer control (Pakistan, 1997). Though, this policy was considered more 
comprehensive as compared to 1990 policy, the basic HFA principles of 
equity, participation, and collaboration were not assured (Ali, 2000, Khan, 
2006, Hameed, 2008). Policy could not work as it was overruled by a new 
health policy that was announced in 2001. 
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National Health Policy of 2001 was again claimed to be based on the Health 
For All approach (HFA). It addressed many health issues and ten key areas 
were identified as targets to work on. Though the policy was based on the 
concept of health for all, it did not address any intervention for collaboration 
of different sectors, ministries, organizations or actors to achieve the 
comprehensive goals of health for all (Khan, 2006). Moreover, scant attention 
was given to the basic principles of equity, efficiency, participation and 
collaboration (Khan, 2006). Health policy completely neglected many 
important health issues like non communicable diseases, drug addiction, 
provision of safe drinking water, and health care affordability issues of 
general public.  
 
The overall approach in the policy seems to be based on biomedical 
concepts of health with major focus on healthcare infrastructure. No attention 
has been given to environmental and lifestyle determinants of health; not 
even in the key area focusing the spread of communicable diseases. The 
priority actions of reducing prevalence of communicable diseases were 
immunization interventions and screening to treatment thus completely 
ignoring environmental and social determinants of health. This policy also 
focused on main inadequacies of the deficient state of equipment and 
medical personnel at district/tehsil level hospitals and BHU/RHC level with 
many promising focuses. The issue of absenteeism among staff was also 
highlighted in the policy. However, the inspection reports of 2009 from 
Punjab province show that still many staff members either were absent from 
duty or were coming later. While at the same time, many staff positions were 
vacant (PHSRP, 2011). 
 
One of the critical issues related with the health policy 2001 was a lack of 
synchronization with other guiding initiatives like the Mid Term Development 
Framework (2005-2010), Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers, Millennium 
Development Goals, Provincial level strategic frameworks and Medium term 
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budgetary framework processes; where some of the policy initiatives are 
ignored while new focuses introduced that were not in the policy agenda 
(Pakistan, 2009b). 
 
The zero draft of health policy 2009 also highlights that the 2001 policy was 
ineffective in terms of producing a measurable impact on intended 
beneficiaries. It was also unbalanced in terms of benefiting relatively more 
urbanites and it is gender insensitive (Pakistan, 2009b).The draft policy of 
2009 was also sometimes referred to as 2011 policy. However, it is evident 
from above policies that the implementation of policies has been a major 
problem right from the start without looking into the factors leading to the non 
-implementation of policies. It seems that all these were long documents, 
which were addressing the core health issues on just the paper. There is an 
evident disconnect between the policies since the beginning. 
 
2.10 Examples of failed policies in health sector 
The Polio Eradication Initiative was launched in Pakistan in 1994, 15 years 
after the launch of the Expanded Programme for Immunization. Since 2000, 
the Polio Eradication Initiative has been following the successful approach in 
developed countries, supplementing routine polio immunization with huge 
countrywide campaigns several times a year to deliver drops of oral polio 
vaccine to every child under the age of five years. Over the past 9 years, 88 
rounds of Supplementary Immunization Activities have been conducted with 
nationwide coverage funded by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative – a 
global partnership of the World Health Organization, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Rotary 
International and other major donors (Tarin et al. 2009). 
 
The initial success of the Polio Eradication Initiative in Pakistan was 
remarkable. The number of confirmed cases of poliomyelitis based on acute 
flaccid paralysis surveillance data, from across the country declined from 
1155 cases in 1997 to 28 in 2005 the lowest ever recorded in one year. A 
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very sensitive nationwide reporting system was built up to assure the 
detection of all remaining polio cases. The system captures all children aged 
less than 15 years with acute onset flaccid paralysis, and includes 
subsequent laboratory testing of stool specimens (AFP surveillance, 2006). 
However, since 2007, there has been a marked resurgence of polio cases, in 
2008; eight cases were reported in Punjab, the largest province in Pakistan, 
home to more than 60% of the country’s population, compared to zero cases 
reported in 2007.Failure to achieve polio eradication demonstrates the 
importance of determinants outside the health sector in influencing health 
status. The  resurgence of polio in areas far from the western border, such as 
in Punjab province, indicates that weaknesses in the delivery of services and 
broader issues of health systems’ governance are a major factor in the failure 
to achieve eradication (Mangrio et al. 2008). 
 
Bureaucratic and political hurdles seem to have widened social inequities 
particularly in EPI coverage. The problems hampering the routine 
immunization related mainly to lack of incentives and restricted mobility of 
health workers in the field. Political interference, flaws in monitoring, the 
disinterest of facility based doctors and lack of private sector involvement in 
the provision of vaccine are other major problems. National immunization 
days (NIDs) so far had a negative impact on routine immunization coverage 
(Mangrio et.al.2008). It is consistently observed that the system provides 
opportunities in many areas for institutionalized malpractice, primarily geared 
towards robbing resources from the system. Staff misconduct is often ignored 
due to collusion between staff and inspectors. As a consequence, staff 
remain absent from duty, do not run field operations and divert vaccine for 
use in private facilities. 
 
2.10.1 Maternal health policy in Pakistan 
Experience in Pakistan has shown that stakeholders such as the government 
and the donors have a lot to do with the success of a program. The 
achievements of the Lady Health Workers (LHWs) Program in the 1990s 
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were due to the firm political commitment and will of successive governments 
backed by the availability of resources. On the other hand, the Social Action 
Program continued to survive despite its less than expected performance due 
to continued donor support, as it was the principal instrument of donor 
investment in the social sectors (Siddiqui et al. 2004). 
 
Several crosscutting maternal and child health system issues have policy and 
programmatic implications, which include weak policy and planning capacity 
at the federal and provincial levels. Inadequate information system and 
limited use delay evidence based policy development. Segregation of 
reproductive health services under two ministries is responsible for 
duplication of effort, system inefficiencies and poor coordination. Provincial 
health departments have not shown themselves to be great implementers of 
programs. Many programs are implemented vertically and often do not talk to 
each other. The result is that directorates in the provinces have remained 
weak and coordination poor (Siddiqui .et al.2004).Lack of clear policy in the 
development of human resource for maternal services and poor personnel 
management practices has been a major contributor to poor performance.  In 
the absence of a clear policy and framework for the for-profit sector, 
commercial interests are taking priority over social goals.  
 
2.10.2 Pakistan’s population policy  
Some patterns were evident in Pakistan's population policy on two levels. 
First is the political context in which the policy of 'population control' has been 
rooted. This context has been influenced to varying degrees during the Ayub, 
Bhutto, and Zia periods by the role of religion in politics, the influences of 
Western donors, the effect of international development ideology, and the 
political utility of the population programme to each government. Second, 
over the last 35 years, Pakistan's population programme has been riddled 
with problems of implementation that have essentially remained unchanged. 
These include an over-centralized and bureaucratized programme which 
relies too much on the power of 'key individuals', a poor working relationship 
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between the government and non-government sectors, and a lack of 
coordination between population and health within government. These deep-
rooted structural problems within the programme cannot be resolved without 
addressing the policy context in which they have evolved (Khan, 1996). 
 
The tension and discordance between the key players in the policy sphere is 
quite evident in some of the above examples and could be attributed as 
deep-seated structural problems. This is not new in the Pakistani context and 
still goes on further complicating the already complex policy implementation.  
2.11 Causes of policy implementation failures in Pakistan 
2.11.1 Unclear or ambitious policy goals 
It has been observed that most policies and plans are inefficient in learning 
from past experiences. As a result, they often develop ambitious targets, 
which ultimately fall short of their desired outcomes (Ahsan, 2003). One of 
the main reasons for such a situation is the absence of reliable data for 
planning in Pakistan. It is often the case that even official documents carry 
discrepancies. Ahsan (2003) has shown that great variation exists among 
many official and semi-official sources, including such basic educational 
statistics as the percentage of literacy. Tsang (1988) strongly suggested that 
there is a dire need in developing countries to strengthen the informational 
base to improve policy frameworks.  Policy makers often face the challenge 
to devise clear policy goals with well-defined implementation plans and 
evaluation mechanisms, and as Wildavsky (1975) suggest a lack of reliable, 
present knowledge results in poor policy outcomes. 
 
 2.11.2 Political commitment 
The problem related to politics and politicians sits at the root of the problems 
of implementation in Pakistan. Literature on implementation highlights the 
importance of political commitment by leadership as critical to policy success 
(Sabatier and Manzamian, 1983). In the case of Pakistan, there have been 
many instances where governments have failed to provide the political 
support needed for implementing and sustaining policy initiatives. Each new 
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government has discontinued most programmes of its predecessors, soon 
after assuming power, for example, a literacy project titled Nai Roshni (new 
light) was launched in 1987 and was discontinued in 1989 with the change of 
government (Ahsan, 2003). Other programmes in health and education have 
also failed due to low political commitments both at federal and local levels 
(Akhtar, 2004). 
 
Ideally, elected representatives are expected to improve education and 
health in their constituencies by facilitating proper implementation of 
development programmes. Instead, they reward their favourites by posting 
them to their desired locations, and allocating lucrative contracts to them. 
These predominantly feudal tendencies among the majority of elected 
representatives hinder improvement in any sector be it health, education, or 
others (Haq and Haq, 1998). Parliamentarians are also unsure of their 
tenure, due to continuous political instability; hence many are mainly 
preoccupied with strengthening their chances of getting re-elected.  
 
For these reasons, parliamentarians use their political patronage 
ineffectively, which causes serious harm to the goals of development projects 
such as the Social Action Programme (SPDC, 1997). This lack of political will 
and sustained lack of interest amongst the political leadership largely leaves 
the task of mass literacy to the civil services which also has been unable to 
improve the situation so far (Ahsan, 2003). 
 
2.11.3 Governance structure 
The issues of ineffective governance and corruption, particularly among 
politicians and civil servants, have also been described as a major obstacle 
to proper policy implementation in Pakistan (World Bank, 1997). One of the 
major reasons for the ineffectiveness of governance is lack of coordination 
and trust among political representatives and government officials, and also 
the lack of cooperation among different government departments (Aga Khan 
University Institute for Educational Development & Department for 
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International Development, 2003). In the case of the social action program, 
the lack of trust among finance and education departments has caused a 
shortage of finances for the project, which has seriously affected the 
envisaged outcomes (World Bank Human Development Sector Unit,  2003).  
 
The lack of cooperation among different organs of government and their 
mutual disrespect create several ‘clearance points’ that hamper the overall 
organisation and implementation of policy. Eventually due to distrust among 
different agencies and due to the tendency of civil services to resist change, 
the policies are implemented only symbolically (Sabatier and Manzamian, 
1983). 
 
Currently, under the devolved district system, the tension between provincial 
and district governments due to lack of role clarity has caused serious 
difficulty for authorities under the new political system. Lack of proper 
accountability mechanisms, excessive transfers and corruption are also 
mentioned as serious governance issues, which affect the proper 
implementation of development programmes (World Bank, 1997). Developing 
countries in general are criticised for their high level of corruption in the 
machinery of government, and Pakistan is no exception. According to World 
Bank research, Pakistan falls well below average on key governance 
indicators, including corruption (Stern, 2001). Frequent transfers of officials 
among bureaucracies further aggravate the Issue. Stern (2001) is of the view  
that ‘as soon as a reform program begins to take shape, which almost 
inevitably threatens the interests of some deep-rooted and powerful group– 
the top bureaucrat  is dismissed and the reform once again loses 
momentum’. 
    
2.11.4 Centralisation 
One of the recurring criticisms of health and educational planning in Pakistan 
is its orientation towards centralisation. Usually the policies and plans are 
developed in the capital with little or controlled consultation with concerned 
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stakeholders. Due to this centralisation, policies often fail to capture the 
subtleties of initiatives at grassroots level, and therefore appears alien to the 
managers who have to implement the policy (Memon and Wheeler, 2000). 
The distance of policy makers from practice not only causes problems for 
managers, but also creates a lack of harmony among different elements of 
the same policy, and among the different units.  Thailand’s experience of 
health and education improvement suggests that involving those who are 
most affected by policy during the planning phase is strongly related to 
successful implementation (Wheeler et al. 1989). 
2.11.5 Resources 
Both financial and technical resources along with quality human resources 
are key factors that contribute to the proper implementation of any policy, 
particularly if a policy requires the creation of new structures and the hiring of 
new personnel (Sabatier and Manzamian, 1983). A unique problem of policy 
in developing countries like Pakistan is their dependence on foreign aid and 
loans to bridge the budget deficit and finance their development plans.  
Financial dependence increases the political pressures (Haque, 2004).  
 
The above discussion clearly shows that many of the Low and middle income 
countries (LMICs) generally and Pakistan, particularly have been facing 
implementation problems for most of their policy history. Time and again, the 
failure of policy implementation has been attributed to some or all of the 
earlier mentioned conventional factors. It is surprising to note that even after 
recognising these factors and their integration into subsequent policies, there 
has not been any significant improvement in policy outcomes. This situation 
invites us to revisit the factors that affect policy implementation and which 
have been overlooked by the mainstream policy literature.   
2.12 Conclusion 
Pakistan has seen twenty-four governments in the past sixty-five years, 
including fifteen elected or appointed prime ministers, five interim 
governments and thirty-three years of military rule under four different 
leaders. Pakistan history is filled with governance failures. Narrowly based 
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elite and personality and family-owned political parties advanced their 
parochial interests in Pakistan. Parliamentarians in general aimed to multiply 
their wealth under state patronage. There is no culture of elections within the 
political parties. 
 
There is a long history of national health policies being launched without ever 
achieving the required targets. Patronage culture is so common in the health 
sector with the favourites being appointed in all the departments, even if they 
are not the right person for the right job. Pakistan’s future is still under the 
shadow of corruption, bad governance and misdirected foreign, health and 
economic policies. Political instability and bad management of the national 
policies be it in health, finance, education or others reflect a high degree of 
incompetence and inefficiency of the political leadership in the country. 
Power relations dominate every sector in Pakistan. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with the study design of the research, the rationale, 
overall approach, the conceptual framework, methods, sampling procedure,  
collection and in detail the process of analysing the data. The researcher also 
reflects on her positioning as an insider/outsider and her learning process, 
which evolved during the course of this study. It is concluded with the ethical 
implications and the limitations of the study. 
 
3.2 Study design and rationale 
At the outset of the study, a range of research methods was reviewed and 
assessed and an initial, provisional view was formed that qualitative 
methodology would be the best suitable for this study. As the study was 
primarily exploratory in nature, the study design had to be sufficiently flexible. 
A qualitative inquiry was chosen to meet the research objectives, given its 
appropriateness in explaining a complex process or phenomenon from a 
more personal and subjective perspective (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) define qualitative research in the following 
manner: 
“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense 
of or interpret phenomenon in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them”(p.2). 
Alternatively, Creswell (1998) defines qualitative research as: 
“An inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological 
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher 
builds a complex, holistic picture analyses words, reports detailed views of 
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting”(p.15). 
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This study used the qualitative approach with semi-structured interviews to 
explain the views of policy makers and implementers. Since little research 
has previously been undertaken on policy implementation process in 
Pakistan, especially in health, this design helped the researcher to gain an 
understanding of issues in this area. 
 
Crotty (2010) acknowledged that when embarking on a research study, the 
researcher starts with a real life issue requiring investigation. This in turn 
leads the researcher to appraise different methodologies and assess their 
applicability to the research questions proposed. Creswell, Plano Clark and 
Garrett stressed that ‘researchers must display ingenuity in building 
customised solutions to their methodological dilemmas using their research 
experiences’ (2008, p. 81). This may result in the need to develop a blended 
approach if there is no single methodology that meets the needs of the 
researcher. 
 
Crotty (2010) identified four key elements of the research process, each of 
which requires careful consideration and alignment in the research study. 
The four elements were: 
 
1. Epistemology – the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective and thereby in the methodology  
2. Theoretical perspective – the philosophical stance informing the 
methodology and thus providing a context for the process and 
grounding its logic and criteria  
3. Methodology – the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying 
behind the choice and uses of methods and linking the choice and use 
of methods to the desired outcomes  
4. Methods – the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse 
data related to some research question or hypothesis.  
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Building on the work of Crotty (2010), Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) 
adapted these four elements, which they described as levels, as outlined 
below: 
 Paradigm Worldview – the ‘philosophical assumptions’ encompassing 
aspects such as the epistemology and ontology. The definition of 
epistemology being ‘what is the relationship between the researcher 
and that being researched?’ whilst the definition of ontology is ‘what is 
the nature of reality?’  
 Theoretical lens or foundations – this provides the ‘stance’ or direction 
for the research study 
 Methodological approach – ‘a strategy, a plan of action or a research 
design’ for example quantitative or qualitative methods  
 Methods of data collection – the tools used to gather data, for example 
questionnaires, interviews or focus groups.  
This is shown diagrammatically below as presented by Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Four levels of research study 
 
Paradigm worldview 
Methodological approach 
Data collection methods 
Theoretical Lens 
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The paradigm worldview influences how the research is undertaken, 
analysed and reported. It encompasses epistemology as ‘the relationship 
between the researcher and that being researched’ and ontology as ‘the 
nature of reality’ (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). 
 
Epistemology relates to the study of “the nature of knowledge (Schwandt, 
2001), its possibility, scope, and general basis” (Hamlyn, 1995). In other 
words, it is a way of “understanding and explaining how we know what we 
know” (Crotty, 1998) and could be embodied in several theoretical stances. 
Given the scope of the thesis that seeks to explore the complex nature of the 
relationship between diverse actors, the influence of structures and discourse 
on the environment within which they act, and the power issues embedded 
within, this study adopts the epistemology of social constructionism. 
 
According to the constructionist paradigm, truth or meaning comes into being 
through our engagements with the world we interpret, and all knowledge is 
derived from and maintained by these social interactions (Crotty, 1998). This 
research views constructionism as an overarching paradigm .The researcher 
considered a range of options for underpinning epistemology for this thesis 
before concluding that constructionism was the most appropriate. The 
rationale for this choice was that the constructionist viewpoint summarizes 
the position that ‘meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage 
with the world they are interpreting’ (Crotty, 2010). This approach takes into 
account the role that individual interviewees have in influencing or 
interpreting how effective or successful particular policy initiatives have been 
along with the role of the researcher in understanding and interpreting the 
data (Patton, 2002), both of which were of critical importance in this study.  
 
This stance enables the research design to emerge as the study progresses, 
which in the context of this particular thesis meant that the key lines of 
enquiry were influenced by constant comparative analysis and literature 
review (Clarke and Dawson, 2005). Furthermore, it supports the use of a 
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semi-structured interview schedule with the flexibility to explore new lines of 
questioning during interviews where this was felt to be relevant to the thesis. 
 
The theoretical lens has been described as being the ‘standpoint taken by 
the researcher that provides direction’ for the research study (Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2011). In literature and practice, methodology is used very 
loosely to mean anything from schools of thought to tools of data collection. 
However, in Kaplan’s (1964) terms, methodology “helps us to understand, in 
the broadest possible terms, not the products of scientific enquiries but the 
process itself”. For the purpose of this research, methodology is understood 
as the description and explanation of the study that guides and justifies the 
choice of its methods, clarifying their assumptions and outcomes, in other 
words, a “strategy for enquiry” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
 
Methodology is concerned with a set of assumptions about the nature of 
reality, the role of the researcher, concepts of action and the social actor, and 
a range of methods for dealing with the research problems (Silverman, 
2006). In order for a piece of research to achieve its aims and objectives, 
suitable tools and techniques have to be adopted. These tools may be 
qualitative or quantitative in nature or a combination of both. Qualitative 
research targets a particular area of research and explains what is happening 
in this area and why. Qualitative research does not produce generalizable 
results: the methods are exploratory and descriptive in nature and not usually 
used when theory testing is required unlike quantitative research. 
Quantitative tools are normally used to empirically prove or disprove a 
specific theory, to revise or modify it after it has been tested (Bryman, 2007). 
Emerging from postmodernist tradition, research which draws on qualitative 
enquiry believes that reality is made up of a multiplicity of voices, views, and 
meanings and that each representative is context and time dependent 
(Cheek, 1999). Consequently, it adopts an inductive approach to 
investigation and analysis as shown on the next page: 
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Figure 5:  The inductive logic of research in a qualitative study  
Source: Creswell, 2009 
 
The researcher begins by gathering detailed information from the 
participants, analyses this information and generates categories and themes. 
These themes are developed into broad patterns, theories or generalizations 
which are then compared with personal experiences or existing literature on 
the topic. 
Researcher applies generalizations and theories to past experiences and 
literature. 
Researcher looks for broad patterns, generalizations and theories from 
themes or categories 
Researcher analyses data to form themes and categories 
Researchers asks open ended questions and records field notes 
Researcher gathers information ( interviews) 
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3.3 Development of the Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
Figure 6: Second version of the conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework illustrated above is the second version of the 
original framework. This was developed during the initial stages of data 
analysis. It shows the policy process, context, content and actors to affect 
implementation. The implementation at different tiers of the government is 
influenced by the strategies adopted by key policy actors. These actors 
happen to be politicians, bureaucrats and other health officials who can play 
their role by adopting, blocking, or delaying policies. 
Policy process 
Policy  content 
Policy 
context: 
Economic, 
Political, 
Situational, 
structural 
Policy Actors 
Implementation 
 
Levels                Strategies                 Actors 
National              Following           Politicians/Bureaucrats 
Provincial          Adapting positively    Officials / Managers 
                            Adapting Negatively 
Districts            Blocking/Delaying                 Health staff 
                                                          
 
  
51 
 
 
A conceptual framework of the research is a statement that shows the key 
relationships which will be studied and how they are believed to be 
interrelated. The initial conceptual framework was developed at a very 
preliminary stage of the study before data collection (in light of the Gill and 
Walt Policy triangle) as shown as the version 1 in the appendices. Later it 
was informed by the discussion with the supervisor, her expert views and 
some preliminary emerging themes.  
 
At the outset of undertaking a research study, the researcher will have some 
ideas about the phenomenon under study, but at this stage, further thinking 
will be required to develop the research questions and formulate the 
underpinning theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In order to facilitate this 
process a conceptual framework was developed which provided a systematic 
approach. Teddlie and Tashakkori described the process of developing a 
conceptual framework as being ‘highly inductive’ (2009). In this thesis it was 
used to frame the overall research process, including formulating the 
research questions, the development of the interview and the presentation of 
findings. 
 
A conceptual framework has also been described as being a ‘model of what 
is out there that you plan to study, and of what is going on with these things 
and why a tentative theory of the phenomena that you are investigating’ 
(Maxwell, 2005). The process of developing the conceptual framework for the 
study provided the researcher with the opportunity to plot out the key themes 
visually and to explore the potential linkages between the themes in a more 
meaningful way than could have been achieved through the use of narrative 
alone. The development of the conceptual framework for this study was an 
iterative process, which evolved as the researcher tested out different ways 
of ordering and presenting the findings until the final version of the framework 
was achieved. 
. 
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3.4 Developing an interview guide 
Qualitative research interviews are “attempts to understand the world from 
the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples' experiences, to 
uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Kvale, 1996). In 
qualitative research, open-ended responses to questions provide the 
researcher with quotations, which are the main source of raw data. According 
to Patton (1990), “quotations reveal the way in which [the respondents] have 
organized the world, their thoughts about what is happening, their 
experiences, and their basic perceptions… The task is to provide a 
framework within which people can respond in a way that represents 
accurately and thoroughly their point of view about the program”. 
 
The interview guide approach was adopted in this research for being the 
most widely used formats for qualitative interviewing. This approach was 
seen as enabling the interviewer to cover an outline of topics or issues, while 
allowing some freedom to vary the wording and order of the questions. 
Another benefit of using the interview guide was seen especially in cases of 
possible deviations from the main themes, if the need would arise during an 
interview to probe for more in-depth responses. It was also expected that this 
format of the interview would remain fairly conversational and informal as the 
researcher aimed to establish a good rapport with her study participants and 
gain their confidence.  
 
A possible drawback of using the interview guide approach was noted by 
Sewell (1992) who suggested that sticking to the outlined topics would 
prevent other important unanticipated topics from being raised by the 
respondent. The interview guide was believed to be flexible enough to enable 
the balance between covering the main areas and allowing to probe into the 
respondent‘s specialised or contextualised knowledge and explore new 
issues and ideas that might come up, with due discipline and time 
management exercised by the researcher during interviews.  
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In essence, semi-structured interviews with this research not only involved 
asking questions, but systematic recording and documenting of responses  
combined with probing for deeper meaning and understanding of the 
respondents’ responses.  
 
3.5 Sampling 
The research adopted a purposive sampling undertaken at national, 
provincial and district levels. The choice of this strategy was in line with the 
methodological approach of the study. Unlike methodologies framed under 
the positivist paradigm, qualitative inquiry in general does not aspire for a 
representative sample arrived at statistically, but instead considers the quality 
of information supplied by a thick description of concepts under investigation.  
In this study, snowballing produced more potential interviewees than 
necessary and they were selected according to the most relevance to the 
subject matter and their availability for the interview. The intention was to 
ensure a balance between the respondents though it was not easy . 
 
Purposive sampling refers to a process by which respondents are 
intentionally selected with the purpose of generating information that is 
relevant to the outlined aims and objectives. Purposive sampling is a non-
probabilistic form of sampling. The researcher does not seek to sample 
research participants on a random basis. The goal of purposive sampling is 
to sample cases/participants in a strategic way so that those sampled are 
relevant to the research questions that are being posed. Very often, the 
researcher will want to sample in order to ensure that there is a good deal of 
variety in the resulting sample, so that the sampling members differ from 
each other in terms of key characteristics relevant to the research question. 
Because it is a non-probability sampling approach, purposive sampling does 
not allow the researcher to generalize to a population (Bryman, 2008). 
 
Snowball sampling is a sampling technique in which the researcher samples 
initially a small group of people relevant to the research questions and these 
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sampled participants propose other participants who have had the 
experience or characteristics relevant to the research. These participants will 
then suggest others and so on (Bryman and Bell, 2007). If a qualitative 
interview study is to be published, the minimum number of interviews 
required seems to be between twenty and thirty. This suggests that, although 
there is an emphasis on the importance of sampling purposively in qualitative 
research, minimum levels of acceptability operate. This study comprises of 
42 semi-structured interviews. 
 
In general, sample sizes in qualitative research should not be so small as to 
make it difficult to achieve data saturation, theoretical saturation, or 
informational redundancy. At the same time, the sample should not be so 
large that it is difficult to undertake a deeper, case-oriented analysis (Bryman, 
2008). 
 
Forty-two interviews were conducted between March and October 2014. The 
participants were mostly politicians, bureaucrats, government officials in the 
health ministry, policy advisors, heads of NGOs, provincial and district health 
officials who have been involved in the decision-making in health or other 
sectors and were selected according to the pre-decided eligibility criteria. All 
interviews were audio recorded (except two) after the written consent of the 
participants. The categories of the participants are shown on the next page: 
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Table 3: Categories of participants  
 
Levels 
Politicians  Bureaucrats Donors Health Ministry officials Advisors 
 
Federal  
9 5 1 4 2 
 
Provincial 
 
3 5 1 2 2 
District  3  5  
 
The researcher tried to get a balanced sample but still there were some gaps 
between different levels. The number of the key informants was not even due 
to unavailability, busy schedules, security reasons and lack of will to 
participate in the study. The facility level actors were not interviewed and that 
is one of the limitations of this study. Some appointments were postponed 
and  cancelled at the last moment. The researcher conducted the interviews 
herself and all were in English. Most of the interviews took place at their 
offices or residences as coffee shops or other public places were not allowed 
in the ethical approval. 
 
3.6 Field work 
The participants were contacted through email and telephones. The 
information sheet and consent form was given to all the participants before 
the interview. Some of them asked for the interview guide as well, which was 
mailed to them. However, when the actual interview took place only a few 
wanted to stick to it, but the rest did not even have a chance to look at it. A 
couple of politicians directed the mail to their personal staff and the 
researcher had to contact them for an appointment. Only few appointments 
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were on time otherwise there were cancellations, rescheduling and 
reappointments. 
 
Most of the interviews were face to face. On average an interview lasted for 
45 minutes to an hour, two interviews lasted for almost 3 hours and these 
participants were older than 60 years who were more interested in sharing 
their institutional memories. Only a couple of them were on skype sometimes 
due to personal reasons and sometimes due to security issues. Almost all of 
them willingly signed the consent forms and allowed the audio recording as 
well. Only two of the participants did not allow the recording. May be they did 
not have enough trust in the researcher. 
 
3.7 Transcription 
Transcription refers to the process of reproducing spoken words, such as 
those from an audiotape interview, in written text. In addition to spoken 
words, various authors have debated on the extent to which nonverbal cues 
(e.g., silences and body language) and emotional aspects (e.g., crying, 
coughs, and sighs) should be incorporated into transcribed text (Verbatim 
transcription refers to the word-for-word reproduction of verbal data, where 
the written words are an exact replication of the audio recorded words The 
way in which interview content is both heard and perceived by a transcriber, 
however, plays a key role in both the form and accuracy of transcription. It is 
advised that transcription forms part of the data analysis process and should 
be clearly disclosed in the methodology of a project (Wellard and McKenna, 
2001). 
 
The audiotaped interviews were transcribed verbatim. The interviewee's 
responses written down by the researcher during the interview, and the 
researchers observations recorded during and post-interview, were used for 
coding purposes. Each interview had a short contextual report describing the 
participant, the venue, time, place and duration of the interview. All 42 
interviews were transcribed by the researcher herself. A 45 minutes or an 
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hour interview took on average 7-8 hours to transcribe and the researcher 
had to go back to the audio recording again and again. Once fully transcribed 
that particular audio recording was deleted as per ethical considerations. 
 
3.8 Data Analysis  
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data, which is one of the most 
common approaches to qualitative data analysis (Byrman, 2008). Thematic 
analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns 
(themes) within the data. It minimally organises and describes the data set in 
(rich) detail. However, it also often goes further than this, and interprets 
various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). 
 
Three rounds of coding were done. The first round produced 65-70 codes per 
interview transcript. The codes branched out like a tree. In the second round, 
all the duplications and redundant codes were discarded. It was only in the 
third round that some patterns or categories started appearing. These 
categories are normally labelled as Themes. There were 6-7 main themes 
that emerged from the data. Following steps were followed while doing the 
data analysis as suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
Themes or patterns within data can be identified in one of two primary ways 
in thematic analysis: in an inductive or bottom-up way, or in a theoretical, 
deductive or top-down way (Boyatzis, 1998). An inductive approach means 
the themes identified are strongly linked to the data themselves (Patton, 
1990) In this approach, if the data have been collected specifically for the 
research (e.g., via interview or focus group) the themes identified may bear 
little relationship to the specific question that were asked of the participants. 
They would also not be driven by the researcher’s theoretical interest in the 
area or topic. Inductive analysis is therefore a process of coding the data 
without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s 
analytic preconceptions.  
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The first phase was to familiarise oneself with the data. If one collected it 
through interactive means, one would come to the analysis with some prior 
knowledge of the data, and possibly some initial analytic interests or 
thoughts. Regardless, it was vital that the researcher immersed oneself in the 
data to the extent to get familiar with the depth and breadth of the content. 
Immersion  involved repeated reading of the data, and reading the data in an 
active way, searching for meanings, patterns and so on. It was ideal to read 
through the entire data set at least once before the researcher began coding, 
as ideas, identification of possible patterns were shaped as one read 
through. 
 
The second phase began when the researcher had read and familiarised 
oneself with the data, and generated an initial list of ideas about what was in 
the data and what was interesting. This phase, then involved the production 
of initial codes from the data. Codes identify a feature of the data (semantic 
content or latent) that appears interesting to the analyst, and refer to “the 
most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be 
assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon”(Boyatzis, 
1998).The process of coding is part of the analysis (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  
 
The third phase began when all data had been initially coded and there was 
a long list of the different codes that have identified across the data set. This 
phase, which re-focuses the analysis at the broader level of themes, rather 
than codes, involved sorting the different codes into potential themes, and 
collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. At 
this point, the researcher started to have a sense of the significance of 
individual themes. 
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The fourth phase began when the researcher had devised a set of candidate 
themes, and it involved the refinement of those themes. During this phase, it 
was evident that some candidate themes were not really themes (e.g., if 
there was not enough data to support them, or the data was too diverse), 
while others could be collapsed into each other.  
 
Phase five began when there was a satisfactory thematic map of the data. At 
this point, it was defined and further refined. By define and refine it was 
meant to identify the essence of what each theme was about and determine 
what aspect of the data each theme captured. It was important not to try to 
get a theme to do too much or to be too diverse and complex (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). 
 
Phase six began when there was a set of fully worked-out themes, and 
involved the final analysis and write-up of the report. The task of the write-up 
of a thematic analysis is to tell the complicated story of the data in a way, 
which convinces the reader of the merit and validity of the analysis. It is 
important that the analysis provides a concise, coherent, logical, non-
repetitive, and interesting account of the story the data tells within and across 
themes.  
 
The inductive analysis of the qualitative data was used for this study following 
all the above steps. An overview of the coding process is shown in the table 
on the next page. The intended outcome of the process is to create a number 
of categories or themes depending on the topic, which in the coder’s view 
capture the key aspects of  the raw data. and which are assessed to be the 
most important themes given the research objectives Inductive coding, which 
ends up with more than about eight or nine major themes can be seen as 
incomplete but again it depends on the topic.  
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Table 4: Creation of categories  
 
 
3.9 Literature Search 
The key terms used in the literature search were: Power, policy, health policy 
or process, implementation, actors, low and middle income countries, policy 
networks, health systems and Pakistan.  
 
Key sources were: Electronic bibliographic databases which included  
primary sources like Science Direct (Date range: 1980s-present, field: Social 
Sciences), ProQuest (All dates), Scopus (All year). Social Science Citation 
Index (via Web of Science). 
 
E-journals: primary sources were Journal of Contemporary Asia, Journal of 
policy studies, Journal of health policy/ policy and development, Journal of 
health policy and planning. Secondary sources included conference papers, 
newspaper articles and policy briefs. Internet websites: tertiary sources were 
google scholar, google book and  websites: World Health Organization/ 
World Bank. 
 
Initially the whole list of journals and databases was searched but as the 
study became narrow, just the relevant journals were searched and the 
literature review updated. Some of the journals and databases were quite 
comprehensive and others were not. However, a combination of all these 
helped to have a thorough literature review. The relevant literature was 
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searched in order to shape the direction of the research conducted for the 
thesis, to identify key issues to be examined and the critical gaps in evidence 
for further exploration in this thesis 
 
3.10 Limitations 
This study was based on a sample of individuals who were interested in 
participating and agreed to speak with the researcher. Therefore, this 
snowball sample is limited by non-random selection procedures, network size 
and reliance on the subjective judgments of informants. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to gather information and consequently not all 
interviewees were asked exactly the same set of questions. This approach 
enabled the researcher to tailor the questions to the contexts of the 
interviewee’s experience. Additionally, where there was a saturation of 
information, new lines of enquiry were pursued rather than repeatedly asking 
questions which resulted in the same responses. A consequence of this was 
that it was not always possible to provide a collated response from all 42 
interviewees for each issue reported; instead, it was only feasible to provide 
an indication of the strength of a response.  
 
This was, however consistent with qualitative interviewing which is aimed at 
gaining an in-depth understanding of an issue as opposed to merely breadth 
of information (Silverman, 2000) and to gain insight into how things work in 
particular contexts. Transferability, which refers to external validity in 
qualitative research, is always an issue. Instead, qualitative researchers are 
encouraged to produce what Geertz (1973 a) calls thick description. This can 
provide other researchers a database for making judgements about the 
possible transferability to other contexts. This study can be replicated in other 
low and middle-income country settings. Internal validity could be a good 
match between researcher’s observation and the theoretical ideas they 
develop. The researcher has tried her best to maintain a consistency 
between the observations and concepts, which could overcome the limitation 
of internal validity. 
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3.11 Positioning the researcher as insider/outsider 
It is important to be explicit in terms of the researcher role in qualitative 
research as knowledge is being created by the interaction of researcher and 
informants (Kvale, 1996). Undertaking the research in a well-known field due 
to shared experiences or a sense of belonging to a certain group has been 
named as insider research. The term outsider, in comparison is defined with 
reference to the relations between researcher and the researched, where an 
outsider is a non-member of the community in question (Dahlgren and 
Winkvist, 2007). I position myself as both an insider and outsider in this 
research. Belonging to the same country and having lived there for the major 
part of my life and being well familiar with the social and cultural aspects I 
consider myself as an insider. This allowed me to enter the field with a 
certain level of ease, develop a rapport with informants and allow a free 
sharing of information. While not being a part of the policymaking or 
implementing groups I position myself as an outsider, and this helped me, 
explore things in detail and to interpret without any pre-understanding in this 
regard. 
 
3.12 Self Reflection 
The data collection was the most interesting but time-consuming period. 
There were cancellations, rescheduling and re-appointments, but overall it 
went well. All interviews were transcribed right after each individual interview 
so that all the first-hand information could be preserved without any loss. The 
transcription was done by the researcher herself in order to be as close to the 
data as possible. Audio recordings and written notes were quite helpful. 
Some of the participants who asked for the questions beforehand never read 
them, although some others came well prepared but did not allow the 
researcher to ask and kept on answering on their own. It was hard to bring 
the participants back on the track, as some of the older participants were 
keener to share their institutional memories. Another interesting observation 
was that the government offices were sometimes overcrowded although 
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interviewing at coffee shops was not allowed on the same pretext. The key 
informants’ behaviour differed according to their categories and ranks. 
Politicians were more casual and bureaucrats were quite cautious. Some of 
the junior health officials talked more frankly once the senior left for an official 
meeting or other commitment. Data analysis was the most difficult part.  
Initially, I kept on going in different directions and came up with new things 
every time I went back to the data. Only after the valuable guidance of the 
supervisors, I was able to think clearly. Multiple rounds of coding were done 
and themes started emerging and data made more sense.  
 
3.13 Ethical Considerations 
The ethical clearance was sought from the Queen Margaret University Ethics 
Committee and a written permission from the Director General of Health, 
Pakistan. The researcher did not have to go to the Research Council in 
Pakistan, as there were no clinical interventions. Interviews took place 
wherever it was convenient for the interviewee and private enough to 
preserve confidentiality. The participants were mostly the bureaucrats, 
politicians and the health ministry officials at different tiers of government so 
a written permission letter from the then DG Health was deemed essential for 
this kind of research. 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2007), certain issues need to be addressed: 
• Possible harm to participants 
• Lack of informed consent 
• Possible invasion of privacy 
• Deception 
These were covered by taking the following measures: 
An ethical form was submitted and participants were made aware of the on-
going research and their consent was obtained in order for them to express 
willingness to take part in the research. The researcher did not misuse the 
gained information or break confidentiality. Confidentiality was guaranteed, 
especially in terms of possible identification of persons, organizations and 
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places. The data was safeguarded in order to ensure confidentiality and 
identifying information, participants’ name, age, and demographic information 
were not reported on the findings. Self-identification was used to allow 
participants to categorise themselves for the study. Only general work-related 
categories were offered to differentiate between various participants, and 
with not much detail to allow identifying their positions or organisations. In 
accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998, the results from the field 
work has been processed fairly and lawfully, stored properly, taking into 
consideration the time frame and its usage. 
3.14 Conclusion 
This chapter summarised the research journey for this study starting from the 
choice of the methods, development of the conceptual framework, fieldwork, 
analysis, limitations, literature search and positioning of the researcher. The 
literature search helped the researcher to do an extensive search and write a 
detailed and comprehensive but relevant literature review chapter.  
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Chapter Four: Literature Review 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes implementation, its background and evolution, three 
generations of implementation theories and agent/structure relations in 
implementation. It also explains power, its various theories and their link with 
traditional implementation approaches, neo-patrimonialism, policy networks 
and path dependency with its various models and critique. This study draws 
on these concepts to support the main argument of the thesis as the findings 
revolve around these concepts. It also focuses on some of the empirical 
studies from low and middle-income countries on the related themes. 
4.2 Background 
Policy implementation should be understood as a process shaped by 
historical legacies, context and timing (Jonsson et al. 2014). Health policy 
analysis in Low and Middle income countries (LMICs) is attracting increasing 
attention. The bulk of research has focused on policy content, particularly 
assessing technical appropriateness. However the nature of the processes 
(how policies are made, and by whom) leading to these policies affects their 
relevance and often their implementation. Researchers have only recently 
started to explore these processes in low and middle-income countries 
(Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
 
A better understanding of these processes could help policy-makers to 
design more appropriate and effective processes and assist other policy 
actors in engaging with these processes. Interactions between policy 
processes, the nature of the policy issue, actors and evidence occur within a 
wider context, which includes the political and socioeconomic environment, 
cultural and religious determinants, gender as well as specific aspects of the 
health system. The wider environment plays an inevitable role in health policy 
processes with policy decisions influenced by both international agendas and 
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the national vision of priorities; hence this context needs to be considered 
within the development of specific policies (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
In the early 1990s, several analysts called for a new approach to health 
policy analysis in low and middle income countries (Walt 1994; Reich 1995; 
Barker, 1996). They noted that, until then, the assessment of health policy 
had focused largely on technical content and design, neglecting the actors 
and processes involved in developing and implementing policies, and taking 
little account of the contexts within which related decisions were made. They 
argued that this was short sighted because it did not explain how and why 
certain policies succeeded and others failed, nor did it assist policy makers 
and managers to make strategic decisions about future policies and their 
implementation. Ultimately, all called for new paradigms of thinking to be 
applied to health policy analysis to enable understanding of the factors 
influencing the experiences and results of policy change. In particular, these 
scholars called for the use of analytical paradigms that integrate politics, 
process and power into the study of health policies (Buse et al. 2005). 
Study of the processes through which ideas, knowledge, interests, power and 
institutions influence decision-making is primarily concerned with public 
policy and pays particular attention to how problems are defined, agendas 
are set, policy is formulated and re-formulated, implemented and evaluated 
(Parsons, 1995). It is based on the understanding that the policy is a product 
of, and constructed through political and social processes. 
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4.3 An overview of Implementation 
Policy implementation research rose to prominence in the 1970s during a 
period of growing concern about the effectiveness of public policy (O’Toole, 
2000 and Barrett, 2004). The stage was set by Pressman and Wildavsky with 
the publication of their book entitled Implementation in 1973.They 
investigated the implementation of a federal economic development program 
to increase employment among ethnic minority groups in Oakland, California. 
From the beginning, policy implementation research was predominantly a 
North American enterprise. 
Many first generation studies were explorative, primarily seeking to position 
implementation within a policy cycle divided into a series of stages such as 
agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation and 
evaluation. Implementation failure was described using a top-down approach, 
which identified factors to explain an implementation gap from the 
perspective of central government policy makers, e.g., unclear or flawed 
policy, insufficient resources, poor compliance by the implementers, 
opposition within the policy community, and unfavourable socioeconomic 
conditions (Schofield, 2001).  
The first generation of research has since been criticized for focusing too 
much on implementation failures to the extent that it earned the nickname 
‘misery research’ (Rothstein, 1998) and unfairly, for being theoretical and 
unable to produce convincing theories to help explain or predict the impact of 
policies (Paudel, 2009). Consequently, a second generation of studies 
emerged from the early 1980s with the ambition to take the next step in 
theory development by moving beyond a success or failure perspective 
towards improved analysis of variables that could explain the impact of the 
implementation process (Schofield, 2001). 
The construction of new analytical models and frameworks was accompanied 
by a debate between so-called top-down and bottom-up perspectives 
(Cairney, 2012). Bottom-up researchers critiqued the top-down perspective 
for viewing implementation as a purely administrative process and failing to 
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account for the role of the Frontline staff who put the policy into action 
(Schofield, 2001). Bottom-uppers shifted the analytical attention away from 
variables at the top or centre of the system to the contextual and field 
variables at the bottom as the policy evolved in the complex process of 
translating policy intentions into action (O’Toole, 2004). Lipsky(1980) 
analysed street-level bureaucracy, focusing on the discretionary decisions 
that Frontline staff makes when delivering policies to citizens and 
organizations. He suggested that street-level bureaucrats could reasonably 
be described as policy makers.  
Interest in policy implementation research seemed to decay in the 1990s, 
with decreased research activity and fewer publications in the main field. An 
important explanation for this decline was the changes that occurred in state-
society relations in many industrialized countries, from unilateral and 
hierarchical to more reciprocal and horizontal relations. In the 1990s, there 
was more reliance on market-based policy instruments and less 
governmental intervention (Saetren, 2005). Policy implementation research 
shifted emphasis to address the effects of institutional and inter-
organizational relationships, with governance and policy networks emerging 
as important research topics (Hill and Hupe, 2009). 
Many governments subsequently recognized the limits to top-down 
policymaking and adopted network governance approaches based on the 
need to consult and collaborate with service providers, interest groups, and 
the users of services, blurring the lines of accountability between elected 
policymakers and other influential actors. Bottom-up inspired studies 
highlighted the unintended consequences when governments did not 
recognise the limits to their ability to implement policy (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006). More recent studies reinforce this focus on the limits to top-down 
policymaking in the alleged absence of central government control of the 
policy process (Room, 2011). 
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4.4 Evolution and Critical Understanding of Policy Implementation 
Theories 
In general, implementation research is supposed to have evolved through 
three generations. The first generation of research ranged from the early 
1970s to the ’80s; the second generation from the 1980s to the 90s; and the 
third generation research from 1990 and onwards (Matland, 1995). 
 
4.4.1 First Generation Implementation 
The first generation implementation research was focused on how a single 
authoritative decision was carried out, either at a single location or at multiple 
sites (Goggin et al. 1990). Pressman and Wildavsy’s work is a prime example 
of this generation of research (Hill and Hupe, 2002). Their analysis 
discovered the problem of policy implementation, the uncertain relationship 
between policies and implemented programs and sketched its broad 
parameters. 
 
The first generation was a more organized effort in the 1980s to understand 
the factors that facilitated or constrained the implementation of public policies 
(Sabatier and Manzamian, 1983). This analysis shows how local factors such 
as size, organizational relationships, commitment, capacity and institutional 
complexities mould responses to policy (McLaughlin, 1987).The first 
generation research was characterized by pioneering but largely a  
theoretical and case-specific studies such as that of Pressman and 
Wildavsky (Goggin et al.1990). 
 
4.4.2 Second Generation Implementation 
The second generation implementation studies focused on describing and 
analysing the relationships between policy and practice. These researches 
generated a number of important lessons for policy, practice and analysis. 
For example, policy cannot always mandate what matters to outcomes at 
local level; individual incentives and beliefs are central to local responses. 
Effective implementation requires a strategic balance of pressure and 
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support; policy directed change ultimately is a problem of the smallest unit 
(McLaughlin, 1987). 
 
The second generation research also taught researchers the importance of 
time periods: at what point in history implementation occurs and over what 
period of time (Van Horn, 1987, quoted in Goggin et al.1990). The second 
generation studies recognized implementation’s variability over time and 
across policies and units of government. It concerned itself with explaining 
implementation success or failure and relied heavily on an explicit or implicit 
model of policy implementation process. The second generation research 
was engaged in ‘the development of analytical frameworks’ (Goggin et al. 
1990). The construction of models and research strategies, however, 
immediately led to a major confrontation between the so-called top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives of policy implementation. Until now, no general 
implementation theory has emerged (Winter, 2003). However, as 
implementation research evolved, two schools of thought developed for 
studying and describing implementation: top-down and bottom-up (for 
comparison of both perspectives, see table 5). 
 
4.4.3 Top-down perspective 
The top-down perspective assumes that policy goals can be specified by 
policymakers and that implementation can be carried out successfully by 
setting up certain tools (Calista, 1994). This perspective is ‘policy centered’ 
and represents the policymaker’s views. A vital point is the policymaker’s 
capability to exercise control over the environment and implementers. Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Manzamian and Sabatier (1989) see 
implementation as concerned with the degree to which the actions of 
implementing officials and target groups coincide with the goals in an 
authoritative decision. 
 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) discuss the extent to which successful 
implementation depends upon linkages between different organizations and 
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departments at local level. Hogwood and Gunn(1978) offer recommendations 
to policymakers about effective implementation.  
 
The top-down perspective exhibits a strong desire for ‘generalizing’ policy 
advice. This requires finding consistent and recognizable patterns in 
behaviour across different policy areas (Matland, 1995).The top-down 
viewpoint emphasizes formal directing of problems and factors, which are 
easy to manipulate and lead to centralization and control. Interest will be 
directed towards things such as funding formulas, formal organization 
structures and authority relationships between administrative units and 
administrative controls like budget, planning and evaluation (Elmore, 1978). 
‘It begins at the top of the process, with as clear a statement as possible of 
the policy-maker’s intent, and proceeds through a sequence of  more specific 
steps to define what is expected of implementers at each level. At the bottom 
of the process, one states, again with as much precision as possible, what a 
satisfactory outcome would be, measured in the terms of the original 
statement of intent’ (Elmore, 1978). 
 
The top-down perspective largely restricts its attention to actors who are 
formally   involved in the implementation of a specific program. The top-down 
researchers focus on a specific political decision. They follow the 
implementation down through the system, often with special interest in 
higher-level decision-makers. They would typically assume a control 
perspective of implementation, trying to give good advice on how to structure 
the implementation process for the above in order to achieve the purpose  
and to minimize the number of decision points that could be vetoed (Winter, 
2003). 
 
However, the top-down perspective of implementation is not free from 
criticism. It faces the following criticisms. First, the top-down models take the 
legal language as their starting point. This fails to consider the significance of 
actions taken earlier in the policy-making process. Second, top-downers 
have been accused of seeing implementation as a purely managerial process 
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and either ignoring the political aspects or trying to eliminate them. Besides, 
this remedy fails to recognize the political realities that account for policies 
with multiple goals, vague language and complex implementation structures 
(May, 2003).  
 
Third, top-downers put special emphasis on framers as key actors. This 
criticism has two key variants. One argues from a normative perspective that 
local service deliverers are experts and have the knowledge of the true 
problems; therefore, they are in a better position to propose purposeful 
policy. Another criticism is that top-downers neglect the reality of policy 
modification or distortion at the hands of implementers. They object to the 
hidden belief that policymakers control processes that affect implementation. 
This model also assumes that all priorities are known and can be 
categorized. Another weakness is that it has no behavioural basis. As the 
rational model is unachievable in practice, the result will always be 
implementation failures (Elmore, 1979).  
 
Similarly, Berman (1978) argues that choosing the top-down strategy can 
lead to resistance, disregard and compliance. The top-down models, 
however, see local actors as obstacles to successful implementation—agents 
whose dodging behaviour needs to be controlled. The second variant argues 
from a positive perspective that discretion for street-level bureaucrats is 
inevitably so great that it is simply unrealistic to expect policy designers to be 
able to control the actions of these agents. The table on the next page shows 
the difference in terms of variables between the two perspectives. 
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Table 5: Differences between Top-down and Bottom-up Implementation 
Perspectives 
 
Source:  Paudel, 2009  
 
4.4.4 The bottom -up perspective 
The bottom-up perspective directs attention at the formal and informal 
relationships founding the policy subsystems involved in making and 
implementing policies (Howlett et al. 2003). This perspective has as its 
starting point a problem in society. The focus is on individuals and their 
behaviour, and in this respect street-level bureaucrats are made central in 
the political process. 
 
The street-level bureaucrats are considered to have a better understanding 
of what consumers need as it is they who have direct contact with the public. 
Michael Lipsky (1980) offers a theory of ‘street-level bureaucracy’.Lipsky’s 
theory focuses on the discretionary decisions that each field worker or ‘street-
level bureaucrat’-as he prefers to call them makes in relation to individual 
citizens when they are delivering policies to them. This discretionary role in 
delivering services makes street level bureaucrats essential actors in 
implementing public policies.  
 
Variables Top-down perspective Bottom-up perspective 
Policy decision-makers Policymakers Street-level bureaucrats 
Starting point Statutory language Social problems 
Structure Formal Both formal and informal 
Process Purely administrative Networking, including 
administrative 
Authority Centralization Decentralization 
Output/Outcomes Prescriptive Descriptive 
Discretion Top-level bureaucrats Bottom-level bureaucrats 
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The bottom-up perspective is to identify the many actors that affect the 
problem and to map relations between them. In these network analyses, both 
public and private actors become essential, and the analyses often include 
several policies that affect the same problem, whether or not it is intended in 
those policies (Winter, 2003). 
 
Hjern (1982) focuses on the role of local networks in affecting a given 
problem in the implementation process, and also proposes a way of 
identifying the networks. It is a combination of a snowball and socio-metric 
methods. This method enables them to map a network that identifies the 
relevant implementation structure for a specific policy at local, regional and 
national level, and allows them to evaluate the significance of government 
programs vis-à-vis other influences such as market. It also enables them to 
see strategic coalitions as well as effects of policy and the vibrant nature of 
policy implementation (Matland, 1995).  
 
According to them, central initiatives are poorly adapted to local conditions. 
Program success depends in large part on the skills of individuals in the local 
implementation structure, who can adapt the policy to local conditions. It 
depends only to a limited degree on central activities. Therefore, their 
analysis is important in drawing attention to implementation activities and 
structures at local level. According to Berman (1978), policy implementation 
takes place at two levels: macro and micro. At macro implementation level, 
centrally located actors devise a government program; at micro 
implementation level, local organizations react to macro-level plans; develop 
and implement their own programs.  
 
However, he argues that, most implementation problems shoot from the 
interface of a policy with micro-level institutional settings. Central-level actors 
can indirectly influence micro-level factors. It is because the rules created by 
central actors are dominated by local implementing contextual factors. 
However, the bottom-up perspective does not provide satisfactory solutions 
75 
 
to the problems of public policy, as its rejection of the authority of 
policymakers is questionable in the light of democratic theory. Policy control 
should be exercised by actors whose power derives from their accountability 
to voters through their elected representatives. The authority of local service 
deliverers does not derive from this power base (Matland, 1995). 
 
Another criticism is that this perspective cannot successfully explain why 
coping strategies occur and why they vary. It is difficult to think of ways to 
change the street-level behaviour in the context of this model, and no thought 
is given to how to use discretion as a device for improving the effectiveness 
of policies at street level (Elmore, 1978). It has also been demonstrated that 
people with very little education and poor social background are less likely to 
benefit from social services compared to more educated and wealthier 
people. This is the case even when these social services are targeted 
primarily at the former category. Hence, blending is done not only by street-
level bureaucrats but also by the self-selection of the target groups 
themselves (Winter, 1990). 
 
4.4.5 Synthesis of both perspectives 
Both top-down and bottom-up perspectives draw attention to the 
implementation process. However, there is a conflict between the two 
perspectives. Each tends to ignore the portion of the implementation reality 
explained by the other. Here, some of the synthesizers of both the 
perspectives are explained.  
 
Elmore (1979) has attempted to combine two perspectives. They argue that 
policy designers should choose policy instruments based on the incentive 
structure of target groups. Forward mapping consists of stating precise policy 
objectives, elaborating detailed means-ends schemes, and specifying explicit 
outcome criteria by which to judge policy at each stage. Backward mapping 
consists of stating precisely the behaviour to be changed at lowest level, 
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describing a set of operations that can ensure the change, and repeating the 
procedure upwards by steps until the central level is reached. 
 
By using backward mapping, policy designers may find more appropriate 
tools than those initially chosen. This process ensures consideration of micro 
implementers’ and target groups’ interpretations of policy problems and 
possible solutions. No specific interrelationships are hypothesized; effectively 
there are no hypotheses to test. As a tool, Elmore’s discussion is useful as a 
theory but it lacks explanatory power (Matland, 1995). 
 
Matland (1995) presents the ‘ambiguity and conflict model’ as a combination 
of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives. His model suggests that their 
relative value depends on the degree of ambiguity in goals and means of a 
policy and the degree of conflict. Goggin et al. (1990) developed a model 
which is based on the communications theory perspective of 
intergovernmental implementation, but also includes many variables from the 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. The model indicates that 
implementation in the states is influenced by a combination of incentives  and 
controls from the federal, state and local level; by a state’s decisional 
outcomes; and by a state’s capacity to act. How implementation exactly 
precedes in specific policy areas depends on the interaction of these 
elements of the model. 
 
Thomas and Grindle (1990) propose an interactive model of implementing 
policy reform. The process of implementing policy reform is seen as 
interactive rather than linear. Their framework for policy study looks at 'how 
reform proposals get on the agenda for government action, what factors 
influence decision makers and the linkages between agenda setting and 
decision-making process.’ The central element in the model is that a policy 
reform initiative may be altered or reversed at any stage in its lifecycle by the 
pressure and reaction to it. This model views policy reform as a process, one 
in which interested parties can exert pressure for change at many points. 
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Some interests may be more effective at influencing high-level officials in 
government, others at affecting the managers of the implementation process 
or those who control the resources needed for implementation. 
 
Understanding the location, strengths and stakes involved in these attempts 
to promote, alter or reverse policy reform initiatives is central to 
understanding the outcomes (Thomas and Griddle, 1990). Analysis begins 
with a look at the characteristics of any public policy in terms of the reaction it 
will generate. Governments must assess what their resources are and how 
they can mobilize available resources to promote successful implementation. 
Decision makers must evaluate political resources while public managers 
attend to bureaucratic resources. Such analysis can lead to a more realistic 
approach to policy where the question of implementation possibility assumes 
major importance. Failure can be better anticipated and resources can be 
more efficiently and effectively allocated (Turner and Humle, 1997). 
 
However, the second generation is not exempt from criticism. Researchers 
cannot agree on a common definition of the term Implementation. There are 
differences in the role of implementers, especially with respect to the degree 
to which they are autonomous actors. Furthermore, it has not been able to 
explain why implementation occurs as it does or predict how implementers 
are likely to behave in the future. Indeed, some middle range theorizing with 
substantial potential utility has emerged from this work (Goggin et al. 1990). 
The main critique of the second generation model is again based on their 
approach, too many case studies, not enough validation and replications 
(Goggin, 1986). Matland (1995) suggests that some first and second 
generation models failed to provide a comprehensive synthesis to 
implementation analysis (Schofield,  2001). 
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4.4.6 Third Generation Implementation 
While both first and second generation implementation researches have 
added much to our knowledge of what implementation is how and why it 
varies, it has been less helpful in differentiating between the types of 
implementation outcomes, or in specifying the causal patterns that occur, and 
the relative importance and unique effects of each of the various independent 
variables (Lester and Goggin, 1998). However, these researches have not 
succeeded in sorting out the relative importance of the explanatory variables 
(Winter,  2003). 
 
A large part of the study could be criticized as merely presenting often long 
checklists of variables that might affect implementation. According to Goggin 
(1986), this problem had hampered the development of implementation 
theory. He, therefore, suggests a third generation of implementation studies 
that would test theories on the basis of more comparative case studies and 
statistical research designs (Winter,  2003). 
 
The unique trait of the third generation research is its research design an  
explicit theoretical model, working definitions of concepts, an exhaustive 
search for reliable indicators of implementation and predictor variables and 
the description of theoretically derived hypotheses, with analysis, of data 
using appropriate qualitative and statistical procedures as well as case 
studies for testing them (Goggin et al. 1990). 
 
In the third generation research, the macro world of policymakers with micro 
world of individual implementers is integrated (McLaughlin, 1987). The 
macro-level research operates at the system level. It stresses regularities of 
process and organizational structures as stable outlines of the policy process 
and frames individual actions in terms of position in a relational network. 
Microanalyses, on the other hand, operate at the individual level. They 
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interpret an organizational action as the problematic and often unpredictable 
outcomes of autonomous actors, motivated by self-interest. 
 
Macro-level analyses generally provide insufficient guidance to policymakers 
or practitioners interested in understanding program outcomes (positive or 
negative), evaluating alternative, assessing internal work requirements, or 
developing models of how policies operate in practice. Conversely, micro-
level analyses ignore complete attainments and unexpected consequences 
for the institutional setting as a whole, so cannot speak to the system-wide 
effects of a policy. Micro level analyses, thus, provide limited guidance to 
policymakers faced with system-wide decisions. However, some scholars 
argue that third generation implementation has not been realized in practice 
(Winter,  2003). 
 
4.5 Implementation as an evolutionary process 
A problem with both the top-down and bottom-up frameworks is that they 
tend to over-simplify the sheer complexity of implementation. Two early 
models which incorporated and developed the insights of both approaches 
were developed by Lewis and Flynn (1979) and Barrett and Fudge (1981). 
Lewis and Flynn, in an examination of urban and regional policy, put forward 
a behavioural model which views implementation as ‘action’ by individuals 
and the institutional context within which they endeavour to act. 
Policy implementers inhabit a world, which bears little resemblance to the 
rational ideal: In reality, there are disagreements about policy goals and 
objectives, vagueness and ambiguity about policies and uncertainty about 
procedural complexity, inconsistency between problems available and 
existing problems, and conflict arising from public participation, pressure 
group activity and political dispenses (Lewis and Flynn, 1979). The 
interaction with the outside world, the organization and its institutional context 
means that policy objectives are not the source of guidance for action. 
Actions that result from the resolution of conflicts between two sets of 
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priorities and policy areas, may precede the formulations of a procedure for 
dealing with similar cases in the future and therefore the policy, or may result 
from what is feasible in the circumstances rather than the fulfilment of original 
objectives (Ibid). 
This theme of analysis in context is also present in the ideas of Barrett and 
Fudge, who argue that implementation may be best understood in terms of a 
‘policy-action continuum’ in which an interactive and negotiating process is 
taking place over time, among those seeking to put the policy into effect and 
those upon whom action depends (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). 
Power is central to the dynamics of this relationship. Implementation of this 
policy-action model is an iterative bargaining process between those who are 
responsible for enacting policy and those who have control of resources. In 
their model, more emphasis is placed on issues of power and dependence, 
interests, motivations and behaviour (Barrett and Fudge, 1981) than in either 
the top-down or the bottom-up frameworks. Furthermore, the policy-action 
perspective focuses on the factors, which affect the scope for action and 
behaviour of individuals and agencies, as well, as how perceptions are 
formed. The policy-action model shows that policy is not something that 
happens at the front-end of the policy process. Policy is something, which 
evolves or unfolds. In the words of Majone and Wildavsky(1984:116): 
‘Implementation will always be evolutionary; it will inevitably reformulate as 
well as carry out policy’. 
4.6 Implementation as a political game 
Models of organizations, which see policy being made and implemented in 
situations of human interaction, rather than as a machine or system, focus on 
the nature of those interactions. This theme of interaction is also the focus of 
the models, which view implementation as a process, which is controlled by 
conflict and bargaining. Rational models, of course, also recognize that 
conflict and deal making will take place in implementation. However, this 
conflict is seen as something, which is essentially dysfunctional, and in need 
of co-ordination (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) or resolution (Dunsire, 
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1978). In these models, conflict and bargaining take place within shared 
goals, in which case implementation is effective when groups resolve their 
differences and put a policy into action. An effective implementation process 
will have methods and systems of controlling such conflict to bring about 
compliance (Dunsire, 1978). It is all a matter of control. 
However, if we have a view of organizations, which is based less upon the 
notion of control as of structures, which are composed of groups and 
individuals all seeking to maximize their power and influence; we may see 
conflict as an essentially political process involving different strategies for 
acquiring and maintain power. Implementation from this perspective is about 
self-interested people ‘playing games’. This game model was advanced by 
Bardach in 1977 in his book The Implementation Game. Implementation, he 
argues, is a game of ‘bargaining, persuasion, and manoeuvring under 
conditions of uncertainty’ (Bardach, 1977). Implementation actors are playing 
to win as much control as possible, and endeavouring to play the system as 
to achieve their own goals and objectives. 
The Bardach model is essentially one which suggests that politics extend 
beyond the formal’ political’ institutions. Politics does not stop once a bill 
becomes law. It does not stop the political process, nor does it cease in the 
decision –making process. Models of the kind, which Bardach proposes, are 
urging us to redefine the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy, and 
between the decision-making process and the delivery of those decisions. 
Implementation is therefore simply another form of politics which takes place 
within the domain of unelected powers (Parsons, 1995). 
4.7 Policy context 
The context is the social environment in which implementation takes place. 
Healthcare settings constitute the context in implementation science, 
whereas the context for policy implementation may be much larger. The 
context represents influences on the implementation process and impact that 
is partially, beyond the control of the implementers and targets. Policy 
implementation research does not distinguish between the concepts of inner 
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and outer context, but similar reasoning exists in this field. The inner context 
(in implementation science) has been afforded great importance, particularly 
in bottom-up perspectives that address the relationships between the actors 
involved in the implementation process (Barrett, 2004), e.g., between civil 
servants and their managers (Lipsky, 1983). The outer context (in 
implementation science terminology) is typically understood to involve 
aspects of the policy environment in which policies are implemented, 
including demographic characteristics and global economic forces that might 
affect policy outcomes (Hill and Hupe, 2009). 
 
By highlighting systematic factors in relation to health care reforms and policy 
development, it becomes quite apparent that context matters. The health 
policy evolution is intrinsically linked to global, national and local political-
administrative and socioeconomic structures, processes and issues. The 
context sets the boundaries of the policymaking processes, and the legacies 
of previous decisions and institutions influence current decisions and 
practices (Jonsson et al. 2014). 
A health policy system cannot be understood without examining the political, 
socioeconomic and cultural contexts in which it operates. Some authors have 
emphasized the importance of understanding a policy context, which they 
categorized into the following elements: demographic and epidemiological 
changes, processes of social and economic changes, economic and financial 
policies, politics and the political regime, and ideology, public policy and the 
public sector. In the political context, opportunities for actors to affect policy 
agendas (policy windows) are shaped by changes in political leadership 
(regime change), socioeconomic conditions, public mood or opinion, and 
decisions in other subsystems (Buse et al. 2005). In federal systems, 
divergent values and goals among political leaders at different levels mean 
policy windows vary sub-nationally (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
In such circumstances of complexity and ‘messiness’, it is important that the 
analysis of the contextual issues recognises this. There is no simple 
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response of health sector policy to easily identifiable contextual factors. 
Policy-makers can be ideologically driven, or lack the motivation and capacity 
to interpret the context. Policies can be embedded, incrementally developed 
over many years, confused, ambiguous, inconsistent and part of a non-
decision-making process. They can also be redefined through 
implementation or simply not implemented (Buse et al. 2005). 
Policy implementation processes are affected also by the wider context 
including key national and international events. The international context had 
considerable influence. The policy does not develop in a vacuum, but in a 
complex context. These are a set of social, political and economic processes 
and structures which condition, to differing degrees, the policy system. 
Understanding these helps to explain why specific issues are on the agenda. 
It is this context that helps mould the manner in which policy formulation and 
implementation is conducted (Buse, 1999). 
While these provide useful categories for comparative research projects, they 
may not be as readily useful in policy analysis. The distinction between what 
is structural and situational can be difficult to decide. Furthermore, the way in 
which political and economic factors express both structural, situational, 
value and environmental factors may be more relevant. More readily usable 
in policy analysis are the ‘reasons’ and ‘forces’ leading to the contemporary 
interest in health as suggested by  Walt and Gilson (1994). 
4.8 Actors in implementation  
For many writers concerned with policy analysis, the key determinant of 
policy change is the group of actors involved, and the focus is often on 
government. Lindenberg (1989), for example, reviews how the governments 
of Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala managed support and opposition to 
their stabilization and structural adjustment policies in the mid-1980s. He 
concludes his analysis with a set of initial lessons, which could help other 
governments manage the 'winners and losers during the process of 
economic change', although he points out these are not blueprints given 
each country's unique history and policy environment. In his analysis of 
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adjustment policies in three African countries, Toye (1992) concludes that the 
World Bank did not sufficiently take into consideration the vested interests of 
government leaders and rich farmers in the agricultural sector, and as a 
result, efforts to reform the economy faltered. 
Attention on the civil service is argued to be important because of the 
strategic roles bureaucrats play in the implementation of policies. Some have 
sought to understand the influence of actors by focusing on the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats. Brown (1989), Mukandala (1992) and 
Panday (1989) for example, argue that in Liberia, Tanzania and Nepal 
respectively bureaucrats have played a relatively insignificant role in the 
policy process, largely because of the dominance of politicians (and in Nepal 
the Royal Palace). In contrast, Koehn (1983) has argued that Nigeria has 
seen so many changes of mainly military government that civil servants have 
controlled policy-making through their greater expertise and continuity.  
Charlton (1991) likewise suggests that in comparison with politicians, civil 
servants in Botswana played a particularly important role at independence, 
although the balance of power between politicians and bureaucrats changed 
over time. Gulhati (1991) observes that the failure to build consensus 
between officials and politicians on the need for reform in Zambia (and the 
fact that the reform measures were largely developed outside Zambia by the 
IMF, World Bank and foreign consultants) was one of the reasons for that 
country's economic impasse during the 1980s. 
A few writers are concerned with societal actors, rather than policy elites 
within government (Ghai, 1992). Tironi and Lagos (1991), for example, argue 
that structural adjustment policies in Latin America are bringing about 
profound changes in the social structure of those countries implementing 
them. They suggest a number of factors (the strength of the government and 
its administration, the dependence on multilateral financial agencies, the will 
and capacity of social actors to resist) will determine whether structural 
adjustment policies are implemented by shock measures or more gradually. 
They place particular emphasis on the roles of trade unions and the business 
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community, and on marginal social groups as well as political parties and the 
state, exploring their relative influence on the assemblage of factors that 
influence policy. 
In his review of development policy as a process, Wuyts (1992) argues that 
the public cannot be separated from the state: 'State institutions are 
influenced by public action, and in turn, provide the means through which this 
action is sustained or modified.' He argues that public action is not simply an 
additional factor in analysing the state's role in the policy process, but is an 
integral part. Hyden and Karlstrom (1993) also emphasize the complexity of 
policy environments and interaction of actors within them: 'a narrow focus on 
the inherent values of specific policy instruments or on the presumed 
interests of various policy actors at a certain time is not enough. What needs 
to be added is a longitudinal dimension that helps us understand how various 
actors interact with each other on specific issues and with what outcomes.' 
Developing world bureaucracies have, however, come under just as much 
attack from the right, who argue that the state sector has become too big and 
that either the private sector must be given a chance to do more, or else 
bureaucrats must be forced to compete. There is a notion of rent-seeking, a 
term for the way in which people operate to maximise personal gains from 
government resources. Supporters of rent-seeking theory argue that state 
bureaucrats are in an enviable position to achieve this. However, it has to be 
said that the same can be true of non-state employees (Barker, 1996). 
Weber saw bureaucracy as requiring both administrative and technical 
expertise appropriate to the specialist area, such as medicine. Indeed, as 
Ham and Hill point out (1984), it may be seen as a shortcoming in Weber’s 
thinking that he failed to foresee the inevitable conflict arising from authority 
based on administrative knowledge and that based on technical knowledge.  
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4.9 Power: A multi-layered concept 
The concept of power is essentially contested (Lukes, 1974; Baldwin, 2002). 
It seems as if there are as many definitions and approaches as there are 
power analysts. Some define power in terms of ‘having resources’, or 
dispositional power (money, knowledge, personnel, weapons, reputation, 
etc.), while others define it in terms of achieving outcomes, or relational 
power (e.g. A influencing B); some consider power in mere organizational 
terms (organizations, resources, rules, bargaining), while others consider it in 
discursive terms (knowledge, story lines, discourses, deliberation); some 
relate power to conflict-oriented zero-sum games, or transitive power (A 
achieves something at the cost of B), while others relate it to social 
integration and collective outcomes, or intransitive power (A and B achieving 
something together); and some situate power at the level of the acting agent 
(the swimming fish), while others situate it at the level of structures (the water 
putting pressure on the fish) (Goverde et al. 2000). In addition, different 
authors distinguish different dimensions in the concept of power: one face, 
two faces, two levels, three dimensions, three circuits, etc. (Dahl, 1957, 1961; 
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962;  Lukes, 1974; Giddens, 1984; Clegg, 1989). 
 
First, the focus is both on agents having resources in policy arrangements as 
well as on agents achieving policy outcomes. Secondly, power will be 
considered both in organizational and discursive terms below. After all, policy 
agents may become influential not only by organizational resources, like 
money, personnel, tactics, but also by arguments and persuasion, or by both. 
At first glance, this seems quite obvious.  However, some political scientists 
do not relate arguing and persuasion to power, as in the end the one who 
should be influenced simply agrees with you. For them, power is always 
exercised against the will of others (Weber, 1946).  
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Thirdly, power games are not necessarily zero-sum games, although this 
may be the case. For example, policy coalition A may win in certain political 
struggles at the cost of policy coalition B, and vice versa. In other 
circumstances, however, these coalitions may also join hands, and achieve 
something together. Obviously, different political processes raise different 
power games, either transitive or intransitive. Fourthly, the power concept is 
definitely multi-layered. Actors do have and exercise power, but are always 
embedded in historically and socially constructed structures, e.g. in terms of 
institutions and discourses. These to a certain degree constitute their 
identities as well as enable and constrain certain types of behaviour more 
than others. (Arts and Tatenhove, 2004). 
 
Substantial part of the power debate is dedicated to the question of what 
dimensions the concept consists of. One milestone in this debate has been 
the well-known article Two Faces of Power of Bachrach and Baratz (1962), 
who criticised the one dimensional view of Dahl. Whereas the latter focused 
on how community leaders influenced certain issues in local political 
decision-making in his famous book Who Governs? (1961), the former 
argued that power is not only exercised through decision making itself, but 
also by excluding issues from the political agenda, hence by non decision-
making. Therefore, power consists, according to Bachrach and Baratz, of two 
faces, and not of one.  
 
For Weber (1946), power consists of two faces as well (although he himself 
does not use the vocabulary of ‘faces’). On the one hand, he conceptualises 
power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis 
on which this probability rests” (Weber, 1946). On the other hand, Weber 
puts this power concept in the context of ‘structures of domination’, based on 
the (uneven) distribution of economic resources and social and political 
authority. These structures of domination form the basis on which the actual 
exercise of intentional power rests (Clegg, 1989). 
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In the 1970s, this power dimensions debate continued, and Lukes, in his 
much-cited Power: A Radical View (1974), added a third one. He criticised 
both Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz for focusing too much on actors, 
behaviour and observable conflicts, while neglecting the subtle, often hidden 
power mechanisms through which issues are kept out of politics. This is also 
referred to as ‘the mobilization of bias’, which occurs through (hidden) 
individual actions, social forces, or institutional practices. This power process, 
both through agency and structure, favours, according to Lukes, certain 
interests over others, even though ‘the dominated’ are not aware of that most 
of the time. Giddens (1984) rejects this view and considers agencies being 
‘capable’ and ‘knowledgeable’ in principle, which implies that people cannot 
simply be dominated at their own expense for long, as if this is the ‘normal’ 
situation. Sooner or later, people will acknowledge and re-act. Therefore, 
Giddens returned to Weber as well as to Bachrach and Baratz, stripped 
Lukes’ third dimension, and re-framed the two faces of power and domination 
in the context of his structuration theory. 
 
Unhappy with Giddens’ view, which he considers too much of an agency-
oriented approach, Clegg (1989) introduced his three circuits of power, which 
consists of episodic, dispositional and facilitative power, respectively, building 
on Dahl, Parsons, Weber, and Foucault, amongst others. The first ‘episodic’ 
circuit relates to agency, causal mechanisms and outcomes, the second 
‘dispositional’ one to social integration, discourses and rules of the game in 
organizations, and the third ‘facilitative’ circuit to system integration, 
disciplinarian power and domination at the systemic level of societies as a 
whole. These three circuits are interdependent. Episodic power produces, 
through agencies certain outcomes, potentially affecting the other two circuits 
of power, dispositional power ‘fixes’ agencies in organizations in terms of 
meaning, rules and resources, and facilitative power enable and constrain 
agencies in social relations.  
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Clegg’s three-circuit model is considered to be an innovative step compared 
to earlier multi-layered models. It transcends the outdated decision/non-
decision debate in which Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes were 
engaged, the Marxist heritage in Lukes’ writings as well as the rather 
abstract, meta-theoretical ‘duality of structure’ model of Giddens, which tends 
to overemphasise the role of agency vis-`a-vis structure. Clegg does the 
opposite: undertheorizing the role of agency. By importing the post-
structuralist power theory of Foucault in his scheme, particularly in his third 
circuit of facilitative power, Clegg seems to de-centre the subject and tends 
to deny its agency. For Foucault (1984) ‘Power is not an institution nor a 
structure nor a certain capacity which some possess: it is the name which is 
given to a complex strategic situation by a certain society’(Arts and 
Tatenhove, 2004). 
 
It is still preferable to attach the concept of power to social actors on the one 
hand and (changeable) structures of domination on the other (such as Weber 
and Giddens do). It is feared that with a Foucauldian power concept the 
knowledgeability and capability of human agencies to intervene in social 
systems, an important premise for any meaningful policy analysis will be too 
easily denied. Although there are feedback loops between the different 
circuits of power in Clegg’s model, and although Clegg considers resistance 
to domination a relevant option for human beings, we still consider his model 
(potentially) too determinist in nature. Therefore, as far as substance of the 
three-circuit model is concerned, we go back to Giddens’ structuration 
Theory. Structures do exist, but they are internal to human action, manifest 
themselves in human action, and transformed by human actions, and are 
changeable in principle, although they transcend individual life histories, and 
therefore seem to exist independent of human agency. But to understand the 
institutionalisation of policy arrangements, we are convinced that we need a 
conception of power that makes it possible to acknowledge both the influence 
of actors on the development of policies in policy arrangements and the 
impact of the structural context in which actors operate (Goverde and 
Tatenhove, 2000). 
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4.10 Concept of power and policy implementation approaches 
The use of power in the policy implementation process is subtle and 
complex. A small number of studies have been conducted in order to 
understand how power is exercised or distributed in the policy process within 
a complicated political environment. These themes and their relevant works 
are most pertinent explaining the relationship between power and policy 
actors. The approaches are discussed below: 
 
4.10.1Structural approach: The top-down perspective 
The first relevant approach is Marxist theory. Marxist approaches to power 
and the exercise of power in the state policy process are unique in focusing 
on its relations to economics, politics and ideologies (Jessop, 2001). 
According to the classical Marxist theory, the social structure of a capitalist 
society is essentially a class structure and the policy outcome of a state has 
been just reflecting the interests of the capitalist class (Hill, 2005). Marxists 
have always claimed that state policy should be determined by the class 
interests of capitalists and their agents.  
 
The policy process can be depicted as reflecting the outcome of a struggle 
between the capitalists and working classes or partially determined by social 
and political forces operating within the state structure itself (Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987). With regard to the methodological perspective, the Marxist 
theory explanation of the state sees “economic imperatives” as a crucial 
influence in the state policy process. It claims that the nature of the economic 
structure is the essential foundational feature of the components of a state 
including legal and political structure. Marxist theory stands on the idea of the 
structural perspective, and sees structure constraints as a type of causal 
mechanism whereby the role of the state in the policy domain is explained by 
the requirements and the rationality of the economic system. 
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Marxists have conducted few empirical works that are more than just 
disputes to link to the perspectives above (Skocpol, 1979). These significant 
works emphasize the historical and structural force to shape the pattern of 
institutional change and policy output but none of these analyses track state 
policy at the level of policy stakeholders. The policy process in modern 
society is complicated and the role of the state does not only serve the 
interests of one dominant class. It means that the simple proposition of a 
policy outcome cannot echo the whole phenomena of the policy process. 
 
4.10.2 Individual approach: The bottom-up perspective 
The second traditional state policy process approach that should be 
discussed is pluralism, or pluralist theory. Pluralist accounts are offered as 
liberal or radical alternatives to Marxism (Bellamy, 2001). Recent studies 
have been concerned with the origins, prevalence, policy interests, resources 
and actors as they seek to influence federal policy decisions in the U.S. 
(Laumann and Knoke, 1987). In other words, the policy process in the 
national domain in general is seen as a wide and complex interaction 
between the interests, actors and institutions rather than between institutions 
themselves.  
 
Pluralists have been criticized for having an overly optimistic view of the 
diverse distribution of power (Luke’s, 1974). A perfect environment of equal 
power distribution has little possibility of existing in a real political process 
and most policy outcomes are manipulated by a few powerful policy elites. 
Moreover, the pluralist explanation ignores not only the role of the state in the 
policy process but also the power of the institutions, which allow the state the 
authority to regulate the behaviours of policy stakeholders. In spite of the fact 
that pluralist theory reflects some of the social and political phenomenon of 
democratic countries, especially in the U.S, the emphasis on interest and 
group interaction provides a limited research tool to examine the policy 
process in modern society and also to make an explanation between policy 
outcome and the actions of interest groups (Wang, 2010). 
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4.10.3 Elitist approach 
The third traditional state policy approach is the elite approach, which arose 
from similar dissatisfaction with liberal democracy and the pluralist theory. 
However, compared to pluralist theory, the elite perspective accepts that the 
power is based on the unequal distribution of resources and that public has 
little influence on policy outcomes. Mills (1956) draws attention to the 
institutional position as a source of power, and concludes that the power 
elites occupying key positions in government and the military are dominant in 
the policy process of the American political system. 
 
Mills’ work takes the individual as its unit of analysis, and suggests that the 
exercise of power is revealed in the overlap and connection between the 
leaders of these organisations (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). When compared 
to Marxist and Pluralist theories, the elite approach provides another different 
alternative to identify who has power and how power is exercised in policy 
domains via analysing the interactions among political elites occupying the 
key positions Though elite theory resolves the analytical problem of pluralist 
theory, it creates another bias of the power  in the policy process.  
 
First, there are difficulties in specifying the mechanisms by which power is 
measured and the techniques used to hold it (Hill, 2005). Second, most 
research in elite theory only focuses on the analysis of powerful individuals in 
important organisations. This neglects the fact that the nature of power 
exercise is also revealed in inter-organisational exchange and the influence 
of interest groups should be one of factors important in the resulting policy 
outcomes (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). In order to cope with the critique, 
some researchers have made efforts to reconcile elitism and pluralist 
democracy to consider the influence of both individual and organisational 
levels in policy domains. 
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The top-down approach says that the structure (both in the institutional and 
political context) shapes the policy outcome. For example, Marxist theory 
states that the policy outcome is the product of structural pressure and every 
stakeholder in the policy domain has to follow the rules of capitalism. 
Although structural pressure can shape a scenario constraining the actors’ 
behaviours, this approach ignores the individuals’ recognition of their political 
context and institutional arrangement. There is no doubt that individuals have 
their own preferences and individuals’ actions might not just be determined 
by the structure (Wang, 2010). 
 
We also have to consider the possibility that individuals under environmental 
constraints can change the rules of the game. At the individual level, 
therefore, the policy process, like the bottom-up approach, seen as a product 
of individuals’ actions is one of the main streams regarded in the interest 
group approach such as pluralism, elitist theory and corporatism. The 
mainstream is a significant level of the policy process in democratic countries 
such as the U.S., the UK and other Western countries. Most theorists in the 
area are concerned with the idea that the political phenomena of the policy 
process in these countries are an interactive game of multiple stakeholders 
(Wang, 2010). 
 
The Elitist and neo-elitist model has its origins in modern social science with 
the work of two Italian theorists Mosca and Pareto. They argued that, 
contrary to Marx, history shows that elitism is inevitable: the classless society 
is a myth and democracy little more than a sham. Later Mosca modified his 
position to argue that democracy could be viewed as a form of politics in 
which elites compete for people’s vote in order to secure legitimacy for elite 
rule. Mosca and Pareto’s ideas form the basis upon which later elitist 
approaches were to be formulated (Parsons, 1995). 
 
Robert Michels(1915) developed Mosca’s approach in a study in which he 
posited that there was an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which operated in institutions. 
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Over time, institutional elites generate their own interests and goals, which 
are distinct from mass members. Max Weber was also focus on the 
institutional or bureaucratic context of power by showing how rationalization 
in capitalist society leads to the formation of bureaucracy, which will 
inevitably replace other forms of institutions and, in the absence of strong 
parliamentary accountability, pose a threat to democratic decision-making by 
elected politicians. 
 
If the arguments of Mosca,Pareto, Michels and Weber were correct, and then 
it left the idea of government by the people looking rather unreal and 
idealistic. The problem of reconciling the elitism of the real world with the 
need for democratic legitimacy was neatly resolved by the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter (1974). Being an economist, he applied an economic approach 
to the problem of legitimacy. Elitism, he argued was legitimated in a 
democracy by a political market composed of competing parties and rival 
elites. The citizen was involved in the policy process by the act of choosing 
between the policy programmes and promises of rival political firms. This 
model was to be developed most fully and taken to its logical conclusion in 
Down’s (1957) ‘economic’ theory of democracy. Schumpeter’s model also 
provided a starting point for the pluralist theories advanced by Dahl et al. in 
the 1950s. 
 
Another line of development in the elite approach was that put forward by 
Lasswell (1936) who also took the view that: ‘the study of politics is the study 
of influence and the influential…..The influential are those who get the most 
of what there is to get …Those who get the most are elites, the rest are 
mass’ (Lasswell,1936). However, whereas for Schumpeter and Downs the 
functioning of political markets could best serve to provide the legitimacy for 
elite power, Lasswell’s view was that it required a more ‘preventative’ politics, 
in which knowledge could exercise more influence on decision-making. 
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Lasswell accepted Pareto’s idea that there was a circulation of elites in 
democracy and argued that in the modern era a shift was taking place from 
class struggle to a struggle between different groups (Lasswell, 1956, 1962). 
These were military, policy elites, technocrats and bureaucrats with 
administrative or organizational skills. His great fear was that, when 
combined, these new elites posed a dangerous threat to democracy. The 
combination of elites with a capacity to manipulate communications and 
symbols with elites skilled in violence, organization and technical know-how 
ultimately raised the real prospect of the development of the ‘garrison-state’ 
in which military, bureaucratic and technocratic elites rule (Lasswell, 
1936,1941). For Lasswell, the key issue was how this trend could be 
prevented. The policy sciences, he believed, could and should have a vital 
role to play in enhancing democracy by seeking to promote a wider 
distribution and pluralism of power.  
 
To some extent it is true to say that Lasswell had a somewhat naïve faith in 
the possibilities of social science and policy analysis. However, this is to read 
Lasswell’s analysis of elites and democracy without taking into account the 
far more radical changes, which he considered essential to curb elite power. 
This is understood by Bobrow and Dryzek when they say that the Lasswellian 
approach shares with critical theory a fundamental practical intent to improve 
the human condition with respect, freedom from coercion, want, indignity and 
manipulation (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). 
 
Lasswell’s idea for controlling elites through policy science is indeed a very 
weak cup of tea if we do not place it in the context of his writings on human 
rights and dignity (McDougal et al. 1980) and his belief in the need to 
promote a critical public discourse, prototypes of which were his idea of 
decision seminars and social planetariums. 
 
As Jon Elster (1989) indicates, the elementary unit of social life is the 
individual human action. According to this view, the main unit of policy 
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process analysis is an individual who is self-interested and action-free, but 
there is no doubt that the stance ignores the influence of the political 
environment and the institutional context, which can shape the chance and 
strategy of actors under the specific game rules. Policy process is embedded 
in distinct institutional and political contexts and different policy domains have 
different game rules and stakeholders. It will become an under-socialised 
approach concerned too much with individuals’ function and the influence of 
the policy process. 
 
Obviously, the policy process in modern society is a complicated political 
scenario. It also means that a more suitable and flexible perspective, such as 
the policy network approach, should be applied to understand the nature of 
power-exchange between official and unofficial stakeholders in the policy 
domain. 
 
 4.11 Emergence of Policy Networks 
Recently, governments faced a more fragmented policy environment. 
Traditional methods of dealing with problems are no longer enough. As 
mentioned above, the nature of the policy process involves multiple policy 
stakeholders and their interest-exchange relationships. The study of policy 
networks offers more insight into how policy is made and implemented than 
traditional policy process approaches. Thus, a policy network approach, 
providing a more flexible explanation can be used to understand the complex 
nature of the policy implementation process in modern society (Wang, 2005, 
2010).  
The concept of networks in the analysis of public policy processes first 
emerged in the mid-1970s and early 1980s (John, 2004). In the past three 
decades, a considerable amount of effort has been expanded by political 
scientists and policy researchers in trying to understand the structure of 
stakeholders’ interaction in policy domains and the reasons for policy failure 
in the U.S., the UK, and other European countries (Heclo, 1978). The 
concept of the network is an appropriate metaphor describing the strategic 
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interaction between Congress, bureaucrats, the president, the courts, the 
people, the media, interest groups, and all other possible actors playing 
important roles in policy domains. In the U.S., numerous researchers have 
used metaphors like “iron triangle”, “whirlpool” or “private government” to 
describe the sub-government system as an important political decision-
making mechanism in earlier U.S. government (John,  2004).  
 
Moreover, Heclo’s popular work on “issue networks” provides a more fluid 
and changeable form of political relationships with the U.S. government. In 
some European studies, the concept of policy networks has been seen as a 
new form of policy (Kenis and Schnider, 1991). These studies attempt to use 
the idea of policy network to facilitate the co-ordination and co-governance 
relationships between multiple agents at the national or domestic levels. 
 
The concept of policy network is used to indicate patterns of relationships 
between interdependent actors involved in processes of public policy making 
(Kickert et. al. 1997). There is no doubt that an independent relationship is 
the most important characteristic of policy networks and many theoretical 
foundations such as the “power/resource dependence” approach (Rhodes, 
1990) or the “idea” approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) indicate 
that all actors in a policy domain cannot achieve their own interests and goals 
without others’ assistance because they need others’ resources and support. 
It means that the complicated policy problems nowadays are non-hierarchical 
and complex in democratic countries. These require a combination of 
resources and ideas owned by different actors. Hence, it is obvious that 
policy games are created when actors recognise that they have to depend on 
one another for the realisation of their objectives and in these cases there are 
mutual dependencies that are not equally divided across these policy 
makers. 
 
Smith (1993) explores the relationship between the two concepts pf ‘policy 
networks’ and ‘Iron triangles’ or ‘policy communities’. These are closely 
related ideas, between which there is no need to make a choice while 
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formulating a policy theory drawing upon them. Communities or triangles are 
stronger versions of networks. Therefore, networks may cohere into 
communities and communities may disintegrate into networks. There may be 
some issues where communities are more likely than networks and vice 
versa. There may be some institutional situations, and even societies, where 
one pattern is more likely than the other and so on. 
 
John (1998) argues that the nature of networks creates a problem. They are 
both everything and nothing, and they occur in all aspects of policy making. 
However, the concept is hard to use as the foundation for an explanation 
unless the investigator incorporates other factors, such as the interests, ideas 
and institutions, which determine how networks function. Marsh and Smith 
(2000) are concerned to take broad issues about networks as structures and 
actors as agents. This involves recognising the way in which actors change 
networks. Marsh and Smith then develop an examination of the impact of 
exogenous factors to stress the dialectic relationship between a network, 
agents and the wider environment. 
 
4.12 Agency structure relations in policy implementation 
The agency-structure relation focuses on autonomy and control. It draws 
more insights from Giddens thinking (Kipo, 2014). Anthony Giddens 
conceptualizes agents as knowledgeable individual actors, with more wilful 
power and committers of action. Agents are active and creative persons who 
are engaged in continual flow of action. Agents continually monitor their 
activities and expect other agents to do same-reflexive monitoring of 
individual activity and others (Giddens, 1984). Agents are competent beings 
capable of explaining what they do. Agents have intentions for doing 
something and they have reasons for doing so. In addition, Giddens thinks 
that while competent agents can nearly always tell or report freely about their 
intentions, reasons for acting the way they do, they cannot necessarily do so 
for their motives. The problem with Giddens thinking is about agents and 
their motives; whether they directly motivate agents’ day-to-day conduct or 
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agents’ motives are structurally determined, (actors in the context of this 
study would be synonymized for agents). 
 
There are consequences of agents’ action, some consequences are known 
others are unknown (unintended). Some consequences may affect agent 
‘doing’ action or affect other individuals and or larger society. The 
consequences of what agents do, intentional (wilful) and or unintentional lead 
to change of events. Such change of events would not have happened if 
actor(s) had behaved or acted differently. The issue is on what agents ‘do’ 
and consequences of what has been done-within agent’s own control (Kipo, 
2014). 
 
It is important to note Giddens practical consciousness of social actor-as 
capacity of human subject in social action and social structure. In Giddens 
perspective, action refers to human beings(agents) and the aggregate of 
action create and reproduce social structure in which action is embedded. 
Social structure in Giddens view is a product of action. Giddens thinking 
illustrates that the relationship between agents and structure is that of 
‘autonomy and control’. This means agents have the capacity to act freely 
and are capable of creating social structures which in tend control or put 
some limitations on agents. To be an agent/actor means capable of exerting 
some degree of control over structures (social relations) in which the agent is 
“enmeshed” (Sewell, 1992, Giddens, 1984). 
 
Agency is the capacity of individuals to act independently of social structures 
in making their own decisions and choices (Giddens, 1984). Other theorists 
view that it is individuals who make and remake their world. All human beings 
have the capacity for agency-for forming intentions, capacity for desiring and 
acting creatively (Sewell, 1992). This is an indication that all members of 
society exercise some amount of agency in the conduct of their daily 
activities or lives. Humans are born with highly generalized capacity for 
agency, as analogous to humans’ capacity to use language. Sewell views 
complement Giddens thinking on agency-structure relation in terms of 
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autonomy and control (Giddens, 1984). Agency characterizes all persons 
(personal agency). However, the agency exercised by persons is collective in 
its sources and mode of exercise. Thus, agency is collective as well as 
individual-dualism (Sewell, 1992). 
 
 4.12.1 Agency-power relations 
Giddens perspective on agency-power relation is based on capacity of 
individual to “make a difference” to pre-existing state of affairs. For instance, 
the ability of an individual to change course of events, for example, A makes 
B to move in the direction B would not have moved (Giddens, 1984). This 
capability of an individual to “make a difference” implies exercise of power. 
Giddens says any agent that loses this capability to “make a difference” in 
course of events ceases to be an agent. Agency logically involves power in 
the sense of ‘transformative capacity’ and power is closely linked to agency 
from Giddens thinking. 
 
Max Weber sees power as capacity of an individual or actor to realize his or 
her will against the will of others in social action. Weber conception of power 
is that one actor exercises power over another actor (Weber, 1946). Luke 
and Weber conceptions of power suggest dominance of the individual will 
and desire over another individual or over collective wills and desires. This 
conceptualization of power in terms of agency misses power of social 
structures, which mould human personality. Agents wield power and power is 
not equal among agents in the social world. 
 
Lukes and Weber conceptions of power as discussed above contrast sharply 
with other scholars’ particularly Parsons and Foucault who conceptualize 
power as ‘property of society or the social community’ (Giddens, 1984). If 
power is property of society or social community, then this makes the scope 
of power too broad. Parsons and Foucault conceptions indicate power is 
vested in groups, communities that they exercise for their common good 
against individual and sectional interest and will. 
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Giddens view structure as implicated in power relations and power relations 
as implicated in structure (Giddens, 1984). Giddens power is not basically 
linked to attainment of sectional interests (individualist or societal or 
communal interest) but duality or dialectic. The conceptual dilemma is 
whether power reflects dualism or duality of structure. 
 
Structure is conceptualized as ‘external’ to human action; it serves as 
constraint on activities of an independently constituted subject. This 
conception of structure is related to dualism of social object and subject, 
macro-micro levels of analysis where society is treated as collective reality 
and individuals as units of analysis. This characterizes ontology of social 
sciences. Anthony Giddens conception of structure differs sharply from those 
dualisms of subject and social object, macro and micro or structure and 
action. To Giddens structure cannot be analysed separately from action. 
Structures are made, maintained and changed through human actions 
(agency). To him structure is intrinsically linked to agency and societies 
would cease to exist if all agents involved disappeared.  
 
Giddens also link structure to rules and resources. He defines structure as 
“rules and resources recursively involved in institutions” (Giddens, 1984). 
Institutions are “the more enduring features of social life” (Ibid). Rules and 
resources are medium of actors’ social interaction. Rules constrain action 
while resources make action possible, treating resources as enabling aspects 
of structure. Giddens sees structure and agency as dialectical rather than 
dualism. This explains Giddens core ontological notion of duality of structure. 
Duality of structure involves social practices of actors and collectivises. 
Social practice as unit of investigation has both a structural and an agency 
feature.  
 
Mouzelis  criticized Giddens reduction of structure-agency dualism into 
duality as incomplete. Giddens conception that structures always constrain 
and enable actors is also criticized for inability to focus on degrees of 
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constraint within or between systems (Kieran, 1998). Mouzelis conception of 
‘dualism’ suggests  ‘distance’ between actor and structure (Mouzelis, 1995). 
Archer made efforts to develop coherent and an empirically profitable 
conception of structure and agency. She made strong effort to connect theory 
and research. Her analytic dualism-claims that effective sociological research 
depends on clear distinction between actors (agents) and structures instead 
of fusion of the two concepts. Researchers and theorists must see societies 
and individuals as different entities in their analysis. 
 
Contemporary social theorists in their construction of social theories look at 
relation between agency and structure rather than as either individualists or 
holists. According to Sztompka social theorists need to create a philosophy of 
science that is adequate in their theoretical needs or to create a “fully formed 
methodological relations” to parallel conceptions of individualism and holism. 
Theoretical problem is whether social theories should be developed, 
constructed or approached as either individualism or holism or be developed 
as agency-structure relation (Parsons, 1995). 
 
Giddens does not see power as a contest, struggle between groups, classes, 
he rather sees a close relation between power and agency. Giddens view is: 
any individual in a social relationship irrespective of that person’s position in 
the relationship has certain amount of power over the other. Giddens says, 
power relations are always two-way, power is a relation of autonomy and 
dependence in social interaction. Giddens sees power in both agency and 
structure, where power is viewed as transformative capacity and domination. 
 
The power is a relational concept linking transformative capacity of actors 
and structures of domination. Giddens structures of dominion refer to 
asymmetries resources used to sustain power relations in social interaction. 
Giddens power is not about struggle for recognition and domination of one 
structure over the other in social life but rather power is about interaction and 
elements of production of interaction between agents and social systems 
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(Giddens, 1984; 1979). Thus, Giddens does not reduce social life to struggle 
for power (Parsons, 1995). 
 4.12.2 Agency-structure relation in policy implementation 
Policy theorists and scholars have different conceptions of effective policy 
implementation. Effective policy implementation is defined as “keeping to the 
original intent of the public officials who had ratified the policy” (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2009). This conception suggests hierarchy of authority or chain of 
command exists to ensure policy is successfully implemented in terms of 
achieving goals and objectives. This conception represents ‘top-down’ 
theorists approach to policy implementation; they see effective policy 
implementation towards achieving policy goals and objectives (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1984). The dilemma is whether effective policy 
implementation is based on carrying out ‘policy intent’ or not. 
 
Agency is a highly contested concept among policy theorists in policy 
implementation. Some policy theorists link agency to actions and activities of 
individuals-human agency. Other policy theorists link agency to structure-
actions of implementing institutions and organizations in society (Manzamian 
and Sabatier, 1983; Hall and O’Toole, 2000). Principal-agent theorists see 
agency differently. Agency is seen as policy implementers (actions of lower 
staffs). Also, agency is seen as ‘principals’ (policy makers like politicians and 
senior public officials). All these conceptions involve human agency. These 
conceptions of agency appear to be a dilemma between actions of 
individuals and actions of implementing institutions. 
 
Agency-structure relation, some policy thinkers view the two concepts as 
essentially linked. In this regard, Winter developed integrated implementation 
model, which attempts to surpass the contrast between agencies (actor-
based) and structure (groups, organizations-based). Winter’s theoretical 
argument is towards synthesizing rather than critical theorizing. In this 
respect, Winter’s model identifies key clusters of factors, actors conceive to 
affect implementation output and outcome. These factors and actors include 
104 
 
policy formulation and design; organizational and inter-organizational 
behaviour; actions, behaviour and perception of street-level bureaucrats 
(actors); target groups behaviour; changes in society and socio economic 
conditions. They are crucial for effective policy implementation (Winter, 
2003). These key factors and actors can facilitate or inhibit policy 
implementation. 
. 
Ayee in his work Saints, Wizards, Demons and System see effective policy 
implementation as involving key policy actors (agents) and environmental 
factors (structures or systems). He sees actors and factors conception as a 
way to solving agency-structure problem in policy implementation study. 
Ayee’s conception makes particular reference to Ghana and other African 
countries. To him key policy actors and factors must be taken into 
consideration for successful policy implementation. These key policy actors 
include committed politicians and bureaucrats (‘saints’), appropriate policy 
analysts (‘wizards’), hostile and apathetic groups (‘demons’). On key factors, 
emphasis is place on identifying environmental factors (‘systems’) that work 
against policy implementation (Ayee, 2000). Ayee’s theoretical insight is 
towards a multi-dimensional perspective, key actors and factors play 
important role in implementation. 
 
4.13 Network as a Way to Link Structure and Agency 
There are two important characteristics of a policy network environment. The 
first one is that no stakeholders can achieve their goals without other’s help 
such as information, finance, and resource-exchange. The second is that the 
exercise of power is the most important element. As noted above, it can also 
be said that the exercise of power or the influential pathways in the policy 
process are absolutely identified by the network relationships between two or 
more policy makers rather than property or attribute that is inherent in an 
individual or group. It also means that power relationships are asymmetrical 
actual or potential interactions in which one social actor exerts greater control 
over another’s behaviour. Besides, more specifically, if we are concerned 
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more with communication and information-exchange in policy processes, the 
influence occurs when one actor intentionally transmits information to 
another, altering the latter’s actions from what would have occurred without 
the information (Klijn, 1997).  
 
If we are concerned more with Dahl’s definition of power, this also shows that 
power is a relationship between one social actor and another within a specific 
situation. In other words, influence can also be seen as the relational 
dimension of power because a communication channel must exist between 
influencer and influence. The basic units of any complex policy network 
system are not individuals, but positions or roles occupied by social actors 
and the relations or connections between these positions (Klijn,1997: Wang, 
2010). 
 
It is obvious that the structural approach not only ignores individual bases of 
explanation in the policy process, but also that the agent approach neglects 
the structural factor that can shape individuals’ behaviour. To be persuasive, 
accounts of policy formation/implementation should combine both structural 
and individual perspectives because the stakeholders in policy domains are 
embedded in the political and institutional contexts. Of course, before the 
causal relationship between action strategy and policy outcome can be 
identified, institutional and political structure has influence on an actor’s 
preference, interests and strategies. The network perspective, emphasising 
structural relationships as its key orienting principle is a strategy to link these 
(Knoke and Yang,  2008).  
 
As Granovetter (1985) points out, under-and over-socialised accounts are 
ironically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations, and 
a detailed account of individual action must consider its embeddedness in 
such structure. The network approach is a method to build a bridge between 
the structural constraints and individual action in social science and can 
provide measures of the structural constraints of actors depending not only 
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on their own relations but also on the way other actors are related. 
Embedding actors within the set of their interactions allows for insight into the 
distribution of power and the effective influence of social and political actions.  
 
With regard to the methodological stance of the network perspective, two 
important themes should be noticed. First, the methodological level of the 
network approach can be identified at the meso-level (Rhodes, 1997) and the 
unit of analysis is not individual but tie. Second, networks are a powerful 
conceptual tool for linking the structural location of actors, their individual 
preferences, and their actions, for bridging the micro/macro gap, and for 
connecting structure and agency (Tilly, 1997). The reason is that the network 
approach works to describe underlying patterns of social structure, explaining 
the impact of such patterns on behaviour and attitudes (Arts and Tatenhove, 
2004). 
 
Policy networks can be defined as a set of relatively stable relationships, 
which are of a non- hierarchical and interdependent nature and link a variety 
of actors who share common interests (not preferences) with regard to a 
specific policy. Actors exchange resources and information in order to 
increase the impact of their lobbying on policy decisions. This relational 
exchange is organized in policy networks. Although it is widely acknowledged 
that final decision control is the most important resource in policy process 
authors largely agree that this control can be exchanged for influence 
resources such as information, public support, or technical expertise (Choi 
and Robertson, 2013). The possession of these influence resources 
considerably facilitates direct access to decision making and policy 
implementation and increases actors’ power (Heaney,  2014) 
 
Policy network analysis has been a research approach in policy studies for 
many years and offers a description of how policy decision processes are 
organised, but does not provide any explanation of why they are organized in 
that way (Hill, 2005). Due to the difficulty of measuring networks, policy 
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network analysis has often been treated as a metaphor, a conceptual 
scheme, or a management technique (Milward and Provan, 1998) but there 
is no doubt that the network perspective provides not only a useful alternative 
to understand the policy implementation process in modern society but also a 
strategy to build a bridge between structural and agent perspectives. To 
assess structural determinants of resources and power, some scholars point 
to two different branches of research that have followed “relatively separate 
tracks”: policy networks versus collaborative networks research. Actors 
exchange resources and information in order to increase the impact of their 
lobbying on policy decisions. This relational exchange is organized in policy 
networks (Laumann and Knoke, 1987). 
 
4.14Theories to be used in this study 
The concepts of power, its different theories and policy networks (will be 
used in the chapter six) to analyse the data along with neopatrimonialism 
concept and path dependency as discussed below. 
 
 4.14.1 Neo-patrimonialism 
To understand the patrimonial core along with the neo prefix, we must re-
examine Weber’s use of the concept. It is argued that a true neo-
patrimonialism, should include the reciprocities that Weber discusses along 
with the personal dimensions of power, governance, and compliance that 
feature in most contemporary accounts. It has to recognize the mutual 
socially constructed obligations along with the inequalities. It must allow for 
the possibility that such a complex, multi-stranded set of ties and obligations 
is too complex and diverse to predetermine any one regime type (Pitcher et 
al. 2009). 
 
For Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, “bad 
governance,” violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific 
form of authority and source of legitimacy.  Almost all structural subordinates 
retain some power to resist or subvert the desires of those in authority, but 
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they also agree that certain individuals are entitled to their obedience. 
Weber’s ideal types, describing the cultural variations with which this 
compliance with authority could be constructed, attempted to examine how 
the dominated understand, participate in, and even celebrate their 
domination. Going beyond Marx’s ideas of mystification or false 
consciousness, Weber tried to catalogue the diverse ways in which the 
legitimate exercise of power could be culturally framed. In patrimonial 
societies, which have existed in many places, what we would call the state 
was indeed the personal domain of one or a few leaders. However, in many 
such places significant legitimacy was derived from an aspect of 
patrimonialism that is now frequently overlooked (Pitcher  et al.  2009). 
 
These were reciprocities that helped cement patrimonial authority. Such 
reciprocities—personal, densely interwoven, often lopsided, and based on 
vague and symbolic dynamics of status, loyalty, and deference as much as 
on material exchange—became the means by which rulers sought obedience 
from the ruled. Particularly in the political science literature, the terms 
patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are commonly understood (with 
reference to Weber) to denote systems in which political relationships are 
mediated through, and maintained by, personal connections between leaders 
and subjects, or patrons and clients. Authority and the social linkages 
through which it is exercised are vested almost as personal property in an 
individual, rather than in impersonal institutions or in a mandate conferred 
and withdrawn by citizens. Ironically, while patrimonialism is said to cement 
social bonds in small-scale situations through a reliance on trust, reciprocity, 
and material exchanges, it is believed to distort power, corrupt authority, and 
fuel personal puffery when it infiltrates larger political institutions such as 
bureaucracies and states (Pitcher  et al.  2009). 
 
Despite early concerns that patrimonialism had become a “catch-all concept” 
(Theobald, 1982) and that the applicability of patrimonialism and neo 
patrimonialism to such a range of cases required too much conceptual 
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stretching (Crook, 1989), the third and fourth uses of these terms attempt to 
advance more general theoretical propositions about the causes and 
consequences of neo patrimonialism in developing countries. In the third 
case, scholars trace relationships between patrimonialism or 
neopatrimonialism and economic development. For example, Theobald 
observes that a lack of development tends to produce a patrimonial public 
administration. 
 
Drawing on Weber’s typology, he suggests that underdeveloped states 
typically have bureaucracies in which individuals rely on public office to 
secure private gain because such states lack the institutional arrangements 
necessary to provide a consistent source of revenue to the state. Without a 
stable revenue stream with which to pay its officials, the state fails to create a 
professional and credible bureaucratic apparatus; officials rely on personal 
networks for power and funds, thereby creating patrimonial bureaucracies. 
Although Theobald does not restrict his analysis to Africa, he cites a number 
of examples from Africa to support his claims. 
 
Most important, contemporary scholars have been at pains to explain how 
personalized relations could function (or malfunction) in the public realm. 
Rather than questioning the supposed exclusion or neutralization of personal 
ties in rational legal bureaucracies, these analysts have seen such 
relationships as either impossible to institutionalize (Budd, 2004) or as 
“polluting” the public sector with inappropriate connections (Jackson and  
Rosberg, 1982), resulting in corrupt “hybrid” forms of social and political 
relations. 
 
4.14.2 Path dependency 
Path dependence implies that the direction and scope of institutional change 
cannot be easily or costlessly divorced from its early direction (North, 1990). 
The core argument of path dependency is that it is difficult to make 
fundamental changes of existing policies and therefore, policy continuity 
110 
 
tends to prevail simply because when policies are laid down, decision-
makers tend to oppose change (Hill,  2003). 
 It is only when a so-called critical juncture occurs there is a theoretical 
possibility that a change of policy can take place. It is very often dramatic 
events such as wars, military conflicts or economic crises that create ‘a 
‘‘breaching point’’ from which historical developments move into a new path’ 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996).Path dependence suggests that when a commitment 
to a policy has been established and resources devoted to it, over time it 
produces ‘increasing returns’ (when people adapt to, and build on, the initial 
decision) and it effectively becomes increasingly costly to choose a different 
path (Room,  2011).  
In many cases these ‘returns’ are associated with the establishment and 
maintenance of institutions. Historical institutionalist studies often define 
institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating procedures that structure conflict’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The 
focus of analysis becomes the details of a ‘critical juncture’ and the timing of 
decisions is crucial, because it may be the order of events that sets policy on 
a particular path. We identify both inertia and unpredictability, as relatively 
small events or actions can have a huge and long-term effect on policy 
change, which is very difficult to reverse. Both, Pierson (2000) and Room 
(2011) adopt the same language (the ‘Polya urn’) to describe the 
unpredictability of events and initial choices followed by subsequent 
inflexibility when the rules governing general behaviour become established 
and difficult   to change. 
Mahoney outlines the three principal elements of a path dependent model of 
historical evolution as differences on general story guidelines. That is:  
(1) only early events in a sequence matter; (2) these early events are 
contingent; and (3) later events are inertial (Mahoney, 2000). Contingency 
usually suggests that the sequence of events is not a strictly necessary one, 
predictable from the conditions of the starting point according to general 
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laws, there is a reasonable pattern, which relates one point to another, 
especially in the early part of the sequence. While a random sequence 
implies that any event has an equal probability of following from any other, in 
a provisional sequence each turning point renders the occurrence of the next 
point more likely until, finally, “lock in” occurs and the general principle of 
increasing returns, takes over the work of explanation (Mahoney,  2000). 
Path dependency stresses the limitations placed on change by the structure 
of institutions and explains why, even in situations that seem to beg for 
significant change, breakthroughs rarely occur. Adding on this 
incrementalism orientation, a number of factors have been examined to 
explain why, in some cases, large change does come about. In this situation, 
the roles of key actors, such as charismatic political leaders, and the 
importance of ideas (Béland, 2005) have been prominent. Large change, 
sometimes referred to as “punctuated equilibrium,” is more likely to follow, 
according to this type of thinking, when institutions show signs of weakness, 
giving way to the action of key players armed with ideas whose time has 
come. The notion of windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995) rationales to 
increase our ability to explain and predict when institutions, actors, and ideas 
are aligned favourably for change. 
 
4.14.3 Models of path dependency 
In the existing path-dependence literature, one can find different analyses of 
path dependence. Many of them suggest that path dependence requires both 
self-reinforcing and reactive sequences (Beyer, 2010). For Mahoney (2000), 
self-reinforcing sequences refers to the ‘formation and long-term reproduction 
of a given institutional pattern, while reactive sequences stand for chains of 
briefly ordered and causally connected events. 
 
As Mahoney states (2000), in reactive sequences ‘each event within the 
sequence is in part a reaction to antecedent events However, other studies 
exclude reactive sequences from the definition of path dependence  
(Dobusch and Schubler, 2013). It is argued that each event or step in any 
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chronological sequence can be linked to each other in a chain of connection. 
As any antecedent event can be linked to subsequent events, almost any 
non-reinforcing event sequence can be treated as a reactive sequence. This 
raises the problem of falsifiability. Given such limitations or difficulties, this 
work also limits path dependence to ‘self-reproducing’ sequences and 
processes. 
 
The highly discussed and frequently employed models of path dependence in 
the existing literature are described below. While these models differ in terms 
of the logic of action and the mechanisms of path reproduction, they have 
similar conceptions of human agency and of social action. 
 
Utilitarian model 
The utilitarian model of path dependence is associated with the logic of 
consequentiality. As March and Olsen (1984) observe, consequential or 
calculative logic states that ‘action is choice, and choice is made in terms of 
expectations about its consequences’. This model assumes that human 
agents have fixed and prior preferences or interests, and they are primarily 
concerned with maximizing their utilities. Agents are also imagined as 
rational, in the sense that they choose among available options by engaging 
in practical cost-benefit assessments. Therefore, it is assumed that agents 
consciously create institutions to increase means-ends efficiency and to 
maximize collective welfare (Weingast, 2002).The main mechanism of 
continuity or path reproduction in the utilitarian model of path dependence is 
increasing returns, which are defined as self-reinforcing, positive feedback 
processes (Dobusch and Schubler,  2013).  
 
Normative model 
Normative paths are linked to the norm-based logic of appropriateness, 
which assumes that actions are primarily guided by rules, norms, and 
identities rather than by material interests (Schmidt, 2010). Thus, as a set of 
norms, rituals, values, meanings, and procedures, institutions provide a logic 
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of appropriateness, which constitutes identities and interests, and 
consequently shapes agents’ behaviour (Olsen,  2009). 
 
In an institutional environment, then, agents are assumed to be motivated by 
ideational concerns such as legitimacy, reputation, and prestige (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). In other words, actors are not only homo economics but also 
homo sociologic us, which suggests that agents also observe collective 
understandings such as socially shared ideas, norms, and values. Behaviour 
is treated as rule or norm driven rather than choice driven. Although the 
normative model is based on the logic of appropriateness, which is set 
against the logic of consequences of the utilitarian model, interestingly, these 
models of path dependence share a similar conception of agency. For the 
normative model, in institutionalized settings actors ‘consciously’ follow the 
associated rules, rituals, and norms and act according to the logic of 
appropriateness rather than just trying to maximize their exogenously defined 
utilitarian interests. However, the normative model also accepts that agents 
are concerned with the consequences or outcomes of their actions. It is 
assumed that agents conform to the rules of appropriateness to avoid certain 
undesirable outcomes such as opprobrium (Olsen,  2009). 
 
Habitual path dependence 
Weber (1978) identifies four different ideal types of social action: Purposively 
or instrumentally rational action is motivated by desired or calculated ends;  
rational action is based on normative or ethical commitments; affectual action 
is driven by emotional factors; and traditional action is propelled by 
accustomed or habituated patterns of practice. Instrumentally, rational and 
value rational actions correspond to the logic of consequences and the logic 
of appropriateness, respectively, and, as discussed above, are highly utilized 
in institutional and policy analyses.  
 
However, traditional action, which is connected to the logic of habit, has been 
neglected by institutional analyses and perspectives. Rather than the 
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purposive, calculative, and strategic aspects of human agency, the logic of 
habit is concerned with its dispositional, iterative, and practical aspects. It 
constitutes the stimulus behind recurrent (usually unconscious) patterns of 
action or practice. As Weber also observes, the bulk of everyday actions 
involves habitual actions. Unreflective, non-deliberative actions are prevalent 
types of social action because human agents do not always engage in 
calculation or deliberation before acting. Therefore, the habitually 
accustomed routines and actions occupy an important place in the social and 
political worlds. Although many rule-following actions are actually based on 
habits (Hodgson, 2007); the logic of habit has been largely ignored by the 
extant path-dependence literature. It can be suggested that the logic of habit 
has major implications for the path-dependence approach. 
 
The notion of ‘habit’ 
Drawing upon studies by William James (1842–1910), John Dewey (1859–
1952), and Thorstein B. Veblen (1857–1929), Hodgson distinguishes habit 
from action by defining the former as ‘a propensity to behave in a particular 
way in a particular class of situations’ (2007) Hodgson further argues that 
habit should be understood as a ‘causal mechanism, not merely a set of 
correlated events’ (2004). 
 
It is widely accepted that habits serve key functions in social life. As Hopf 
notes, habits are ‘the unreflective reactions we have to the world around us: 
our perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and practices. They simplify the world, 
short circuiting rational reflection’ (2010). And most people get mental and 
physical comfort and reassurance in continuing to do what they did in the 
past. Similar to long-term contracts, habits also reduce uncertainty by 
increasing the predictability of future actions. Habits are assumed to be 
usually unintentional, unconscious, automatic, and unreflective processes, 
but several scholars warn against overly mechanical understandings of 
habits, devoid of any meaning and understanding. They assert that, although 
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unreflective and iterative, habits also involve meaning, understanding, and 
knowledge (Hopf,  2010). 
 
Habits and Institutions 
There is a direct linkage between habits and institutions. As Fleetwood 
suggests, institutions ‘become internalized or embodied within agents as 
habits via a process of habituation, whereupon the habits dispose agents to 
think and act in certain ways, without having to deliberate’ (2008). The 
concept of routinization is closely related to habituation. As a largely 
unconscious process, habituation is characterized by repetition, regularity 
and continuity. With these features, habituation helps a choice or action 
become routinized or taken for granted. Therefore, it is asserted that 
institutions are linked to agency through the mechanisms provided by 
habituation and habits (Hodgson, 2007). Habits help institutions sustain 
themselves. 
 
Features of habitual path dependence 
Habitual path dependence requires some of the defining features of the 
classical conception of path dependence. In that understanding, a path-
dependent process should have the following properties: unpredictability, 
inflexibility, non-ergodicity and potential inefficiency(Pierson, 2000). 
Unpredictability is related to the presence of multiple choices or equilibria at 
the initial conditions. Because early events are treated as stochastic, 
contingent occurrences, it is difficult to predict which option will be chosen 
and lock it in. Contingency, which is considered a necessary condition for 
path dependence, is also relevant to habitual paths. At critical junctures or 
moments, a variety of actions or choices are available for human agents, and 
any one might be chosen. In other words, it is difficult to predict which 
behaviour will be habituated and lock it in. Thus, habitual paths might also 
emerge out of contingent or stochastic events and conditions (Pierson, 
2000). 
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Inflexibility means that once a path is chosen, it becomes difficult for agents 
to return to initial conditions or to shift to another path. Mahoney asserts that 
‘once contingent historical events take place, path-dependent sequences are 
marked by relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of 
as “inertia” that is, once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a 
particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in motion and continue to 
track this outcome’ (2000). Habitual routines are also difficult to break.  
 
Non-ergodicity means that small, random occurrences early in a sequence of 
events do not cancel out; rather, such events have a long-lasting impact on 
future choices or events (Mahoney, 2000). This feature is also relevant for 
habitual paths. Early events or developments in the process of habituation 
have greater determinative impact on which choice is routinized. 
 
Potential inefficiency suggests that the path chosen by agents may not be the 
most efficient choice. In other words, despite conventional models, which 
assume that rational actors make the most efficient decisions to maximize 
utilities, sub-optimal, inefficient outcomes or paths might also lock 
themselves in. Potential path inefficiency is relevant to habitual path 
dependence simply because, efficiency is not really the issue in the case of 
habitual human conduct; such conduct is primarily unreflective, non-
deliberative  and automatic (Hopf,  2010). 
 
4.14.4 Critique of path dependency  
A process is path dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further 
moves in that same direction; in other words the order in which things 
happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain 
point constrains the trajectory after that point. As the Nobel Laureate 
Douglass North (1990) puts it:  
“path dependency is a process that constrains future choice sets: At every 
step along the way there are choices, political and economic, that provide 
real alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the 
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choice set and link decision-making through time. It is not a story of 
inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future”. 
 
The concept of path dependency is neither a framework nor a theory or 
model in the terms of Ostrom (1999): it does not provide a general list of 
variables that can be used for ‘diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry’; nor does it 
provide hypotheses about specific links between variables or parameters. 
Instead, path dependency is an empirical category, an organizing concept 
which can be used to label a certain type of temporal process. The 
application of this label to a phenomenon is a form of explanation; it 
competes with alternatives, such as the particular political circumstances 
pertaining at different times to provide the best explanation of that 
phenomenon. Importantly, however, the concept of path dependency does 
not per se provide necessary or sufficient conditions to understand or explain 
that which it labels: path dependent processes. 
 
Path dependency summarizes the insight that policy decisions accumulate 
over time, a process of accretion can occur in a policy area that restricts 
options for future policy-makers. In this sense, path dependency arguments 
can provide an important caution against a too easy conclusion of the 
inevitability, or functionality of observed outcomes (Pierson,  2000). 
 
The criticism that the concept path dependency lacks explanatory power is 
well expressed by Raadschelders (1998): “It is only by virtue of retrospect 
that we are aware of stages or paths of development. ‘Path dependency’ 
refers to a string of related events: causality in retrospect. The concept does 
not come even close to pinpointing a mechanism or the mechanisms that 
propel social change”. The quotation contains two criticisms. The first is that 
the concept cannot be used for current or future phenomena. This is not a 
singular feature of path dependency but common to many concepts that are 
useful for retrospective, ‘thick’ historical description in the social sciences. 
The more important criticism is that even if one accepts path dependency as 
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a possible candidate for explanation it is unlikely to be convincing because 
the idea does not provide any mechanisms that might provide sufficient 
conditions for the process observed.  
 
4.14.5 Politics of path dependency 
Deeply embedded in the historical institutionalist literature, lies the notion that 
those policy systems tend to be conservative and find ways of defending 
existing patterns of policy, as well as the organizations that make and deliver 
those policies. In Pierson’s (2000) terms there are self-reinforcing processes 
in institutions that make institutional configurations, and hence their policies, 
difficult to change once a pattern has been established. During the past 
several decades, historical institutionalism has emerged as a leading and 
prominent approach in political science generally.  
 
Historical institutionalism conceives of public policy  and political change as a 
detached process, characterized by extended time periods of considerable 
stability referred to as “path-dependency” interrupted by turbulent, “formative 
moments.” During those formative periods public policy is assigned new 
objectives, new priorities are established, and new political coalitions evolve 
to sustain those new policies (Steinmo et al. 1992). Political conflict, is not 
just a feature of formative moments but just often occurs during path-
dependent periods, whenever path dependency is sustained by a dominant 
political coalition successfully fending off all attempts  to alter the political 
course (Morrill et al. 2003). 
 
Scholars especially those focusing upon the state, overemphasize the 
importance of civil servants and bureaucrats in policymaking processes, 
depreciating excessively the importance of politicians as creative actors. One 
can identify instances in which civil servants do play policy roles far 
exceeding the influence usually accorded to them in constitutional 
frameworks (Pierson,  2000). 
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Several scholars emphasize how “policy legacies”(the effects of earlier 
decisions) constrain subsequent policy choices about what innovation is 
permissible (Weir, 1992). This notion of constraint is not a new claim, and 
Heclo singled it out in his comparative study of British and Swedish social 
policy(Heclo, 1974). The same sort of argument is explained by path 
dependency theorists, who seek to argue more that “history matters,” to 
some extent a self-evident truth (Berman, 1998). Rather, they claim that 
apparently small choices in institutional arrangements can have remarkable 
consequences at a later date and that some policy choices may prove almost 
irreversible (Kingdon,  1995 ).  
 
Sabatier argues that policies persist primarily because of the persistence of 
the shared policy beliefs that undergird them. Actors in the policy process are 
reluctant to dismiss their core beliefs, although they may be willing to 
dispense with more peripheral beliefs in order to hold on. The idea for the 
persistence of policies here is not dissimilar to that found in at least some 
versions of historical institutionalism, and in March and Olsen’s version of 
institutionalism but lacks the institution that formalize and structure the 
resistance to change. Institutions, in the form of agencies in government, are 
used in empirical analyses of policy change, but the emphasis in the analysis 
has been on political actors rather than institutions (1993). 
 
4.15 Empirical studies from Low and Middle income countries  
Translation of policy into practice in developing countries is a challenging and 
real concern. The policy implementation process in developing countries 
shares a great deal with the process in more developed countries. However, 
the effects of poverty, political uncertainty, people’s participation as well as 
the unique character of each developing country cannot be ignored in the 
policy implementation process (Saetren,  2005). 
 
Jan-Erik Lane (1999), in ‘Policy Implementation in Poor Countries’ argues 
that the problems connected with policy implementation in developing or 
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Third World countries are tangled with basic economic and political 
conditions. He contends that political stability and economic development are 
closely interrelated. On the one hand, low level of economic development 
leads to political instability and, on the other hand, political instability worsens 
poverty. Effective policy implementation improves poverty situation in 
developing countries, which need both economic development and political 
stability. He is optimistic about the possibility of closing the gap between the 
rich and poor countries, provided strong and stable regimes utilize available 
economic resources to foster economic growth and development. 
 
Participation in policy processes is not so pronounced, and the channels for 
participation are less well established in developing countries. At the same 
time, the state structures, whatever their weaknesses, are relatively powerful 
as compared with their societies. However, the interface between state and 
society is constantly changing. Of all the causes of poor policy 
implementation in developing countries, the most serious institutional flaws 
are in political systems. Furthermore, a common assumption is that 
implementers are involved at every stage of the policy-making process, and 
that they are often the most powerful groups in setting the policy agenda. In 
many developing countries, participation of lower level in the selection of sets 
of options is rare, and the choices are made by central-level policymakers. 
Very often, the problems the developing bureaucracies have to deal with are 
more difficult to solve than those in developed countries, multiplied by limited 
resources for implementation (Lane, 1999). 
 
Interdependence between developed and developing countries arising from 
globalization is growing up. It has direct impact on the design and 
implementation of policy of the country. Usually, aid conditionality as per the 
interest of donor country determines whether a policy is translated into 
practice or not in a developing country. The adoption and application of 
implementation research findings from western countries for further 
improvement of policy implementation is a challenging concern in developing 
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countries. There are not enough autonomous associations and institutions at 
work to obtain information on the impact of policies or to communicate this 
information to public officials. Policy evaluation tools like ‘think tanks’, 
university research facilities and investigative journalism are virtually 
unknown in developing societies (Lane, 1999). The more conventional 
feedback mechanisms, such as political parties and interest groups, are 
fragmented, or not trusted by their constituents, or controlled or ignored by 
the government. 
 
The literature is dominated by the top-down and bottom-up perspectives and 
their synthesis. The basic arguments of these perspectives concern 
methodologies and accountability. The ‘top-downers’ call for eliminating the 
‘gap’ between formulation and output, whereas the ‘bottom-uppers’ 
emphasize the inevitable, and perhaps desirable, participation of other actors 
in later stages of policy process. Synthesizers have tried to get variables from 
both top-down and bottom-up perspectives (Paudel,  2009). 
 
However, the policy implementation process in developing countries shares a 
great deal with the process in more developed countries. Issues concerned 
with the conceptual clarity of policy implementation, theoretical debate over 
the top-down or bottom-up perspectives, applicability or transfer of research 
output from one region to another, methodology employed in implementation 
research and so on are seen as arguable. This needs to be addressed .In 
addition, such studies should consider the implementation context as well. It 
is because these theories were developed in the Western context where 
more stabilized and democratic political regimes are functional. But, quite a 
different situation often characterized by uncertain, unpredictable and ever 
changing political situations diversified social settings and weak economic 
condition prevails in developing countries (Paudel, 2009). 
 
Several constraints are hampering the implementation of policies and 
programmes in the developing countries which  according to  Hamdan and 
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Defever (2003)  are: shortfall of budgets, inadequate coordination and 
communication between key players, particularly in the area of training and 
education, dependence on external funds, lack of sound data, wide-range of 
actors with divergent interests complicating policy implementation, insufficient 
evaluation and progress monitoring mechanisms, inadequate legal 
framework regarding both public and private sectors, political interference, 
the effects of political patronage system, e.g. opening new facilities, 
recruitment, political appointments, highly centralised management system 
and bureaucratic procedures, resistance to change by personnel, especially 
when the issue entails additional responsibilities, poor incentive system to 
stimulate implementation, in particular regarding strategies of equitable 
distribution of personnel, involvement in private practices, and attraction of 
qualified personnel to the public services, influences of political patronage, 
e.g. unnecessary political appointments, competition between public and 
private sector for limited qualified health personnel in the workforce market. 
 
Some studies (the Ghanaian, Malawian, Nigerian, Pakistan and Bangladesh) 
illustrate how two sets of institutional arrangements formal, ‘Weberian’ 
bureaucratic arrangements in democracy, on the one hand, and varieties of 
patronage and patrimonial relations, on the other  overlap each other, and 
how one tends to prevail in practice, distorting the other (Leftwich,  2007).  
 
Pakistan political system fits into egalitarian-authoritarian, which is 
characterized by a closed ruling elite, authoritarian and patrimonial 
bureaucracies and state-managed popular participation. Close links often 
exist between single political parties and the state and its bureaucracies. 
During the 1970s, the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique 
and Cuba might have been included (Buse et  al. 2005). 
The pluralist approach to politics (Held, 1996) presumes democracy of some 
kind and starts from the assumption that democratic politics in such 
institutional arrangements is as much about the interaction of groups and 
group interests as it is about formal electoral politics and party competition. It 
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is assumed that all groups have some power or influence which they can use 
to advance their interest or curtail the interests of others and help to shape 
policy and institutional outcomes. Democratic politics is concerned with how 
these interests are able to exercise legitimate voice. More recent versions of 
pluralism recognise that states are seldom ‘neutral’ and that they have 
interests of their own, and that some wider interests, notably corporate ones, 
have more power than others (Leftwich,  2007). 
Indian democratic politics, for instance, since 1947, for all its complexities 
can be interpreted in pluralist terms, as can the politics of Canada or New 
Zealand, the mix and overlap of basic institutional rules for politics can 
generate what Carothers (2002) has described as ‘feckless pluralism’. By this 
he means a situation in which dominant elites in coalition, in competition or 
one after each other circulate at the apex of power, seizing scarce state and 
social resources in a vacuum of persistent societal poverty.  
 
Marxist conceptions of politics strongly believe that political power is 
essentially an expression and function of economic power; that class and 
class structures are direct expressions of the economic structure of societies, 
that class conflict is the essence of politics. Marxism asserts that there is only 
one science for the study of society and it calls it by the name of ‘historical 
materialism’ for it is impossible to understand, contemporary British, Bolivian 
or Bangladeshi politics without a full engagement with their economic and 
social history. Interestingly, that is indirectly but precisely the broad approach 
adopted in a number of studies (Pakistan and Bangladesh, for instance) and 
the study of Bolivia’s political party system makes that very clear (Wiggins et 
al. 2006). 
 
Richard Sklar, has pointed out that in many African polities, especially, it is 
not economic power that has given rise to political power, but the other way 
around, where those in control of state power, that is political power, have 
been able to use that control to expand their wealth and that of their 
followers. In Africa, as Sklar argued, ‘class relations, at bottom are 
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determined by relations of power, not production’ (Sklar, 1979). A couple of 
studies on Bolivia, Pakistan, Ghana, and Malawi show the persistence of 
uneven distributions of power, partly anchored in cultural institutions and 
partly anchored in the structure of ownership and control of economic and 
political resources (Leftwich,  2007).  
 
The emergence of new interest groups is often suggested as a potential 
driver of change since these have the potential to challenge and undermine 
existing power relations. The existing power brokers in Pakistani society, 
such as landowning elites, the urban rich, and state functionaries will need to 
accommodate emergent class interests or face political conflict (Gazdar and 
Sayeed, 2003).The emergent middle class is often assumed to play this role 
by virtue of its numerical and economic significance, but its interests may well 
run counter to those of the poor. A counter-argument to the underlying 
progressive role of the middle classes highlights its engagement in 
unproductive rent-seeking which diverts resources from the poor (Nadvi and 
Robinson,  2004).  
 
In a comparative analysis of health policy implementation in developing 
nations like Columbia and Iran (Ugalde, 1978) it was noticed that apolitical 
planning is not possible. In the two countries studied and the literature shows 
that the same is found in many other nations, political leaders and 
technocrats found themselves frequently at odds and in conflict. In Iran, the 
political elites could easily control the technocrats but this was not the case in 
Columbia where technocrats made many political decisions.  
Main weaknesses in the implementation of the voluntary health policy in a 
study conducted in Lebanon in 2013, included lack of planning, and lack of 
political commitment, inadequate resources and weak capacity of public 
institutions. The success of policies depends on integrating knowledge from 
the following three sources: political know-how, scientific and technical 
analysis, as well as professional experience. Findings showed that political 
judgment pre-dominated policy implementation and was influenced by 
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political interests, urgency, and the values and opinion of policymakers 
(Jardali et al.  2014). 
 
Frequently policy programs in low and middle income countries are not 
implemented or are only partially implemented. The interesting finding in the 
study of health sectors in two countries was the many similarities in the 
process of implementation. The flow of decisions in authoritarian societies is 
downward without a previous upward flow of information and demands. 
Implementers do not feel strongly motivated to carry out decisions made 
elsewhere particularly in the face of difficulties which they may have seen 
and superiors declined to acknowledge. It was learnt that poor supervision 
and evaluation also contribute to low compliance and weak implementation 
(Ugalde,  1978). 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) despite achieving success in 
policy formulation has some challenges in terms of effective implementation 
(Jonsson et al. 2014). By comparing two policy implementation processes 
and the role of research in policymaking, it was illustrated that not only the 
context per se is important for the policy formulation and implementation but 
also the timing. It shows that without contextual knowledge and domestic 
implementation capacity the policy in question risks producing unintended 
effects or being delayed (Jonsson et al. 2014). 
The Policy-Implementation gap was quite evident in another study conducted 
in South Africa, Marais (2000) points out that attempts to merge the medical 
and socio-political paradigms were unsuccessful. According to McIntyre and 
Klugman(2003), the course of the implementation process created a 
conspicuous gap between the policy intentions and the policy reality, 
preventing from attaining its more comprehensive goals. It reveals that the 
widening gap between policy intentions and policy implementation resulted 
from a complex interplay of all policy components and actors (Nattrass, 
2007).  
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In another study conducted in Tanzania (Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007) shows 
that pressures from the ruling party to speed up implementation may explain 
why policy implementation was an imposed and rushed process, which gave 
them little time for preparation and left a number of key issues unclear. Other 
studies have certainly shown that policy implementers react negatively to 
new policies formulated by national-level policy makers without their 
involvement (Mwangu,  2002).  
It is interesting to assess the role of Population Policy in Pakistan in relation 
to the experience of neighbouring countries. Useful contrasts can be found in 
the histories of policy and change particularly in Bangladesh, Iran and India. 
Pakistan was the last among its neighbours to have fertility decline and 
continues to have the highest fertility rates. At the time of its inception, 
Pakistan’s fertility rate of 6.6 births per woman fell between India’s fertility 
rate of 5.9 and Iran’s fertility rate of 7 births per woman, and was the same as 
Bangladesh’s (Weiss and Khattak,  2013). 
Bangladesh offers a particularly tantalizing comparison since it was a part of 
Pakistan and therefore had the same policies until 1971. In fact much has 
been written about the comparative experience of the two countries. In 
essence, while politically joined but geographically separated, the two 
countries had many differences in terms of ethnic mix, population densities, 
marriage patterns and landholding patterns. To reduce their different fates to 
merely different implementations of the same development policy is to view 
major shifts in human behaviour through a narrow lens. Another Important 
difference between the two countries was that the newly formed Bangladesh 
had a chance to view its resources in line with population size. Pakistan in 
1971 was in a different position; having lost half of the country, did have at 
that point more resources and other concerns such as a population 
fragmented across four provinces and multiple ethnicities (Weiss and 
Khattak,  2013). 
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Perhaps even more intriguing is Iran, a seemingly conservative country 
where Ayatollah Khomeni announced a population policy quite late, in 1992. 
Yet Iran has found routes to achieve fertility reduction much more rapidly 
than Pakistan population policy in all practical terms followed a fertility 
decline in the case of Iran; perhaps the policy was a mere means to endorse 
behaviour that had already started to take root. In fact, the story of Iran’s 
family planning program is an ideal one, showing how various groups 
converged. Planners, economists, and health specialists, among others, 
joined to create consensus on the issue, taking the powerful clergy on board 
slowly and surely. Iran illustrates that the success of policy lies in its wider 
endorsement. In any case, in Iran as in Bangladesh, a policy supporting 
family planning was  accompanied by supportive policies such as education 
of women, an excellent rural health system with neighbourhood health 
houses, and religious orientation counselling before marriage. This pattern of 
policies led to very rapid decline (Weiss and Khattak, 2013).  
The concept of power and patronage has been well noted in Africa, where 
wielders of traditional sources of patronage were able to gain control over 
government resources (Boone, 1998). The result was a fragmented political 
structure in which national leaders were compelled to negotiate with political 
elites for control of state institutions (Simpson, 1988). 
 
However, this process was not restricted to traditional or tribal areas. Even in 
relatively well-institutionalized Canada, patronage was the primary means by 
which the loyalty of elites was bought in the building of the independent 
Confederation. Relatively more centralized former colonies like Botswana 
and Singapore also used patronage liberally, but in these states, as in Sri 
Lanka the distribution of patronage emanated from the capital. The 
importance of this varied location of patronage distribution lies in the 
contrasting practicality of reform in centralized and decentralized polities. 
Dictators across Africa, even in relatively strong and centralized states like 
Rwanda, have been prolific users of patronage, and have used control of the 
state to amass enormous personal fortunes (Kenny,  2013). 
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A study conducted in Ghana showed that the appearance of a policy or 
programme on the agenda and its fate within the programme of work is 
predominately influenced by how national level decision makers use their 
sources of power to define maternal health problems and frame their policy 
narratives (Koduah et al. 2016). Power is not restricted to the relational 
mobilisation of resources or the achievement of outcomes by actors alone, 
but it also includes dispositional and structural phenomena. 
 
Fischer and Sciarini (2013) confirm that institutionalized decision-making 
power affects how influential an actor is perceived in a policy network. Actors 
have formal authority if they are administrative agencies, executive bodies of 
the central state, political parties, or peak associations. It is suggested that 
the presence of a specific kind of policy network in a given policy sphere 
reveals a great deal about the propensity for it to experience certain types of 
policy change. The evidence from the four Canadian cases in a study 
conducted in 2002, suggests that ‘‘networks do matter,’’ and that continued 
research in this vein is definitely needed. This is why policy networks can 
also explain policy stability, insofar as they are ‘closed’ networks, where key 
actors prevent new actors from entering policy debates and discourses. 
Namely, all actors strive to create ‘policy monopolies’ dominated by the 
stability of interpretations and predictability in terms of who can participate in 
policymaking. Closed policy networks typically also involve veto players that 
can prevent changes from occurring (Howlett et al. 2003). 
 
In a study conducted on Israeli Health systems in 2010, has shown that the 
hospital trust and health reforms suffered due to weak institutions and path 
dependency. It definitely lacked a corps of powerful political actors interested 
in overcoming the obstacles to change (Feder-Bubis and Chinitz,  2010).  
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4.16 Conclusion 
An extensive review of the literature showed policy implementation as a 
complex, technical and political game with a key role of actors/agents and 
structures. It presented an overview of evolution of different implementation 
theories and their synthesis. The relationship between policy actors and 
implementation was emphasized by linking the top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives to Marxist and Pluralist theories. Giddens thinking was applied 
to policy implementation in context of agency structure relations. The 
emergence of policy networks as a way to link actors, their power and 
structures was highlighted. Power and patronage leading to neo-
patrimonialism, path dependency and its models were also discussed in 
detail. 
This chapter highlighted that despite the central role power plays in affecting 
policies, it remains under researched. The central concern of this research 
therefore is to unmask the power relations and strong nexus between these 
networks and path dependency, which affects implementation of policies at 
different tiers. Some of the empirical studies have shown these concepts as 
separate entities but none of the studies conducted in Low and Middle 
Income Countries (LMICs) has integrated all these novel concepts in a single 
study so far.  
The empirical evidence from Tanzania, South Africa, Lebanon, Iran, 
Colombia, Nigeria and Botswana highlighted the complexity of policy 
implementation. Power and patronage were seen African states like Ghana, 
Nigeria and Rwanda. Policy networks seemed to be operating even in 
developed countries like Canada but there was hardly any example found in 
developing countries. Path dependency in Israeli context showed how it 
could block some of the much needed reforms in the health sector. These 
concepts of power, policy networks and path dependency would be taken 
forward to discuss the core argument of this research. 
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Chapter Five: Findings  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the data extracted from the forty-two interview 
transcripts, particularly outlining the perceptions, experiences and knowledge 
of key policy actors in policy implementation process in general and in health 
sector in particular. It also presents the roles of different actors in the 
decision making process and how they perceive their role, the relationships 
among  key actors and the extent of power they exercise. These findings are 
compared and contrasted under the seven main themes from the data, which 
are policy development context, process, role of actors, policy content, policy 
implementation, financing and policy recommendations.  
5.2 Actors in policy implementation  
The main policy actors among the key informants were bureaucrats (civil 
servants inducted through a written and oral exam), politicians, technocrats 
(officers in health and other ministries but not civil servants), donors, Council 
of Common Interests (funding body formed after the 18th amendment and 
chaired by the Prime Minister) private sector, doctors and other interest 
groups. Different groups of the key informants had conflicting perspectives on 
almost all the issues. Consensus was seen within a group where there was a 
common interest, goal or sharing of authority and resources. 
5.2.1 Bureaucrats (national and provincial level) 
There was a consensus among the politicians that the role of bureaucrats 
was of agenda setters and  real decision-makers in the Pakistani context. 
They are seen as all strong and powerful and dominating all the decisions at 
the higher level. It is generally perceived that they can implement what they 
want and create hurdle in those policies which they do not want to see come 
into force. Almost all the politicians agreed that bureaucrats are seen to have 
their own vested interests. Just one politician at the national level had a 
contrasting (minority) view that they are helpless in front of the politicians and 
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they are there just to draft policies. It can be seen that just a minority opinion 
was in favour of the bureaucrats. Bureaucrats at the national level were 
blamed more as compared to the ones at the provincial level. Analysis 
revealed that it was due to conflict of interests, which was seen more at the 
national level. It was interesting to see that the politicians and bureaucrats 
both blamed the army. Politicians more for seizing the power from them and 
bureaucrats for having more control on resources. 
One senior technocrat remarked, “In public sector it’s the health ministry and 
people even like secretary health are helpless. Mainly the politicians are in 
control and it is translated down.”(Key Informant, 12) 
When asked why there is so much dependency on the bureaucrats one 
participant laughed and said “As our politicians do not know how to draft 
even a letter so they are dependent on the bureaucrats”. (Key Informant, 30) 
Therefore, it can be seen that the expertise of the bureaucrats was clearly 
admitted by the politicians and that made them so indispensable for the 
policy makers. Their power was admitted by the majority, but the expertise 
was mentioned by just one or two. 
The politicians who were over 60 years of age had a long institutional 
memory and saw the Pakistani bureaucracy as a remnant of the colonial 
past. In some instances, they explicitly mentioned the institutional friction and 
policy inertia in the general political sphere. The technocrats were of the view 
that the power of bureaucracy vis-à-vis politicians differs from country to 
country. In the current system of political patronage, civil servants and 
politicians may form very tight circles and networks and take policy initiatives, 
which suit them the most. In some career systems like ours, civil servants 
stay and politicians change so they are dependent on the civil servants. 
These bureaucrats have strong linkages in other departments and to some 
external interest groups as well and this thing increases their influence in 
decision-making processes in all sectors be it health, education or others.  
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Bureaucratization in Pakistani context also grew out of nationalism like most 
of the African states. It can be seen that the personal and political 
connections and linkages were prevalent among every group of key actors in 
the policy sphere. Findings suggest the Pakistani bureaucracy could be 
rightly labelled as Patrimonial Bureaucracy as it is mostly run by personal 
networks and personal relationships at all levels and across all departments. 
The patrimonial culture, which prevailed in the macro-political sphere and 
was reflected in the health policy sub-system as well. 
Some of the bureaucrats were keen to explain to the researcher as to how 
the system works in Pakistan. They told that at the national level, federal 
minister and federal secretary are responsible separately to the Prime 
Minister. There are six provinces and each headed by the Chief Minister. 
Each Chief Minister has a secretary and the cabinet. Both secretary and 
ministers report to the Chief Minister. The ministers are more interested in 
funding rather than policy formulation. They try to divert funds to their 
constituencies. They are just interested in service delivery in their areas to 
garner votes for the next tenure. They do not strengthen opposition party 
constituencies. They do it not on policy matters but on local interests. 
Politicians interfere in administrative domain which is considered by the 
bureaucrats to be their domain. There was a clear blame game going on 
between the two important policy players in Pakistan i.e. bureaucrats and the 
politicians. It is striking that tensions among role players existed primarily 
horizontally where two interest groups at the same level competed for 
authority and resources.    
Another senior official in the health ministry remarked “I think  that enhanced 
role of bureaucracy is everywhere. Ideally it should be political ownership but 
conversely every policy, particularly health policy is influenced by the 
bureaucrats.” (Key Informant, 16)                              
A politician who had been in power for quite long and now in opposition said, 
“I think major policy decisions are taken up by the bureaucrats in our country. 
I am a privy to a lot of meetings and certain tasks were given and timeline set 
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but they used to come up with bureaucratic hurdles and procedures.” (Key 
Informant, 2) 
This quote reflects the helplessness of the politicians and the non-decision 
making power of the bureaucrats, which was perceived by a majority of the 
key informants. 
The bureaucrats at the provincial level had quite varied views about political 
interference from the centre. The ones from the Punjab province (which is 
also being governed by the ruling party at the centre) said that they have no 
political pressure or interference by the federal government. But the ones 
from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) complained that they cannot work 
according to their own will and have to listen to what politicians tell them to 
do. 
On the other hand, bureaucrats at national and provincial level were of the 
view that they have the desired knowledge and skills in the policymaking and 
its implementation, which adds to their power and gives them an edge over 
the politicians. They were of the view that it is their knowledge and expertise, 
which makes them indispensable for the politicians. Interestingly, the top civil 
servants supported the government policies and avoided certain issues, but 
the junior officers spoke more openly and were critical of the policies. Most of 
the top-level bureaucrats were reluctant to talk about the reasons behind the 
failure of polio eradication program in Pakistan although some junior level 
blamed the international lobbies behind it. Therefore, the views clearly varied 
at different levels of the government. This also shows the variation of views 
within the group of bureaucrats and the coalitions at this level. 
 5.2.2 Politicians (national and provincial levels) 
There was an apparent consensus among the bureaucrats, health officials, 
and technocrats that the politicians have a lack of commitment, ownership, 
and direction. It was the other way round with the bureaucrats. Just one 
bureaucrat at the federal level praised the politicians for not interfering in his 
decisions. However, mostly they were believed to have some prefixed ideas 
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about policies. Politicians were blamed by the bureaucrats and the 
technocrats to interfere at every level of policymaking and its implementation. 
They were seen favouring and posting their close ones on important posts. 
They were also blamed to just support the politically visible projects to gain 
electorate in the next elections. This blame game was more visible between 
the politicians and the bureaucrats at national and provincial level. Every 
group of actors had a subgroup that differed with the majority, which can be 
considered a minority view. 
A senior technocrat said, “Government makes policies which are run by 
bureaucrats. They just favour their close ones. With each succeeding 
government there is a shift in the policies and the top management.” (Key 
Informant, 9) 
There are two viewpoints in this quote, favouritism and frequent change in 
the governments. 
 A health official involved in the policy implementation remarked, “Politicians 
are the main barrier in implementation of policies. They have a myopic vision 
and earn for personal gains. Every government has its own political agendas. 
They want political visible projects.” (Key Informant, 19) 
Personal and political agendas are being attributed to the politicians. They 
were blamed having wrong priorities and investing in politically visible 
projects for winning the next elections. 
Technocrats believed that politician friendly policies are being made with 
every government and at every level. One health official at the mid 
managerial level narrated this, as “Not just in health but in all sectors 
politician friendly policies are made, like there is no tax on agriculture 
because all politicians are feudals.” (Key Informant, 5) 
The above quote clearly reflects the political patronage and networks in all 
the sectors and not just health. 
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Most of the bureaucrats at the federal level were of the view that the 
politicians do not give them a direction or input and at the end that gets 
implemented is the politicians’ choice. This view was shared by all the 
bureaucrats at the national and provincial level except one at the federal 
level. He expressed his views that the government fully supports him and 
cooperates with him. But sadly, after a month when the researcher was still 
collecting the data he was removed from his office for some unknown 
reasons. 
A senior health ministry official remarked, “Policy is a broad framework. It has 
to be projected and programmed with consensus. But sometimes they are 
standing together, but their faces are in different directions. I mean to say 
they are at 180 degrees. But at the end what politicians want gets onto the 
agenda“. (Key Informant, 16) 
This quote clearly reflects the conflicting working relationship between the 
politicians and the bureaucrats.  
A technocrat at the provincial level said, “Politicians dominate and 
bureaucrats listen.” (Key Informant, 21). 
The above view (though a minority view) was in contradiction to the 
politicians who perceived bureaucracy to be the most powerful. The 
politicians were also blamed  for rent seeking. Rent seeking was mentioned 
mostly by the provincial level bureaucrats. Corruption and rent seeking 
frequently came up during the interviews. It was  evident that due to 
conflicting goals and interests there was strong lobbying among different 
groups. 
Despite the apparent, blame game the hidden power game could easily be 
sensed, which no one talked about and it was directly related to the control of 
resources at different tiers. The power nexus at the national level was clearly 
mirrored at the provincial level and down to the districts. Though at the higher 
level, it was mostly over resources and authority, at the lower level there 
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were some clear alliances, sometimes due to personal networks and 
sometimes due to political connections. 
 5.2.3Technocrats (national and provincial) 
Technocrats were seen to be important actors in the policy implementation 
process. Most of them thought that they are seldom consulted on important 
matters even if they have the right expertise for it.  A couple of politicians at 
the federal level were of the view that the technocrats should be the part of  
the ministries as they have a better knowledge of running the affairs then the 
politicians. 
One health professional remarked: “My big objection is that out policy 
process should also include technocratic part. Bureaucrats are everywhere. 
They can draft well but it is about actual targets and its essence. So I think 
right stakeholders involvement is lacking.” (Key Informant, 40) 
It is quite clear from the above quote that the participation of the right people 
is lacking in the overall policy process. The objective of the health 
professional is apparent here as he sees the gap in the system where the 
stakeholders who are central to the policymaking are marginalized or 
ignored. They are intentionally kept out of the system as the policy makers 
want to have their own monopoly. 
Commenting on the role of recently founded National Health Services 
Regulation and Co-ordination Ministry, a provincial health ministry official 
commented, “The new health ministry is at its budding stage and still not 
mature. It has not given any policy still or defined its role and responsibilities.” 
(Key Informant, 21) 
It can be seen that the provinces openly criticized the new health ministry at 
the centre for not providing the framework for the policies at the provincial 
level. 
A national level bureaucrat “They are doing nothing absolutely nothing.” (Key 
Informant, 41) 
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The above two quotes clearly show the disappointment with the ministry of 
health formed at the national level after the June 2011 devolution which was 
blamed for its careless attitude and not providing a forum for the provinces to 
have a common framework and develop their own individual context specific 
strategies at the provincial level. 
5.2.4 International donors (national) 
There were two views about the role of international donors in Pakistan. 
Politicians viewed them as having a  positive role in the policy process as 
they were investing money in the country. On the contrary, technocrats were 
of the view that they had  an  international agenda behind this financial aid. 
A senior technocrat at the provincial level remarked, “I mean the biggest 
challenge government has when dealing with International partners is that 
they do not have for example a policy framework for a province or centre. 
They would have a five-year plan and a plan is not a policy. So the challenge 
is when international aid and assistance is available what is it used for?” (Key 
Informant, 6) 
All the technocrats at federal and provincial level were of the view that the 
donors would want to align the implementation of their funded programs with 
their country plans and policies. And that does not necessarily go along 
national priorities because there is as such no policy. Therefore, the 
government does not have that strategic steer to align international 
assistance to their own strategic goals. In addition, the funds are always 
diverted (mostly by the politicians) which is again the rent seeking as 
mentioned above. 
The outsourcing of some of the districts in KPK province was criticized by 
some senior health officials of the same province. According to them, the 
junior doctors were being hired at a high salary by these donors and once 
they retreat, these doctors and paramedics were not willing to go back to the 
low salary structure in the public sector. A few of the  technocrats at federal 
level  blamed the provincial government for not having any  provincial health 
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policy after devolution. There were provincial health strategies on the 
websites, but in practice nothing substantial was being done. 
The bureaucrats kept silence on the donor issue. Their silence clearly 
indicated that they collaborated with the donors on a number of issues like 
funds and resources.  And this thing further strengthened their position in the 
policy sphere. However, the technocrats were of the view that the national 
priorities shifted towards the issues where international focus was. They 
quoted AIDS program as an example, which received out of focus attention 
as compared to hepatitis or other non-communicable diseases. So the 
phenomenon of selective attention was visible in the health policy sphere.  
 5.2.5 Media (national and provincial) 
Media was perceived to be an important actor these days in the country. 
Most of the politicians were of the view that the media people can influence 
the policies at the national level by portraying the good and the bad points 
about these policies. Some technocrats thought that media could be used 
more to create awareness among the masses regarding the basic health 
issues and quoted the examples of some neighbouring countries in regards 
to that. 
On the role of media, one health official working in an International 
organization remarked, “Media people have their own political mileage. 
Bangladesh has used Maulvis to control population but we do not use them 
in a constructive way. We should have right people everywhere who can 
formulate policies and disseminate it.” (Key Informant, 5) 
The need for appointing the right people for the right job has been pointed 
out mainly by the technocrats. 
 5.2.6 Council of Common Interests (CCI) (national level) 
The CCI was seen as an important actor in health and other sectors following 
devolution, as it is responsible for funding of various projects at the centre 
and in the provinces. CCI was mentioned in the wake of devolution by most 
of the participants. This body consisted of chief ministers (of four provinces) 
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and some other key ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. It is responsible 
for the funding of the provinces. Most of the politicians in opposition viewed 
this body as a political thing, which hardly ever meets. Some bureaucrats at 
the national level thought it is working fine and its decisions cannot be 
challenged by anyone. Usually the vested interests dominated the provincial 
interests. A state of confusion prevailed after the devolution and some of the 
donor agencies approached the provinces directly.  
 
A health ministry official said, “CCI has not played any role that’s why Polio is 
still endemic and we have travel restrictions. Dengue is also out of control.” 
(Key Informant, 19) 
A senior national level politician remarked, “I think CCI is just discovering its 
role and still struggling. They are trying to take their own decisions. Concept 
is good depending on which government is in power, like the current 
government is not a great believer of CCI.” (Key Informant, 9) 
The politicians in power praised the working of CCI but those in opposition 
and the bureaucrats criticized it for it being overshadowed by the current 
government and not addressing the issues on time. Again, political patronage 
was seen. According to the participants, it hardly meets to address the 
provincial problems, which are creating unrest among the provinces, 
especially among those, which are not governed by the ruling party at the 
centre.  
5.2.7 Doctors (national and provincial) 
Findings revealed that the medical doctors (who are well versed with the 
health issues) were generally not invited to the policy-making forums. They 
were just informed once the policy was formulated. Most of the doctors 
wanted to serve in the private sector due to a high salary structure. 
A minority of the technocrats mentioned that the best brains were fleeing 
from the country and labelled it as the brain drain. Health ministry officials 
were of the view that health is not a top priority of the present government 
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rather it has never been on the agenda of any government. Technocrats 
thought that medics have  the powers limited to the hospitals only. Clinicians 
turned advisors complained about the government funding NGOs and tertiary 
care suffering as a result. So alliances could be seen among the technocrats 
and the clinicians and both these groups criticized the bureaucrats and the 
politicians. 
Politicians were of the view that the doctors have created hegemony in the 
hospitals and even to get a bed in a ward in PIMS (Pakistan Institute of 
Medical Sciences) you need a call from a higher up in the government. 
Although the senior management in all the hospitals was appointed by the 
influential politicians, but still they had a perception that they were all 
powerful within their own settings. There was a consensus among all the 
technocrats that health has never been a priority and some of the top 
bureaucrats and politicians criticized that even if the common people were 
given a choice they would opt for jobs and employment.  
5.2.8 Interest groups (national and provincial) 
Another actor in the policy sphere appeared to be the interest groups who 
were also seen to be influencing the decisions indirectly. They were seen to 
be close to both the politicians and the bureaucrats. They were regarded as 
the invisible actors in the policy environment but were an integral part of the 
policy network. 
A senior technocrat at the provincial level said, “Policy is influenced by the 
interest groups most of the time in most of the countries and get their 
demands and suggestions included in the policies like professional bodies, 
traders. etc. They influence the policy making and the bureaucrats, as they 
are primary beneficiaries and try to include those objective suitable to them.” 
(Key Informant, 8) 
Professional bodies included doctors, nurses, paramedics and some 
pharmaceutical companies. There were some contradictory views on this 
power group. Bureaucrats thought that there was a strong triangle of nurses, 
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doctors and paramedics who influenced the decisions. There was a clear 
lack of consensus on the role of interest groups in the decision making 
process. Interest groups also strongly allied themselves with the people who 
could promote their interests. Alliances here were more for monetary gains.  
A senior health professional KI(28) remarked “Patients are not forced but 
they want good service delivery so they go to the private sector as there is 
more efficiency here. There is an attitude problem in the government sector 
as there is no responsibility and accountability in the public sector.” 
KI (1) another senior health ministry official remarked “In public sector 
performers have no threat. Accountability is more in the private sector and 
there is more efficiency and best brains are hired by them. They do not 
improve qualifications and skill set. But in private sector case is different; 
there is more accountability and more efficiency. Public sector has less 
accountability and less efficiency. They have a job security so they get away 
with it.” 
The technocrats at all levels, whether national or provincial saw the private 
sector as an important player in the health sector.  It was thought that the 
best brains among the doctors were being hired by this sector and this 
showed lack of interest on the part of policy makers to formulate policies, 
which could provide a proper career ladder to the young doctors. An 
important insight was that these interest groups kept on shifting alliances 
depending on where the locus of power is. The main interest group like the 
civil society was just acknowledged mainly by the technocrats who viewed its 
presence as vital in the policy forums in order to have first-hand knowledge of 
the grass root problems. However, majority of the bureaucrats were of the 
view that they know nothing about the policies so why they should be 
consulted. 
A technocrat from the planning commission KI (16) commented “Ideally it 
should be the political ownership but conversely every policy is influenced by 
the self -interests”. 
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There seems a strong connection between  the behaviour of the policy actors 
and  implementation as their self- interests, personalized and patrimonial 
relations of power had a great effect on the policy implementation be it 
health, education or others. 
5.2.9 District health officials (actors at local level) 
The perceptions of the local health officials are compared and contrasted 
below: 
A district health officer from KPK remarked, “My experience says, the main 
problem is political interference, lack of HR, lack of funding, lack of 
equipment. And administrative issues in the management as well.” (Key 
Informant, 19) 
 
Another district co-ordination officer from the same province said, “If you 
don’t bow you have to go.” (Key Informant, 20) 
 
It can be seen from the above quotes that in KPK the district officers were 
more dissatisfied with the higher authorities as compared to Punjab and the 
capital. The KPK informant was of the view that politicians always like to 
have their own personnel even at the district level and the ones who disobey 
them are transferred to a remote place soon. However, the way these 
officials sounded made it clear that personal and political connections did 
matter at this level as well. Those who were personally loyal to the ruling 
party and submissive were favoured the most to form a strong network at all 
levels. Personal connections and political linkages did matter at every level, 
which may be understood as Patrimonialism. 
The district health officer from Punjab province remarked, “We never face 
any political interference and our province is performing well.” (Key 
Informant, 25) 
The ones in Punjab seemed to be satisfied with the policies of the seniors 
and boasted that their province excels in many things. Once again, a strong 
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coalition was seen between the ruling government at the centre and their 
counterparts in the province. So the perceptions about the seniors differed 
within the group of the district health officials or the street level bureaucrats 
belonging to different provinces. The district health official sitting in a Basic 
Health Unit (BHU) in rural Islamabad first gave the appointment, but was not 
comfortable at the start of the interview and suddenly left on the pretext that 
he had to attend the meeting. This district health official appeared to be 
dissatisfied with the politicians but refused to give comments on any of their 
policies. The silence was stronger than the words.  
5.3 Policy Process 
Commenting on the policy process some of the key informants gave their 
viewpoint as: 
A technocrat in the Planning Commission quoted “As James Wattman 
analyzed Pakistan’s policy in 1980 and said that it is nothing but government 
decisions on day-to- day basis”. (Key Informant, 8) 
 A senior health ministry official remarked, “I mean to say policy process or 
decision making is a bit complicated. There are lots of players or actors 
involved at various levels. In Pakistan it is always been a top-down approach 
and will always be”. (Key Informant, 13) 
Another technocrat remarked, “Well policy making all over the world is the 
same cycle. As far as the matters are concerned, they are pretty good 
policies in all sectors modelled after some foreign model or locally. What I 
feel and experienced is that we are very poor implementers”. (Key Informant, 
9) 
A senior technocrat KI (7) remarked, “A policy is not a policy when 3-4 
individuals are involved and they lock themselves in a room and make a 
policy”. 
Further, another technocrat remarked, “When Clinton or Obama make any 
policies all CEOs are sitting behind them. Here it is not so. World Bank wants 
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us to do something and we are driven by them which may or may not be in 
our interest but it’s our policy”. (Key Informant, 5) 
The above quotes clearly show the top-down, centralized and non-
participatory nature of the policy process with hegemony and multiplicity of 
the key policy players in the overall policy process. 
On the other hand, a senior politician KI (10) remarked, “Why are we 
dependent on the bureaucrats for policy making. The politicians need 
capacity building and research fellows who can help them with policy 
formulations. We need to increase the budget on health and education, but 
80% goes into defence and the civilian governments have no control to 
change this”. 
One of the senior health ministry official remarked  “Ah my experience is that 
probably policy decisions lack necessary data and the policy makers have 
some prefixed ideas in their minds or sometimes there are reactive decisions 
rather than collecting good set of data and evaluating it they make short term 
policies. We just sit down for some short term policies”. (Key Informant, 1) 
The above quotes give us some insights into the policy implementation such 
as the short term policies are preferred over the long-term ones and even if 
there are no obstacles on the surface, we were poor implementers. Another 
important message being conveyed here is lack of evidence based policies, 
which is clearly everything but definitely lacking in Pakistani policy sphere. 
The strained civil-military relations are also being reflected in the earlier 
quote. 
There was a disagreement on the centralization of the whole policy process. 
The bureaucrats who were in the decision making positions were happy with 
the way things are. District level health officials were not pleased and felt 
disappointed, as they did not like some of the policies imposed on them. 
When they delayed or blocked they were transferred and the politicians 
appointed the officials who obeyed them blindly. 
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Ten out of forty-two key informants argued that the drivers of the policy 
development were not informed and we had whimsical policies. Mostly the 
policies lacked all steps of implementation. Some go directly and suddenly 
onto the agenda and some even being good policies never got onto the 
agenda. Even after getting there, some policies were never implemented. 
Politicians were blamed not to give proper directions and the bureaucrats for 
making the whole process so rushed that sometimes the politicians do not 
have time to read the files properly. The policy process was criticized for 
being rushed, ill planned and politically manipulated in the quote below. 
A senior health ministry official said, “If you want my personal experience 
regarding decision making it can be very very critical, so the current decision 
making is not satisfactory at all, not properly planned, no proper consultative 
process is adhered to. Things should be done in a proper planned manner. 
They are not done like that. There are lot of subjective influences especially 
from the senior leadership, which may or may be not fully aware of the 
issues. Input is not there. So that’s’ why we have problems”. (Key Informant, 
3) 
5.3.1 Implementation 
Political hurdles 
A senior health advisor commented, “Of course there are barriers in the 
implementation but I think mainly it is driven by political motivations and 
resources as these are always limited”. (Key Informant, 23) 
 A senior health ministry official at the national level said, “Ah implementation 
is primarily at provincial or district level .For one policy if its national policy it’s 
different but in provinces it’s more local priority. It could start for not taking 
stakeholders in confidence and then non-realistic targets. Not linking the 
policies with the financial resources and then the capacity of the health 
system, so a weak health system could also be a barrier”. (Key Informant, 
13) 
Financial constraints, political motives, fragmented health systems and lack 
of involvement of key stakeholders is being stressed in the above quotes. 
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A technocrat said, “It is evident who started polio eradication? Is that a 
Pakistani agenda? There is WHO agenda”. (Key Informant, 18) 
It is evident that in a complex policy environment, international donors and 
their agendas directly influenced the success or failure of policies. 
Surprisingly the donors were blamed by just one group of the participants, 
which were mainly the technocrats, and not by the politicians or bureaucrats.  
 Lack of resources, absenteeism and lack of rural health workforce were 
considered other impediments. A bureaucrat at the centre commented: 
“Lack of resources becomes a barrier. Just to quote an example. I would take 
the example of health. Provision of health to the rural population is our 
responsibility. We have scarcity of doctors working in our rural areas because 
of so many reasons and they are not willing to serve there. With the 
imposition on the ban on the recruitment, we cannot hire new doctors. Health 
facilities, which are not attended by doctors, become an impediment for the 
smooth implementation of the policies for example if we do not have the 
money in my office we would be stuck up. So lack of resources would 
become an issue”. (Key Informant, 17) 
Levels of implementation 
Technocrats at the senior level were quite keen to share the policy 
implementation process. They told that the implementation was mainly at 
three levels, micro, macro and meso level. Meso level was the middle level 
where all cogs and wheels were located. Then the policy was passed onto 
the implementers. The real issue was at the meso level where the finances 
are involved. The financial constraints have always been a big issue. This is 
the point where many policies got stuck, remained partially implemented and 
eventually fizzled out.  
5.3.2 Devolution 
The 18th amendment and Devolution of health [June 2011] (which is 
described in detail in chapter two) was one of the most common themes that 
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emerged in the interviews. Some of the politicians who belonged to the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which designed the 18th amendment, saw it 
as a necessary shift to a more federal system, but most of the national level 
bureaucrats were concerned about the ability of provincial governments to 
assume regulatory authority in these areas which are often labelled as the 
capacity issues by the participants. Capacity was mentioned at the provincial 
level by almost all the participants,  
 Majority of the bureaucrats at the federal level were of the view that the 
provinces were still dependent on the centre for the support as they were so 
used to it. One of the provincial level bureaucrat mentioned that the financial 
control was still with the centre and it caused difficulties in efficient delivery of 
the services. One politician shared that there was a lot of resistance from the 
centralists on the pretext that the then government was trying to create four 
nations by giving more share to the larger provinces and this would 
aggravate the sense of deprivation in the smaller provinces. 
Those who were against it saw the whole process of devolution suffering 
from a knee jerk reaction of the provincial governments who were 
unprepared, incapacitated and unaware of the implications. Regarding 
capacity issues of the provinces, the provincial level technocrats and 
bureaucrats had varied views. Some said the provinces like Punjab and Sind 
handled devolution better than others did. Many belonging to Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) suggested that their province was doing better. 
 A national level politician criticized devolution and saw as if it never 
happened and was badly needed if Pakistan was to survive. One provincial 
level  politician viewed it as a political decision under political pressures.  
One of the politician remarked, “It was an ill planned and hasty decision”. 
(Key Informant, 11) 
One of the senior personnel in the health ministry said “After the passage of 
18th amendment health [June 2011] was devolved to the provinces and the 
work has become difficult and challenging. So you can say that we are 
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currently in the transition phase, trying to recover from the devolution of 
health which was not conducted in an orderly and planned manner and we 
have to face a number of unnecessary challenges.” (Key Informant, 3) 
A national level politician who brought in the 18th amendment remarked, “It 
was not a political move rather it was the need of the hour”. (Key Informant, 
2) 
A technocrat remarked, “The people who are fond of centralization often 
throw this argument that provinces are not ready, but I say, “Unless you jump 
you cannot swim”. (Key Informant, 33) 
Some of the technocrats at a senior level were of the view that the devolved 
system of governance was necessary. It was delayed by 67 years and over 
the past 60-70 years; there was an accumulated frustration in the provinces.  
A minority of the participants were quite keen on sharing the background of 
the 18th amendment and told in detail about the federal and concurrent 
legislative lists (described in detail in chapter two).  
One of the bureaucrats (KI, 30) explained in detail that Pakistan is a federal 
state and provinces are expected to be more autonomous. Regulatory 
mechanisms need to be uniform across the provinces, but the power rests 
with the federal government. Anything which is not in the federal legislative 
list is a provincial prerogative. Actually, in 1956 there were 3 legislative lists, 
two federal and one concurrent list (explained in the background). The 1973 
constitution said that one would be federal and the other concurrent. The 18th 
amendment has done with that concurrent list. They abolished 21 ministries. 
There should not be any education or health minister at the center. 
A head of an International organization (KI, 7) praised the decision. She was 
of the view that before devolution the district managers were bypassed and 
they were just a post office. She tried to convey that after devolution the 
managers should take the ownership and plan according to the needs of the 
population and now the onus should be on them to plan and prepare. But it 
was a minority view. 
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Findings revealed that devolution instead of making things clearer created 
more confusion among the policy makers and implementers. A devolved 
subject like health had a ministry at the federal level. The donors seemed to 
be confused as well as was evident from the informants who were heading 
some donor organizations. 
It was evident that there was no political will on the part of governments to 
improve governance. Every successive government had her own priorities. 
Most of the participants saw no accountability or transparency in the whole 
system of governance in Pakistan and perceived it to be one of the major 
challenges as well and mother of all evils.  
Corruption was mentioned by all the participants and was seen to be the 
greatest governance challenge in our setting. Decision makers thought it 
unnecessary to involve the public. The elected representatives who were the 
parliamentarians were not sensitized to their real problems.  Politicians 
favored their own people in all ministries and Sifarish was  norm of the day 
(Sifarish is a commonly used in the Pakistani society, mainly by the influential 
to favor someone not on merit). 
One of the participants remarked “In Pakistan there is no culture of 
justification. They don’t think they are responsible to the public”. (Key 
Informant, 3) 
5.4 Policy Development Context  
There were several dimensions of context that were widely seen to be 
influential on policy implementation like political and historical. The interviews 
generally indicated that the policy process in Pakistan was affected by the 
wider context both national and international. Five participants among the 
politicians referred to the military regime of field Marshall Ayyub Khan as the 
Golden period (1958-71) of Pakistan’s economy. Mostly senior politicians 
with an institutional history (organizational memories) praised the 70s era. 
One of them said that at that time, Pakistan was the hope of the Muslim 
world and the people were coming here for studying and being inducted in 
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the army. The technocrats in contrast, viewed the nationalization reforms of 
the 70s as the beginning of nepotism in the country. The ‘Favourites’ were 
brought in by the then government and this thing was still being continued. 
Some of the politicians were of the view that Bhutto era (1971-77) was one of 
the best periods in the country’s history. It was usual for the contextual 
factors to be noted by the slightly older key informants be it a bureaucrat or a 
politician. 
 
Some senior politicians were of the view that the governance system in 
Pakistan had not given up its traditions from the colonial past. One of them 
remarked, “It is a very centralized type of system in which even the elected 
leaders’ style has a shadow of governor general or viceroy’s style.” (Key 
Informant, 21) 
This quote reveals the political mind set of concentrating power at the centre. 
The role of the policy context was clearly recognized by majority of the key 
informants. According to an expert working in a health related international 
organization, the health strategies and programs that successfully worked in 
other countries may not work in Pakistan primarily due to an unfavourable 
political context. A top-level bureaucrat (now retired) remarked: 
“Since 1954, it has happened for four times (58, 69, 77 and 99) a gun comes 
in with two jeeps and one truck. The entire structure depends on one gun. A 
culture developed by the state is that the gun prevails. In a country where 63 
judges can be detained with their minor children for 6 months. So where was 
governance then?”.  (Key Informant, 3) 
The respondent clearly pointed towards the weak and unstable political 
system in the country. The military is being blamed for the coups and bad 
governance in the country. There has always been a rift between the military 
and civilian governments in Pakistan. The respondent (with his institutional 
memory) visibly remembers the exact dates in history. It clearly shows the 
civil military relationship, role of the army throughout the political history and 
the power culture developed by them (judges and their families were 
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detained during President Musharraf’s military regime which created unrest 
and street protests). 
The key informants commonly acknowledged that Pakistan is lagging far 
behind its neighbours in the region especially in health and education. A 
minority among the politicians thought that we should look into factors which 
are helping India to go towards brain gain instead of brain drain like Pakistan 
and good lessons should be learnt from the neighbours.  
They were of the view that politicians are more interested in politically visible 
projects. Technocrats said that although 60-80% health budget is kept for the 
hospitals but it never reaches them. Most of the technocrats acknowledged 
that the funds are there, but these are not going in the right direction. There 
is an embezzlement of funds at every level. On the point of resources and 
funding the technocrats and bureaucrats were seen to have formed an 
alliance and sometimes the network was between politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
A head of an international donor organization at the provincial level, 
remarked, “Health authorities are making efforts, but direction, commitment 
and discipline is missing. Key players like DFID and World Bank are worried 
that most of the funds will lapse.” (Key Informant, 21) 
This quote clearly reflects the donors’ apprehension on the lack of political 
commitment and wastage of resources due to lack of attention. Some of the 
policy makers at the national level thought there has been no emphasis on 
policies till 80s and that after Bohr commission in 1946 till 1973. And there 
were national health policies in 1990, 1997 and 2001 but all these documents 
had shortfalls for their implementation and lacked some evidence based 
data. 
 5.4.1 Health Systems 
Findings revealed the weak and fragmented health systems in Pakistan. 
There is a lot of burden on the tertiary hospitals and more focus on the 
curative and less on preventive side. Even the emergency care is not of good 
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quality in the public sector. There is a visible difference in the quality of 
services between the private and public sectors as this thing emerged as 
another insight during analysis. There is a complete absence of licensing or 
regulation of the private sector, although one of them mentioned about 
setting up of a Licensing body for the laboratories in the capital city of 
Islamabad. 
Some senior clinicians turned technocrats told that our tertiary hospitals are 
acting as primary, secondary as well as tertiary care hospitals. And there is 
no referral pattern and people come to the capital because there is no facility 
in the rural areas. There is a need to build up the capacity of the paramedical 
staff as over the years the medicine has become so complex and 
complicated that it is not the job of a doctor anymore. He needs a proper 
support from his staff, especially the nurses. 
 A senior health ministry official said “But one thing tertiary hospitals like 
PIMS and Polyclinic are doing well. The problem is the overflow of the 
patients. People from all levels are coming here, even from the BHUs. There 
is always an overload and the increased number of patients compromising 
the services.” (Key Informant, 40) 
The above quote clearly supports the absence of basic health services in 
rural areas and overburdened tertiary hospitals in the capital. 
The majority of the key informants were worried over an overlap of services 
and the multiplicity of actors in Islamabad and paucity in other cities of the 
country. Capital development Authority (CDA) has dispensaries and 
Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) administration is also having dispensaries. 
So there is no one uniform system. Like ICT district health officer checks for 
quality and similarly CDA is checking as well. No one is responsible and it’s 
more of a puzzle. 
 A senior health professional remarked “Patients are not forced, but they 
want good service delivery so they go to the private sector as there is more 
efficiency here. There is an attitude problem in the government sector as 
153 
 
there is no responsibility and accountability in the public sector.”(Key 
Informant, 28) 
A senior clinician remarked “I mean Pakistan is unfortunately one of those 
countries who do not have health care standards or hospital standards. Even 
if you want to make a gas station you have to get permission from 20 
different organizations, but if you want to build a hospital you hardly need any 
approval or permit”. (Key Informant, 12) 
Lack of accountability and ownership in the health sector is evident from the 
above quotes. 
Similarly the provincial health officials viewed that the provincial health 
structure, especially in Punjab consists of BHU, RHC, DHQ and THQ. But the 
problem is that everyone rushes to THQ so the consultants are overburdened 
and have to do multi-tasking. The health officials also mentioned that in 
developed countries like USA and UK, the medical system is more organized 
and GP issues the medicines, but in our country the pharmaceuticals are 
involved in medicine business. The multinationals market the medicines and 
have their own interests and commissions.  
Outsourcing of the services was once again severely criticized by the health 
officials. Some technocrats were concerned about the delivery system in 
rural areas and health indicators there. Infant mortality is still high and our 
health delivery system at the lowest level is almost non-existing. Actually, 
there is no delivery system in areas where 60% of the country’s population 
lives. They said that even the rural areas of the capital city Islamabad are the 
same. The researcher went to interview a district health officer in the rural 
area of capital city Islamabad and saw the cattle grazing on the lawn there 
(surely depicts the lack of interest on the government to develop the 
infrastructure in the health sector). 
Commenting on the overburdened tertiary hospitals a national level politician 
remarked “First problem is in our capital city Islamabad there is no hospital in 
rural areas. Only two hospitals are PIMS and Polyclinic and the population 
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has grown to more than 2 million. All emergency patients come to these two 
hospitals. Even patients from Fateh Jang and some die on the way. Now you 
have to have Sifarish or a reference for the beds in PIMS.”(Key Informant, 2) 
The above quote endorses the poor health care delivery within the capital 
city, Islamabad, and a general culture of personal or political connections 
even for a basic health service in a hospital.  
Interviews generally revealed that health policy initiatives are being taken in 
different provinces, but at a different pace. Most participants were of the view 
that Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are doing well. Baluchistan 
lacks capacity and Sind lacks political will. Baluchistan is the most deprived 
of all the provinces. Punjab and KPK are leading as the former has the 
capacity and the latter the political will. 
 5.4.2 Health workforce 
A few  of the technocrats thought that there is no proper career ladder in the 
public health sector and this leads to dual job holding by most of the health 
personnel in the public sector. There were issues like over employment 
(more than generally required) and underutilization in most of the public 
health facilities.  The public health workforce is considered to be less efficient 
and less accountable as compared to the private sector. Bureaucrats saw 
less accountability and more job security for the doctors in the public sector. 
Technocrats were of the view that the health personnel are more satisfied 
with their jobs and pay scale in the private sector and career structure as 
well. There is more accountability in the private sector to the top 
management so there is more efficiency. Even some saw the private sector 
emerging as the powerful actor in the coming years, although they are still 
not involved in the policy formulation stage. 
There is no human resource policy. This was endorsed by a number of 
participants as seen from the quotes below: 
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“We do not have a policy for HRH or a master plan. We are trying to look into 
these issues. We do not have an HR information system. It’s politically 
driven. I mean postings and transfers”. (Key Informant, 20) 
 A bureaucrat at the provincial level remarked “The pay scale and promotion 
policy are very intelligently designed. I would have opposed some policies. 
The human resource policies are driven by collective bargaining. Triangle of 
doctors, nurses and paramedics have their own interest”. (Key Informant, 30) 
Political patronage and networks are evident from the above quotes. 
Another senior health ministry official remarked “In public sector performers 
have no threat. Accountability is more in the private sector and there is more 
efficiency. They do not improve qualifications and skill set. But in private 
sector case is different; there is more accountability and more efficiency. The 
public sector has less accountability and less efficiency so have a laid back 
attitude. They have a job security so they get away with it.”(Key Informant, 1) 
The health officials blamed the public sector for the lack of accountability, 
which ultimately leads to poor health services on the public side as compared 
to the private sector. 
A politician in charge of the health issues in the capital city of Islamabad 
commented “There are 32 dispensaries in the rural areas of Islamabad but 
not even a single functioning. No staff no medicines”. (Key Informant, 2) 
Comparing the health workforce in Punjab and KPK a head of reform unit in 
KPK commented “Absolutely Punjab is in the lead. Simply because of human 
resource capacity”. (Key Informant, 6) 
Human resource capacity and the lack of will to build it up was mentioned a 
couple of times mainly by the provincial health officials. The brain drain has 
emerged as a serious issue for the health workforce in the country as the 
bright and competent doctors and paramedics are leaving the country due to 
a lot of reasons in search of greener pastures. It was attributed mainly to lack 
of merit based employment and promotions, sense of deprivation and non-
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conducive working environment. Some technocrats suggested that we should 
learn from our neighboring countries as how to prevent this. Some of them 
quoted India as an example of Brain Gain instead of Brain Drain. 
A national level bureaucrat “The brain drain has hurt Pakistan tremendously 
and the intellectual capital is not available, because the economy is not doing 
well and second merit based system is not there. Organizations are 
unprofessionally run. Professionals find difficult to work here.”(Key Informant, 
11) 
Findings revealed that in places human resource is not being properly utilized 
and others, they are supposed to do multitasking and this links back to the 
absence of a proper human resource policy. All technocrats were of the view 
that the roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined at any level.  
5.5 Policy content 
 5.5.1 Health polices 
A senior official at the health ministry remarked “The workers are covered in 
the overall policy. 2009 sometimes referred as 2011 one was never officially 
declared; it was finalized as the zero draft and never officially launched as 
the final policy. It promotes or advocates the provision at the doorsteps so 
that the door can be in in rural and urban area and policy covers the entire 
population like rural health centre, basic health centre and secondary and 
tertiary care centres and hospitals. So I think that policy was not bad ah, but 
never got a chance to get implemented so need to be taken up again”. (Key 
Informant, 3) 
A senior technocrat at the national level “You see start with the policies they 
are not realistic pick up any policy… they have everything under the sun that 
the government would like to do. I think policy should not be seen as a 
document, the policy should just be a guideline and let each province come 
up with their own “. (Key Informant, 7) 
A few technocrats mentioned that the population policy of 2002 was 
implemented in letter and spirit. They attributed its success to the political 
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will, commitment, ownership and community participation. The interest 
groups were on the same page and there were some shared incentives as 
well. 
But it was generally agreed that rural vs urban, rich vs poor and social 
demographic factors are still hampering the overall health indicators. There 
was a consensus among all the key informants about the success of lady 
health workers program (LHW) but the other successful policies were either 
mentioned by those who were the ex or current heads of these programs. 
Most of the bureaucrats who are generally thought to be policy makers and 
by some as implementers were of the view that most of the policies are donor 
driven.  The departments and ministries do take part, but they do not know 
the real decisions, allocation of resources come from anywhere else. The 
provincial health officials were of the view that there are a lot of strategies, 
but no policies exist as such and they suggested that the health policies 
should just be the guiding documents. Some key informants were of the view 
that the policies should be good enough to ensure their continuity and should 
not be affected by the change in governments. There should be sustainability 
and ownership. 
A health ministry official at the national level commented “I think you should 
ask why policies fail in Pakistan? It’s because these policies always give 
coverage to the politicians and nothing more than a show off”. (Key 
Informant, 40) 
Head of an international organization at the provincial level commented “I 
think we are following 2009 health policy, but I must say that the way it is 
drafted is not a policy statement... That’s my trouble with policies. But where 
did it go? What was the follow up? Did provinces connect themselves with it 
or used as an overarching framework nobody knows”. (Key informant, 6) 
 A health official at the center commented on health policies “Health policy 
was last made 15 years ago. Efforts were made, but after devolution at the 
federal level nothing concrete has been done. Health issues are scattered 
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among 6-7 departments with no coordination. Efforts are still in the draft 
stage”. (Key Informant, 22) 
Bureaucrats admitted that linkages between day to day policy makings are 
clearly lacking and this affects the implementation negatively. Self-praise was 
another interesting finding. If a technocrat was heading blood policy he 
labelled it as the best while a bureaucrat who headed the tobacco policy 
couple of years back said that it was the best. Some technocrats criticized 
the health policy wing of the newly created Ministry of national health 
services regulation and coordination ministry and labelled it as a redundant 
unit. The national health ministry was blamed to make postings and transfers 
and the provinces were not being provided with a common national policy 
framework. 
5.5.2 Interprovincial variation 
A health ministry official from KPK said “We are the vanguard of reforms. In 
the early 1990s, we started this health sector reform unit and other provinces 
followed us. We have many feathers in our cap. This unit itself is doing very 
well. We are trying to bring minimum quality standards at the primary level 
and share it with the rest of the country”. (Key Informant, 20) 
The KPK province did well in spite of not being ruled by the political party at 
the center. One main reform in the health sector, which emerged during 
analysis, was the outsourcing (through bidding) of the districts especially in 
KPK and Punjab to the donors. These donors offer a higher pay scale to the 
doctors and the paramedics as compared to the government. But only those 
in the health workforce are attracted who are not well settled in their jobs. 
Some of the informants thought that it is not doing any good as the highly 
paid workforce does not go back to their previous jobs, but instead try to go 
abroad in search of greener pastures. So they linked it to brain drain in our 
country.  
Another important health initiative was to give more hospital autonomy to the 
district hospitals which means they would be independent in taking decisions 
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for their daily affairs. This was mentioned mainly by the technocrats, 
politicians and the health officials belonging to the KPK province. The district 
hospitals were being given more powers and made financially independent. 
In Punjab Rescue 1122 (a project of the previous government to provide 
emergency services) was performing well. In KPK Sehat Ka Insaf (a 
voluntary project to provide medical services in KPK) was mentioned as 
another health reform and some politicians labelled it as a great example of 
good governance getting implemented and millions of immunization took 
place and volunteers were mobilized. Further insight into this revealed that it 
was an awareness program at the grassroots level, mainly designed for 
Immunization coverage and vaccination. Almost all the participants agreed 
that Punjab is leading in health reforms as it has the best human resource 
capacity. But one senior technocrat working for health ministry at the 
provincial level was of the view that although everyone thinks Punjab to be 
leading but a latest survey shows that health indicators have not improved at 
all. 
5.6 Determinants of Policy Implementation Gaps 
5.6.1 Barriers to implementation 
Major hurdle is getting the policy implemented, not just the amount of money, 
but how is that money going to be released and accounted for. It was a 
general perception that in our system people are very scared to use the 
money. They have to pay a huge price in their reputation and career. This is 
unfortunate inherited from our colonial past. They were not  well versed with 
the system. Because they did all this now the implementers are scared many 
times in case they use the money and are held responsible. This  perception 
was shared by majority of the technocrats at the national level. 
A technocrat involved in the policy and planning at the planning commission 
said “Yes, we analysed rather I analysed 2001 policy and assessed its 
implementation of federal, provincial and district levels. I analysed the 
problems of dissemination at different levels and at each and every tier. 
Actually, you need a financing strategy, and then there were governance 
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issues and service delivery issues, so there should be a mechanism that 
should be in place for implementing the policies”. (Key Informant, 8) 
At the provincial level, the implementation was also considered to be quite 
weak. A technocrat at the provincial level commented, “I think that’s one 
other dilemma. Sometimes and often we have written policies and 
regulations for many things, but implementation part is very weak and then 
there is capacity and the other is actual intention and motivation”. (Key 
Informant, 14) 
The intentions and motivations play an important part and here as well it can 
be seen that lack of motivation at every level is being pointed out by the  
policy makers. The implementation model in Pakistan is generally perceived 
to be  a top-down model which sees local actors as impediments to 
successful implementation—agents whose shirking behaviour needs to be 
controlled. But the analysis so far has shown that in reality it is hybrid of top-
down and bottom-up where that discretion, though hidden at times for street-
level bureaucrats is there and that it is simply unrealistic to expect policy 
designers to be able to control the actions of these agents. The policy 
makers at the national and provincial levels seem to be more interested in 
politically visible projects by diverting huge funds towards them They were 
blamed as to be least interested whether the policies are well implemented or 
not which points to their lack of political commitment. 
A national level bureaucrat KI (15) said “You see what should come out of 
policies is strategies… not much of attention is given to policy making or if 
the policy is approved for implementation the linkage between day to day 
policies  missing in all our decisions”. (Key Informant, 15) 
The absence of links between different phases of policy development was 
being criticized by the top level bureaucrat. And clearly there was a lack of 
attention as well. Another bureaucrat at the provincial level was of the view 
that implementation goes smoothly at the district level while the majority 
negated this. He KI (38) said, “At the local level, there are no issues 
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regarding implementation. We have to consult different people. Sometimes 
there are certain ambiguities and clarifications are sorted however, generally 
not much issues”. 
A head of a private organization and involved in technical advisory group 
commented “You have to present your case and opinion in a best way that it 
gets implemented”. (Key Informant, 36) 
A national level politician KI (2) remarked, “Policy making with regard to 
Islamabad and its implementation has to be done by the bureaucracy and its 
always personal interests and lack of will to implement certain policies”. 
Personal and political interests and relationships have clearly shown to play 
an integral part in the overall policy process which ultimately affects the 
implementation of policies. The bureaucracy has its links in almost all the 
departments. These personal relationships and political linkages add to the 
complexity of the policy implementation process and leads to political 
patronage as mentioned earlier as well. 
Head of a private medical college and university saw  lack of implementation 
of policies as “Well, you know a policy should contain most of the ingredients 
including a workable plan but unfortunately implementing infrastructure lack 
the right people and level of motivation. We give too much to implement”. 
(Key Informant, 9) 
This quote clearly reveals that the right people are not appointed and the 
implementers are asked to do a lot without giving them prior knowledge. Lack 
of motivation was not just there among the makers of the policies but the 
implementers as well. 
When the key informants were asked to share their experience of best and 
worst implemented policies. The best implemented policies according to 
them were Lady Health worker (LHW) program, Expanded Program for 
Immunization (EPI), Ionization of salt, Population policy of 2002 and National 
blood transfusion policy. 
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On further probing participants revealed that these policies, especially the 
LHW program had the continuity and sustainability. The community was 
involved and their needs were paid special attention. It was revealed that the 
local people thought it as a step towards the rural health development. Health 
officials viewed it as a step in the right direction to improve service delivery at 
the doorsteps to the rural population. The participants saw LHW as being 
owned by every government and even after devolution; it is working fine in 
the provinces. Political will was there to make it successful. The path 
dependency phenomenon was quite clear, especially in LHW, where the 
policy makers did not want to divert due to increasing returns. As it had good 
international support, donor funding and local acceptability.  
The EPI, population policy, national blood policy and ionization of salts were 
neither success stories, nor failures, but the key informants did not say much 
about them. The National EPI program had a number of corruption tags 
attached to it, but the technocrat who had been its head for a long time 
refused to comment on this. However, the head of national blood policy was 
of the view that it is the best so far and was being disseminated well. The 
nutrition policies and control of Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI) was 
mentioned by one of the senior technocrat who said that it was a success, 
but was suddenly rolled back and attributed it to the influence of donors in the 
policies. 
The worst implemented policies suggested by the participants were Polio 
eradication, community midwives policy, the ban on the private practice of 
doctors in KPK and HIV/AIDS policy. Despite being in place for so long, 
these policies failed to deliver the desired objectives. All the participants were 
of the view that LHW program has been the best implemented policy so far 
and has been very successful and was continued by the subsequent 
governments. Path dependency was obvious in some of the policies and 
these were considered to be successful as the policy actors, their interests 
and incentives were favourably aligned. 
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A senior policy maker in the planning commission commented 
“Implementation of policies has been a general issue. But we can say that 
some aspects of policies were successful. In the health sector lady health 
workers are seen as successfully implemented and a step towards the rural 
health development. We have human resource available in the form of lady 
health workers. Policy interventions we can say are successful ones”. (Key 
Informant, 8) 
So the picture is not that gloomy. The success stories show that if the 
relationships are above the personal and political interests and all the actors 
at all the levels are taken on board it could lead to successful implementation 
in future as well.  
One participant from KPK commented, “LHW program has taken the health 
services down to the community. Benazir Bhutto initiated this and this is the 
only program which has empowered women and helped communities”. (Key 
Informant, 20) 
The polio eradication campaign also came up as a recurrent theme. There 
have been travelling restrictions imposed on Pakistan recently due to regular 
polio cases coming up. But strange enough one participant from KPK 
labelled it as most successful policy. He further added that it has been 
successfully implemented in some districts in KPK and attributed it to the 
awareness among the local people. But the majority of the participants saw it 
in totality and labelled it as a failure and quoted travel restrictions on 
Pakistani passengers travelling internationally. Some of the participants 
labelled its failure as an International conspiracy against Pakistan. Although it 
was a minority view. 
A senior health ministry official commented “Polio eradication is like Kashmir 
for Pakistan and I cannot comment more”. (Key Informant, 22) 
It is evident from the above remark that there is a hidden fear among the 
senior participants to comment why polio has not been completely eradicated 
in Pakistan. And he was of the view that there is an international conspiracy 
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behind it. But Polio issue never received the full attention of the our policy 
makers. Some of the participants labelled a failure of implementation in Polio 
case due to cultural and religious norms which place crippling restrictions. 
A technocrat remarked, “You mean a best implemented policy. Well, I have 
yet to see. For the last 15 years I have not seen any policy”. (Key Informant, 
1) 
Some participants did not approve of any policy as being successful and this 
came mainly from the technocrats. Non-implementation of policies is also 
linked to the frequent change of governments as every government tries to 
have its own policies and own people at the policy making sphere. Who is 
number 10 in one government may become number 1 in other and this thing 
severely affects the whole implementation. The starting point changes for 
every top policy making post. 
A health ministry official remarked, “When policies are made, their execution 
should be considered. Here it has always lacked technical steps. Our 
objectives are not clear. Our vision should be more realistic and based on 
ground realities”. The same KI said “In the very recent past a policy was 
made just because the minister wanted it “. (Key Informant, 40) 
It is quite evident that the targets or goals are not realistic and need based 
policies are not made. Further, the personal interests dominate the national 
interests. 
 A head of an international organization commented, “Politicians not just 
interfere at the implementation level but at every level and in every strategy 
and policy”. He further added “Political agendas are everywhere to give you 
an example our policy would be to bring down MMR by 13%. When it comes 
to the implementation phase it gets messed up due to political agenda”.  (Key 
Informant, 5) 
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It is evident from the above quote that the donors also complained about the 
political interference of the politicians at every level. So politics- policy nexus 
was quite evident across all the sectors and not just in the health sector. 
On the failure of polio eradication, a senior technocrat said, “Polio is a classic 
example of our policy failure. I mean we do not have any data. How many 
children are to be vaccinated? No demographic data. They just have 
vaccines not properly kept or stored. They are just pouring in.” (Key 
Informant, 1) 
The key informants at the provincial and district level linked the polio failure 
to the security issues in the country in which some polio workers were killed 
in the tribal areas recently. They suggested that this issue should be the 
domain of the home ministry and not just the health ministry. A couple of 
health ministry officials also suggested that we could also incorporate some 
of the features of the Iranian model into our existing LHW model. In our 
context, we lack basic amenities in our remote and rural area, but in the case 
of Iran they provide full facilities to the health workers especially the LHWs. 
There are a couple or brother and sister are given motor bikes and 2-3 
villages to cater. So there should be culture sensitive and context specific. 
A minority opinion among the bureaucrats thought that there are no barriers 
in the implementation of policies as such rather it depends on the way the 
policies are formulated and presented in front of the higher authorities. There 
were some strong alliances or networks to drive the implementation at 
different tiers of the government. As a result, the process presented itself to 
us as marked by unease and apprehension, which in turn hindered rather 
than supported the process.  
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5.6.2 Governance Challenges 
The health officials on the management side whether at national or provincial 
levels saw governance as the biggest challenge. They were of the view that 
the managers should not act as dictators and work for the success of their 
team and induct right people for the right job and with the right skills. 
 A technocrat KI (9) remarked “Governance is new in our country and we 
very frequently keep on romancing with it. To me it is the art of solving public 
problems through the most efficient means like human and infrastructure”.  
Most of them were of the view that we kept on using the word governance 
without knowing what is good and what is bad governance. All of them 
viewed the failure of polio eradication as an example of bad governance and 
Lady health worker program as an example of good governance within the 
health sector. Though deeper analysis revealed there were factors like path 
dependency and established power relations involved as well. 
They were of the view that Governance is the overall system of the policy 
process taking all stakeholders on board, considering their input and 
addressing all kinds of problems, developing strategies on short/long term 
basis and breaking them into strategic initiatives. And the government should 
be held accountable and responsible for its decisions. But rule of law and 
equality before the law was clearly seen missing by the same bureaucrats 
and all the technocrats who believed it to be a part of good governance. 
A health ministry official “Governance is a cross cutting subject, one cannot 
have good or bad governance. Like all the other sectors, governance is an 
issue in the health sector, Governance probably needs an accountability 
structure”. (Key Informant, 13) 
Some of the participants viewed governance as the major issue in the recent 
past and linked it with devolution. According to them it was the biggest 
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governance reform in the country’s history and not been successful.They 
thought that out of the five provinces, Punjab has  relatively better 
governance infrastructure compared to the other provinces. 
Another senior health official at the national level who had been involved in 
the health sector for more than 3 decades saw Governance as “Effective 
governance is the one which leads to better health of the individuals by 
improving the health services. We should be able to achieve outcomes. 
Policy makers should be accountable and would be able to say this is what 
we planned and this is what we achieved. Everything should be transparent. 
Resources should not be wasted and people should get what they need. 
Governance matters for everything. We should have the right people at the 
right places. What happens in our country is the transfers. Politicians’ 
unnecessary interference moves people around. The government does not 
care and keeps changing the health officials. Governance is broken at every 
level, not just at the top”. (Key Informant, 34) 
The above quote clearly depicts the lack of accountability and transparency, 
political interference and wastage of resources as major contributing factors 
behind bad governance. This was further strengthened by the quote below: 
A senior bureaucrat involved in policy formulation and implementation saw 
governance as “I think governance is a challenge in itself. I don’t like the 
word. Management of resources, including financial, human resource, 
equitable distribution and strict accountability. To me accountability is the 
key. If someone is not performing he should be shown the door. There 
should be zero tolerance. These are the governance challenges”. (Key 
Informant, 17) 
One of the senior bureaucrats who has been involved in many governance 
reforms in the country said “Governance is basically keeping track with the 
fundamentals. We experimented with various forms of governance. Even for  
building you need a plan. Any foundation depends on the site plan. 
Governance first principle is equality before the law and due law. Of late in 
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our society since 1954 force proceeds law. The law should be equal for all. 
The first principle of governance should be equal before the law. Governance 
should secure people from internal or external threats. Each one of them has 
certain duty and power”. (Key Informant, 4). 
So accountability, transparency and rule of law was considered to be the 
essential characteristic of the Governance and which seems to be lacking in 
Pakistani context and it can be seen below by different quotes. 
 A provincial level bureaucrat described governance as “To me governance is 
about the fairest system of decision making at the highest level and proper 
allocation of resources in a transparent and accountable manner”. (Key 
Informant, 21). 
Another senior technocrat remarked “Without accountability, what's 
governance. That’s hegemony”. (Key Informant, 6) 
The implementation challenges as mentioned by most of the participants 
were lack of political will, political interference at every level, lack of 
accountability, no transparency, rule of law, not followed, no respect for merit, 
corruption and rent-seeking, lack of participation, nepotism, favouritism and 
Sifarish (which is basically a reference for someone who does not deserve it 
and is commonly used in Pakistani context). It was also suggested by the 
participants that these challenges are there at every level, be it national, 
provincial or district. 
 5.6.3 Financial issues 
Findings revealed that there is no proper financial strategy as per se. The 
government spending on health is 0.6% of GDP. Instead of spending more 
on the preventive care as well on the tertiary care hospitals, huge non-
development funds are being given to NGOs. After devolution there is some 
confusion among the donors. Some are still dealing with the federal 
government, especially with the newly created Ministry of national health 
regulation and co-ordination. Others prefer going to the provinces directly. 
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Then some vertical programs are still being funded by the centre even after 
been handed over to the provinces. 
Two main issues regarding the finances highlighted by most of the 
participants were mismanagement of the funds and not based on the needs 
of the population. Some were of the view that the public should be taken into 
account about the financial crunch while a couple of the bureaucrats were of 
the view that everything related to finances should be kept confidential. 
Technocrats were of the view that the decision power is with the ministry of 
finance and after getting directives from the Prime Minister through cabinet 
division or directly, they initiate the process of financing for example, annual 
plan, annual budgets and Public Sector Development Program (PSDP). 
These three or four documents are developed by the government. Then a 
technical body like Planning Commission plays a pivotal role to provide 
feedback on different technical side of the projects. The above process was 
before the 18th amendment. 
Then there is a national finance commission award, this is another forum, 
federal divisible pool whereby all taxes are taken into account from all the 
provinces and then after providing share to the federal tier rest of the 
financing is distributed among the provinces on a five year basis like previous 
national finance commission award was in 2009 and the next is due in 2014-
15. So this is the distribution process at the federal level. This is one way and 
a lot of nitty gritty is involved and it takes 7-8 months to prepare an annual 
budget which is then presented to the National assembly and the Senate 
 A senior technocrat (at the provincial level) tried to explain the financing 
mechanism  as: “Sometimes if there is an incremental change under different 
heads. Next year under the same head they will adjust for inflation and 
increase in 2-3%. So this is not strategic need based but a technical point of 
view unless there is some need. The planning commission like projects of 
national importance, PM directives and then ongoing schemes for last few 
years for which federal government is providing to all the vertical programs. 
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There is a fixed amount till 2014-15. If there is a national emergency like 
Polio then they can adjust that into it. Then there is Council of Common 
Interests. And that is for any conflicting issues like electricity, dams, taxes. So 
this is another policy making forum. There is a social sector committee and 
then there is a defence committee and Parliament and Senate”.(Key 
Informant,6) 
The financial mechanism as explained by some of the key informants 
appeared quite smooth but in reality the networks or ties seemed to be 
operating at every level for authority and resources. 
 
5.7 Policy Recommendations 
Every key informant gave his or her input according to their position and 
experience and it was considered appropriate to cluster them under policy 
recommendations theme.  
 5.7.1Policy  
The technocrats (who were clinicians earlier) were of the view that instead of 
a top-down approach all the policies, including the health policies should 
follow a bottom-up approach with involvement of all the communities. They 
suggested that there was a need for a context based health policy 
addressing the needs of the local population. The government should own 
the policies as that would lead to the sustainability of policies in the long run. 
They recommended that there was a need for a holistic approach to the 
policies. Some of them stressed the need to fund and focus on preventive 
care rather than the curative care and include the social determinants of 
health in our health policies. The tertiary care needs to be funded more and 
there should be an effective referral pattern throughout the country to reduce 
the burden on the tertiary care hospitals. A few of the politicians suggested to 
re-design the whole health system as to make it more accountable and 
transparent especially the public sector. There was another important 
suggestion by the bureaucrats to reshape the role of different actors in the 
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health systems at the federal capital i.e. Islamabad to avoid duplication and 
overlapping of services. There should be involvement of the civil society in 
the policy decisions at every level. It was also stressed to have a proper co-
ordination among provinces in health and other sectors. 
 A technocrat suggested, “There is national health ministry, whatever in 
Islamabad. This is a coordinating body and if they have regular quarterly 
experience sharing meeting or national conferences. It could bring all the 
stakeholders on the same table”. (Key Informant, 18)   
5.7.2 Role of actors 
Politicians recommended that the bureaucrats should not create hurdles in 
the implementation of some useful policies and the technocrats should be 
involved more due to their knowledge and expertise. Bureaucrats were of the 
view that there should be less political interference, although they agreed that 
more technocrats should be brought in. Some senior politicians 
recommended to have some research fellows to help them in order to reduce 
their dependence on bureaucrats. The health officials recommended that the 
federal secretary for health should be a doctor instead of a bureaucrat. 
District health officials recommended that they should be involved in policy 
formulation stage as well. 
5.7.3 Health workforce issues 
All the participants suggested that there should be human resource in health 
policy in the country which should address the health workforce issues. There 
is a need for a good team in the public and private organizations and 
institutions and to provide it with a conducive environment. There is a need 
for a proper job description before recruitment of the health workforce so that 
they are well aware of their rights and duties. The technocrats also 
suggested that there is a dire need for a proper career structure for the health 
workforce in the public sector as this thing would prevent them from going to 
the private side and would convert the Brain drain into Brain gain. Some 
technocrats also suggested looking for the strategies in India as to how they 
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attracted the doctors by providing them good financial and other incentives 
which made them return to their own country. 
Some of the technocrats stressed the need to place the right people with the 
right skills at the right place. They added that there should be more respect 
for the paramedics and one way to do that is to educate them more. There 
should be more focus on the training of cadres other than doctors in order to 
strengthen our health workforce. These technocrats further added that the 
doctors should be motivated and incentivized to work at the district level and 
also in the rural and remote areas. There should be in job training for the 
doctors and other cadres of health workforce as this will improve their 
existing skills. The national and provincial technocrats agreed that there 
should be a uniform health policy framework at the center even after 
devolution. The provinces could have their own provincial health strategies 
built in line with the guidance provided through this national framework and in 
this way there could be a standard guidance to look up to. 
A health ministry official suggested “The basic service structure should be 
such as to provide a proper job description should be made to for everyone. 
The right people should stay”. (Key Informant, 36) 
5.7.4 Health financing  
Regarding the financing strategies in health the technocrats suggested that 
there should be need-based allocation of resources and should be context 
specific. There is a need to increase the health budget and improve the 
Health: GDP ratio in the country. 
A retired technocrat who has been involved in the formulation of financing 
strategies suggested “Like I said the resources should be allocated to the 
needs and based on what is the actual requirement of the district and what is 
the quality of infrastructure... Are there adequate coverage for the 
population?” (Key Informant, 23) 
A bureaucrat suggested “For a lot of our maladies we have to generate 
enough revenues so that you have more money as things cannot be done for 
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cheap. Pay people enough to improve human resource issues”. (Key 
Informant, 15) 
5.7.5 Governance Issues 
It was highly recommended by the bureaucrats and technocrats that political 
interference should be minimized as this leads to nepotism and favoritism at 
every level and is affecting the overall governance in the country. There 
should be respect for the law and merit. Every decision should be made more 
transparent and everyone should be accountable. The stakeholders and the 
public should be given an opportunity to participate in decision making. Some 
of the politicians also suggested that there should be bureaucratic reforms. 
The patronage culture should also be dealt with by introducing strict laws to 
ensure merit and accountability. 
A senior technocrat suggested “We should have respect for law, merit, 
accountability at every level and transparency”. (Key Informant, 8) 
A health   ministry official suggested “We should do things on transparent. All 
the world campaigns have transparency behind their success. Only with 
transparency, we can assure that we are going right. The worst thing with our 
governance is transparency. We need to come up with some credible 
people”. (Key Informant, 1) 
Another health ministry official suggested “It will be very difficult, but right 
people should be placed at the right places. Secondly, it is very important to 
reduce bureaucracy and political influence. Accountability is needed because 
most unqualified people are sitting there and doing nothing”. (Key Informant, 
26) 
A retired bureaucrat suggested “The government should be held accountable 
and responsible for its decisions”. (Key Informant, 37) 
5.7.6 Devolution 
The technocrats recommended that there should be more devolution at the 
local level and the communities should be empowered to take their decisions. 
The local authorities should be made more financially independent as they 
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know the grass root problems well. There should be capacity building at the 
provincial level to handle devolution. 
A senior health ministry official suggested about devolution “More and more 
devolution. Give responsibilities to the people”. (Key Informant, 28) 
 A national level politician suggested “You need to devolve power. The local 
people should have the resources and responsibilities to solve their issues”. 
(Key Informant, 11) 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter depicted a clear and comprehensive picture of the complex 
policy environment and role of the key policy players in the fragmented 
Pakistani health systems. Policy process in general was perceived to be top-
down, non-participatory, rushed, secretive and highly bureaucratic. It was the 
prerogative of a few policy elites who made the policies behind the closed 
doors. They were seen as having captured the policy making/implementation 
process. Health policy trajectory clearly revealed incoherent and 
disconnected national health policies. The June 2011 Devolution created 
more confusion as far as the role of policy actors was concerned. 
 
The factors behind the implementation gaps as seen by the policy actors 
were: corruption, political interference, nepotism, institutional flaws, wrong 
priorities, capacity issues, lack of merit and accountability, lack of evidence-
based health policies, financial constraints, overburdened tertiary care, 
absence of a proper career ladder for  health professionals, limited decision 
space for  district health officials, lack of capacity building, dual practice by 
the medics, maldistribution of health workforce, rent-seeking, lack of political 
attention, multiplicity of actors, donors’ agenda, lack of conducive working 
environment, brain drain, lack of inter-provincial co-ordination, 
patrimonialism, lack of national ownership of health, hidden alliances and 
policy-politics nexus. 
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Some of the key informants were keen on discussing different political eras in 
the country’s history which gave a tour d’ horizon of the political history of 
Pakistan. The information provided clearly indicated that constant domination 
of the political power and the state apparatus by narrowly based elite seeking 
to advance its private and parochial interests lay at the heart of the problem. 
Regime changes either military or civilian did not make any substantive 
difference. Due to this, stasis in some of the state policies was seen. This 
was due to the some strong policy players pursuing their own interests for 
authority and resources.  
 
The same pattern was mirrored in the health policy subsystem where the key 
policy actors had strong coalitions as some of the informants referred to. It 
was either due to their political influence and institutional roles. Institutional 
position of the key players (politicians and bureaucrats) also identified where 
these actors were located in the complex political environment. Power, 
interests, patronage and incentives were the main underlying drivers. The 
excessive use of patronage in case by case policy making/ implementation to 
favour narrow interest groups has derailed decision making, its rules and 
transparency.  
As far as the role of policy elites was concerned, majority saw the 
bureaucrats as the agenda-setters and having the non-decision making 
power in their hands. This group of actors could easily be termed as the Veto 
Players in the overall policy sphere. The apparent blame game by policy 
players had a strong underlying power nexus. This provides a strong 
foundation for the later chapter where all these findings will be discussed in 
light of the relevant theoretical frameworks.  
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Chapter Six: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the main elements of this study as emerged 
from analysis of the data. The findings will be discussed and argued in light 
of the wider literature. The theoretical frameworks selected will be  applied to 
the results. The main points of this chapter will inform the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
6.2 Findings of this study 
The findings suggest that it is the power game in the macro-political sphere, 
which is reflected in the policy sub-system as well. This power was seen to 
be working at two levels: actors and institutions, and one cannot be 
separated from the other. The key players using their individual or 
institutional power formed strong coalitions, which resulted in policy networks 
or iron triangles. The political history clearly revealed some policy reversals 
but mostly the process remained path dependent as the power relations did 
not change even with the change of the governments. This path dependency 
concept was also evident in the health policy sphere where some policies 
were there even for more than two decades. All these have an effect on the 
implementation of policies in the longer run.This is shown in a revised 
conceptual framework on the next page: 
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Figure 7: Final version of conceptual framework 
The development of this last and final version of the conceptual framework 
was an iterative process, with different themes taking the centre stage at 
various stages of data analysis. As it was a data driven inductive study, the 
concept of Power emerged as the core theme at the end. Power is a broad 
concept, but in the context of this research was seen mainly as relational, 
transitive, intransitive and non-decision making (explained in chapter four). 
As the arrows indicate, the power can be deconstructed into agential and 
structural, where the agents or policy actors were able to influence one 
another, work together, or at times use their authority at the expense of 
others. Policy implementation should combine both structural and individual 
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perspectives because stakeholders in the policy domain are embedded in 
historically constructed institutions or structures. 
 
Due to underlying incentives and self-interests, power relations always take 
the form of policy networks or iron triangles. The underlying power relations 
were present throughout the different phases of the political history in one 
form or the other and this led to the path dependency or policy inertia. All the 
arrows finally culminate into the implementation box, displaying it as more of 
a political game where the actors, power, incentives, institutions and policy 
networks have their own role to play. 
 
6.3 Key findings  
 6.3.1 Complex power relationships 
Implementation came up as a political game rather than simple policy–to-
action continuum in this study. Gaps in implementation of policy were 
compounded by power relationships between groups of actors. Clearly, 
patronage as a part of power relationship existed at all levels. At the national 
level, between the politicians and bureaucrats, between the provinces and 
the centre, within provinces and between the provinces and the districts. 
Sometimes this patronage was obvious, sometimes hidden, and not 
verbalised. The findings also suggested some strong coalitions at every level 
due to personal, political connections, authority and monetary interests. 
 
Even at the district level, the local health officials seemed to pursue some of 
the policies of the politicians they tend to know personally and they were kept 
at the same position until their patrons were in power. As is evident in 
(chapter five) recruitments in all sectors and especially health were made 
under the umbrella of patronage. Patronage also gave rise to corruption and 
vested indiscriminate power in the hands of unaccountable appointees who 
disappear once the political government is gone. 
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The key informants who happened to be the key players in the policy sphere 
had conflicting perspectives on the surface. As all the groups had different 
beliefs and experiences, so they did not have a shared perspective on most 
of the key issues. There were competing interests and personal linkages at 
every level. Conflicting actors had a contrasting vision on the problems and 
the solutions. Military and politician friction was evident from the findings. 
Bureaucrats differed with the politicians. Technocrats differed with both the 
politicians and the bureaucrat. District health officials had divergent views 
than their superiors. Alliances were seen when there was a shared interest 
over money and authority. And these alliances turned into personal and 
political linkages with the passage of time and took the form of established 
power relations in the longer run. 
 
Findings from low and middle-income countries showed that political 
judgment predominated policy implementation and was influenced by political 
interests, personal linkages and the values and opinion of policymakers 
(Jardali et al. 2014). Implementation is seen as a mostly complex, interactive 
process in which a wide range of actors influence both the direction of travel 
as well as the way that given policies are executed, within the constraints of 
existing institutions. 
 
In a study conducted in South Africa in 2008 by Lehmann and Matwa, it was 
shown that the role of power in policy implementation processes is an under-
researched, yet crucial, aspect of understanding policy implementation. In the 
webs of relationships and tensions key players attempted to exercise power 
in several ways.  
 
Keeping in view our findings, Pakistani society could be rightly termed as a 
patrimonial society, which has existed in many places outside Africa, what we 
would call the state was indeed the personal domain of one or a few leaders. 
But in many such places significant legitimacy was derived from an aspect of 
patrimonialism that is now frequently overlooked. These were reciprocities 
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that helped cement patrimonial authority. Such reciprocities like personal, 
densely interwoven, often uneven, and based on vague and symbolic 
dynamics of status, loyalty, and respect as much as on material exchange 
became the means by which rulers sought obedience from the ruled. The 
term patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism has persisted, even proliferated, in 
recent decades (Pitcher et al. 2009). 
Eric Budd (2004) and Jay Oelbaum (2002) support the claims made by 
Theobald regarding the relationship between neopatrimonialism and poor 
policy outcomes. Like Theobald, Budd indicates that patrimonialism is a 
structural feature of many states that all states are patrimonial but “some 
states are clearly more patrimonial than others” (2004), and he attempts to 
document levels of patrimonialism exhibited by thirty developing countries. 
Budd emphasizes the inhibiting effect of patrimonialism not only on the 
economy but also on democratization, his rankings indicate that the more 
patrimonial the state is, the lower its gross national product and its “freedom” 
score in the Freedom House rankings are likely to be. Although Budd does 
not present an African case study to illustrate his claims, many African 
countries appear in his rankings, with Botswana considered a “moderately 
patrimonial” state and Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zimbabwe 
considered “highly patrimonial.” 
Pakistan clearly has a history of patrimonial authority along with democracy. 
Politicians favour the bureaucrats who obey them and bureaucrats patron 
their junior colleagues. This patronage in turn adversely affects the policy 
implementation in the longer run as this patrimonial culture just promotes the 
policies to win the electorate for the politicians. 
The Neo-Patrimonial power politics that saturated the political landscape had   
surrounded the political elites. This is a manifestation of the nature of politics 
in the society, which Kew (2006) sees as a negative phenomenon that should 
be altered. The neo-patrimonial contract between the Big Man (usually a 
patron either in or outside the government) and his supporters is based on a 
shared perspective of how both see the relationship. The social position of 
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the Big Man is seen as the source that creates the relationship, such that the 
patronage flowing downward is a favour that demands loyalty in exchange. In 
Pakistani context the loyalty to the ruling government was seen among few 
bureaucrats and the technocrats who were enjoying the power and did not 
criticize any of the policies of the current government. 
 6.3.2 Role of actors 
The bureaucrats in the Pakistani context were generally perceived by all as 
strong and powerful agenda-setters and the real decision makers in all 
sectors be it health, education, finance and others. But this was more of a 
non-decision making power attributed to the bureaucrats pointing to the 
bureaucratic hurdles created by them at all levels. The politicians and 
bureaucrats both held military responsible for disruption of the civilian rule. 
This civil-military conflict had always been a part of the political history of 
Pakistan since its inception. It was a power struggle between the two which is 
continuing until now.  
 
The historical facts (mentioned in chapter two) clearly reflect this strained 
relationship between the civilian and the military governments. Political 
process or the structure of the country has been severely affected by this 
tension. In the health policy sphere, International donors were more critical of 
the bureaucrats than of politicians. Medical doctors were seen as helpless in 
the whole policy sphere and their power was just confined to the four walls of 
the hospitals. Whereas the politicians blamed the doctors of their hegemony 
and had to use the political influence even for a bed in the emergency ward. 
Again a clear nexus of army versus politician and bureaucrat was visible and 
this was mentioned in a quote by a senior bureaucrat. 
 
Apparently, there was a blame game going on between the key policy actors, 
especially between the bureaucrats and the politicians where politicians 
blamed the bureaucrats for putting bureaucratic hurdles in the policies which 
they did not like. And sometimes bringing in the files at the last moment 
where the politicians have no time and no choice to think twice. This thing 
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was also attributed to the rushed policy process. On the other hand, 
politicians were blamed more by the bureaucrats and less by the technocrats 
for political interference and patronage at all levels starting from the agenda 
setting onwards till policy implementation. They were blamed for not 
providing their inputs and for the lack of ownership of the policies.  
The bureaucrats were viewed as the locus of power in the policy sphere in 
Pakistan and used this authority and power wherever and whenever they 
liked. There were some non-state actors which could be regarded as the 
policy players outside the government. They had strong connections with 
either the bureaucrats or politicians or both and influencing the policy 
decisions at the top level from behind. This complexity of conflict and 
consensus, multiplicity of linkages and the interest-power structure in the 
policy sphere has a strong influence on policy-action relationship. 
Another phenomenon observed in course of data collection was that the 
politicians spoke more openly but the bureaucrats were a bit cautious in 
discussing especially the ones at the higher and senior positions. While the 
junior level bureaucrats and the technocrats openly criticized the 
government. 
The proposition that the Pakistani bureaucracy is a Weberian institution has 
become a subject of considerable interest. One-yard stick against which to 
evaluate the Pakistani bureaucracy has been to ascertain whether Weberian 
characteristics of meritocratic recruitment and long-term career ladders are in 
evidence. Another consideration has been with regard to adherence to the 
system of rules in the Pakistani bureaucracy. What is not clear is whether 
political neutrality, a Weberian characteristic, should continue to be used as a 
characteristic to classify a bureaucracy as Weberian. In fact, such a 
proposition becomes meaningless within the context of the incentives that 
are faced by these individuals. In fact a bureaucrat who chooses to follow 
principle of Political Neutrality is far more likely to be removed on the basis of 
political grounds (Tanwir and Fennel, 2010). 
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Findings did not show any political neutrality rather political leaning of the 
bureaucrats who were in majority. However, minority spoke against the 
politicians and their policies. The recruitment whether in bureaucracy or 
health sector was not merit based. None of the characteristics of weberian 
bureaucracy was found in Pakistani bureaucracy in the context of this study. 
The Pakistani bureaucracy is rooted in a quagmire of political intrigues and is 
miles away from the ideal apolitical officer that Weber (1968) envisaged. 
 
In many of the studies, the absence of ‘political commitment’ is frequently 
mentioned when referring to failure of policy implementation. In studies on 
Bangladesh, Malawian, Ghanaian and Pakistan studies this is shown very 
clearly (Leftwich, 2007). Lack of political commitment was one of the themes 
which emerged strongly and consistently in the data analysis as a part of role 
of actors in policy implementation. In the context of this study it is best 
understood as lack of motivation or wrong priorities. Majority of the policy 
makers criticized each other and especially the politicians for not prioritising 
policies beneficial for the people. They were interested in the projects and 
policies that were politically visible and earn them more political mileage in 
the next elections. The policy makers in a way also blamed the general public 
that their priority is not health but education for their kids and jobs for 
themselves. Lack of political will also led to lack of ownership of health as the 
top priority. 
 
Conflicts and alliances are a part of role of actors. Extensive empirical 
research on policymaking has emphasised the central role of actors in the 
face of complex problems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003), as a way to begin to 
bring together divergent dialogues and perspectives. Moreover, contrasting 
perspectives may well be part of the problem that must be addressed. For 
complex issues, action is often required by a number of actors, who may see 
their interests as being at loggerheads with those of others, or who may not 
buy the importance of an issue, conflicting actors may base their position on 
equally conflicting visions of the problem and its solution. 
184 
 
 
 6.3.3 Interests, incentives and policy networks  
Coalitions normally resulted in networks which affected the policy decisions 
and implementation as seen in the context of this study. These networks 
were due to self-interests, incentives, resources and distribution of authority 
and power. Sometimes within a policy subsystem, between bureaucrats and 
at other times a network consisted of bureaucrats and politicians, 
occasionally with technocrats as well, having the same personal and political 
inclinations. These were ‘closed’ networks, where key actors prevented new 
actors from entering policy debates and discourses. All actors strived to 
create ‘policy monopolies’ dominated by the predictability in terms of who can 
participate in policymaking and its implementation. Closed policy networks 
typically also involved veto players (who happen to be the bureaucrats in this 
study) that can prevent changes from occurring. The policy networks were 
more than just networks and could be labelled as iron triangles, of stable 
relationships between various interest groups which sometimes persisted 
even with the change of political governments. 
 
Probably, the most important type of relation in a network setting involved 
exchange and acquisition of resources Resource exchange and acquisition 
could be information and money and equates with access to authority.  
 6.3.4 Corruption and rent seeking 
Corruption as a major implementation barrier was mentioned by almost all 
the participants. It was seen as one of the most important challenges in 
implementation of policies and governance. This has been confirmed by 
some other studies as well. Corruption is another economic and socio-
cultural factor that affects health policy implementation in Pakistan. Several 
international organizations, including the World Bank, the IMF, and 
Transparency International, have demonstrated their concern about 
corruption in Pakistan and its negative impact upon the development of the 
country (Khan,  2005). 
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Corruption was closely allied with rent seeking in health and other sectors. 
Rent seeking phenomenon was mentioned by the provincial bureaucrats 
blaming the national politicians. Surprisingly, none of the key informants at 
the federal or national level mentioned this. Although rent seeking is quite 
common in bureaucracy and other institutions but strange enough the 
politicians did not come up with this complaint. Diversion of funds in the 
health sector was mentioned a couple of times by the key informants and 
was seen as a hurdle in policy implementation as well. 
 
As a consequence of lack of accountability, the health sector suffers from 
corruption. Furthermore, health professionals working in the public sector do 
not feel themselves accountable for their performance (Khan, 1996).The 
health sector is among the top six key sectors in Pakistan that are seriously 
affected by corruption. There are numerous charges of corruption, repeated 
complaints of bribery, misuse of resources and sale of public equipment in 
government hospitals (Waxman,  2003). As a result, the health sector loses 
its scarce resources and health policy implementation is distorted, this was 
disclosed by the interviewees at all levels. They recognized that there is a 
high level of corruption in the health sector. It affects the trust of people and 
hinders wider participation in the implementation of healthcare policies, 
programmes and innovations in healthcare. Interviewees at the provincial 
and local levels disclosed that corruption demotivates local managers, health 
professionals and field workers alike. 
 
The health system in most countries is the result of a mix of institutions, 
regulations, conventions and historical accidents. These arrangements give 
scope for rent seeking behaviour. When the government undertakes 
activities, the possibility is created for gains to be transferred to individuals for 
their own advantage, reducing the social benefits. In low and middle income 
countries, the features of primary health care also provide greater scope for 
rent seeking as many services are easily transferable, for example, 
resources meant for the cure of communicable diseases can be transferred 
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to other conditions (Kymenyi and Tollison, 1999). In Pakistani context, it 
happens frequently where funding for one project is transferred to another for 
a variety of reasons and more so in the health sector. 
 
In Nigeria, it is sad to note that the institution which is meant to handle the 
health needs of the people is among those affected by the menace of 
corruption. The health sector is witnessing failures, as most hospitals are in 
poor shape, drugs are lacking, life expectancy is not improving, the number 
of people living with HIV/AIDS is still high, other killer diseases such as 
malaria, diabetes, TB, cancer are still a major threat to the people. The 
contribution of corruption to these failures is very significant as some of the 
funds meant for healthcare delivery are sometimes diverted (Oluwabamide, 
2013). 
 
Political corruption on the part of the inner circle ruling elite and filtering down 
to the middle levels of the state bureaucracy has skewed a power structure 
that enables institutional manipulation. The prevalence of corruption has 
been blamed for persistent poverty, capital flight and a constrain to 
development in African countries like Uganda (Godfrey,  2013). 
 
In the context of Pakistan, numerous charges of corruption and misuse of 
public authority against civil servants working in health ministries, health 
managers and physicians appear in the press regularly. Factors responsible 
for corruptions in health sector include: weak judicial system, lack of 
accountability, low salaries, and non-recognition of performance and lack of 
motivation particularly among professionals working in rural areas (Khan and 
Heuvel,  2007).  
 6.3.5 Path dependency  
Path dependency phenomenon evolved as one of the core themes during the 
course of data analysis. Policies like Lady Health Workers (was initiated in 
1994 through the Prime Minister Bhutto’s Program for Family Planning and 
Primary Care) National Blood Transfusion Policy, Rescue1122, EPI and 
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HIV/AIDS (mentioned in chapter five) were there for decades. Although new 
actors emerged or a change in policy preferences was formulated, certain 
actors (mostly the politicians and bureaucrats) had an incentive to prevent 
change to occur and maintain the status quo. This phenomenon was also 
observed in Benazir income support program which was continued by the 
rival political party when it took over in 2013.The path dependency seen in 
Pakistani context was more of a Habitual path dependency with inflexibility 
and potential inefficiency as the main characteristics. Inflexibility is closely 
related to historical inertia. Both these interlinked patterns are quite evident in 
this study context. Another feature, potential inefficiency is also obvious in 
Pakistani context where rational actors have not taken efficient decisions to 
maximize utilities whether political or health policy sphere. 
 
Path dependence arguments often offer important insights into political 
dynamics. It was quite evident that once on a particular path political actors 
will generally have powerful incentives to stay on it. Switching costs are 
normally borne in the short run, and the benefits will generally add in the long 
run and that too to someone else. The political world is unusually prone to 
increasing returns (Pierson, 2000). That could be one of the reasons for 
continuation and lock-in of a couple of policy initiatives mentioned earlier. 
None of the political governments was willing to change it for the fear of 
losing increasing returns generated by these policies. Apart from increasing 
returns it also served the interests of some of the actors.  
 
In a study conducted by Bertone et al (2014), path dependency phenomenon 
along with incremental policy making and stop gap measures were quite 
evident in Sierra Leone. It was clear in Sierra Leone case that sequence in 
which certain events happen does matter. Due to the conflict in health sector, 
the alignment of actors and agendas was not seen in Sierra Leone until 
sometime later. 
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Path dependent effects are quite intense in politics of implementation. The 
key features of political life, public policies and formal institutions are change 
resistant. Both are generally designed difficult to overturn for two reasons. 
First, who design policies and institutions may wish to bind their successors 
(Pierson,  2000). According to Moe (1999), this reflects the problem of 
political uncertainty. The political actors anticipate that their political actors 
may assume the reins of the government soon. To protect themselves they 
must create rules that are hard to reverse and here the habitual path 
dependency comes into play.  
 
Perceptions and attitudes of players can vary due to their positions in the 
institutional policy web since different stakeholders tend to see the same 
process in very different ways in terms of whether there is stagnation or 
change. Radical change can have a strong impact on these perceptions. 
Some stakeholders view any change smaller than radical change as 
stagnation, since they are fascinated with the large change that has 
occurred. Others will see the punctuated equilibrium as a blip in one part of 
the system, possibly the culmination of trends over time but a diversion from 
the real action, which remains path dependent (Rosen,  2008).   
 
The policy subsystems in Pakistan never developed enough to allow for 
independence from the central government. Unstable political institutions in 
the country have led to selective attention from the policy makers affecting 
the policy implementation in the longer run. As mentioned in the background 
chapter, Pakistan saw twenty-four governments in the past sixty five years, 
including fifteen elected or appointed prime ministers, five interim 
governments and thirty-three years of military rule under four different 
leaders. There has always been institutional friction between the institutions 
in Pakistan.   
 
It is clear that the national health policies were announced with 7, 4 and 8 
years gap. These were quite repetitive (as mentioned in detail chapter two). 
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Opportunities were not availed even during the stability periods in the 
country’s history. The new ideas and the new actors in the political sphere 
were not utilised by the key players in the policy sphere. There is no 
synchronization between the political and health policy history. The share 
and spread of political attention was never on the health policy issues and 
was completely partisan. Path dependency put limitations on the change due 
to the structure of the rigid institutions. Some periods in which the change 
was required, it rarely occurred. According to path dependency models 
(described in detail in chapter four) current policy decisions are restrained by 
structures represented by past policies. 
 
This could be seen from the statements of the older participants either 
politicians or bureaucrats. The institutions have always been sticky, they 
have not responded directly to demands or needs. The decision space has 
always been limited and many issues often compete for the attention of the 
policy makers. The value for each policy topic is assigned a percentage of 
attention by the policy makers at any one time, so as one topic rises on the 
political agenda, the amount of attention for all other topics falls. This lack of 
political attention was quite visible in Pakistani context.  
 
Pakistan has a democratic setup but as it is clear from its political history, it 
has always been authoritarian. In authoritarian systems, the press is closely 
monitored, elections are tightly controlled, and channels for grievance 
representation are restricted. Most importantly, policy decisions are made 
unilaterally by the political leadership and implemented by coercion if 
necessary. There is relatively little institutional friction in authoritarian 
regimes, which would suggest that punctuated instability would 
correspondingly abate in intensity (True, 2014). But in Pakistan case, the 
institutional friction was there right from the beginning, between military and 
civilian government, within civilian governments, between the politicians and 
the bureaucrats.  
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Structural continuities, institutional inertia, and limitations of agency do not 
provide a receptive environment for fundamental change in Pakistan. Despite 
these constraints there exist some opportunities for catalysing some change 
through external intervention. These have implications for policy design in the 
short to medium term as compared to longer-term strategies. Relations 
between elected and non-elected organs of state power have been identified 
as the key source of political instability. The role of the military, in particular, 
is a highly problematic one in the economic history of Pakistan. The 
imbalance between military and civil power is also a persistent source of 
political instability (Naqvi and Robinson,  2004).  
 
If we analyse the political history of Pakistan, we can see that health has 
never been on the political agenda of any government. It has been shown 
that the political context is unstable and experiences frequent change in 
governments. This political instability leads to centralization, sticky but weak 
institutions, and a low priority to social welfare issues including health. But if 
we examine the history of the national health policies in Pakistan (mentioned 
in detail in chapter two) we gain an important insight that not enough time 
was available to any health policy for its effective implementation, which 
resulted in wastage of resources.  
 
In 1997, the government introduced its new National Health Policy by 
replacing the National Health Policy of 1990. Then another government 
introduced a new health policy in 2001 by replacing the previous one. 
Frequent change of governments have also removed the political energy that 
is needed for the effective implementation of health policies and programs.  
During the military regime of General Zia, the population-planning program 
was seriously affected (Lee et al.  1998; Khan, 1996). Zia froze the 
population program when he assumed power in 1977 due to his antagonism 
to former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Mr. 
Bhutto used his party (PPP) workers as field motivators to make the 
population program accessible and popular (Khan,  1996). 
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The results also generate insights on some of the classic conundrums of 
Pakistani politics as they apply to the political agenda, such as whether party 
control of government makes a difference, which it does for punctuations. 
Perhaps of greatest significance, the analysis is able to determine the date, 
direction and magnitude of watersheds or break points in Pakistani political 
agenda according to the share of attention that the politicians assigned to 
particular topics and the spread of attention across them. The political 
agenda contains turning points that are driven by the relative dominance of 
certain issues over the priorities of the politicians. The lock-in occurred due to 
the increasing returns these policies were delivering. 
 
Two sources of instability under authoritarian institutions can be identified. 
First, it traces back to the perverse incentives set in place by the 
infrastructure for top-down control. Even though institutional friction is low 
and authoritarians can and do initiate major changes unilaterally, 
centralization essentially removes a very common source of policy instability 
(Tsebelis, 2002). Whereas policy actors in the democratic system promote 
their agendas by actively and openly challenging current policy, hidden 
collaboration against rather than open violation of the authoritarian’s policy 
would minimize the risk of detection and serve administrators’ interest best 
(Olson,  2000). 
 
The policy subsystem is not insulated and is influenced by pressures from 
public opinion, events such as war, and by long-term structural changes, 
such as a failing economy. Within this environment, there are opportunities 
for political actors, such as political parties or politicians, to compete for 
control over the policies and shift it to other issues. However, this pattern of 
shifting attention is subject to periods of extended incrementalism as well as 
to rapid and dramatic realignments of the status quo (John and Jennings, 
2010). 
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Political institutions translate inputs in the form of changed preferences, new 
participants, new information or sudden attention to previously available 
information into policy output. In the process they impose costs on this 
translation and this leads to institutional friction. It is argued that friction in 
political institutions leads not to consistent gridlock but to long periods of 
stasis. As political institutions add to the cost of translation of inputs to 
outputs, institutional friction would increase and outputs from the process will 
become increasingly path dependent overall (Jones et.al.  2003). It has been 
observed that the factors which can lead to path dependency like institutional 
breakdown, ideas, and policy leaders themselves are subject to additional 
contextual factors. Failure to take account of this may lead to frustration and 
perhaps even to dysfunction, for policy analysts and decision makers alike 
(Feder-Bubis and Chinitz,  2010). 
6.4 Theoretical Insights  
This research draws on the theoretical concepts of power, policy networks 
and path dependency. It can be argued that power in Pakistani context is 
multi-layered. To begin with it is relational where bureaucrats and politicians 
are trying to influence each other at the macro political level. Sometimes it is 
intransitive where all the key players whether bureaucrats, technocrats, 
politicians and other interest groups are working together in form of coalitions 
towards their shared goals for authority and resources. In the political history 
of Pakistan, this phenomenon is quite obvious where sometimes a coalition 
of bureaucrats and politicians against the army was seen and sometimes 
within themselves. The politics in the general political sphere was mirrored in 
the policy subsystems as well.  
 
In the health policy sphere, the key players when they were loggerheads with 
each other tried to use the power at the individual level. But they were 
together for some common interests, incentives and resources and at this 
point used their institutional positions to form coalitions or networks at 
different tiers of the government. Some of these actors were definitely 
stronger than others. The bureaucrats have strongly emerged as having the 
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non-decision making power where they could easily hold the policies off the 
agenda or put hurdles in their implementation. 
 
Actors are perceived to be the agents and the institutions as structures in the 
context of this study. As can be seen in the conceptual framework (earlier in 
this chapter) actors or agents are embedded in the structural components of 
the political system as a whole. Even if they use the power at the individual 
level they are constrained by the institutions. The institutions themselves are 
the outcome of the strategies of ongoing political conflict. The institutions 
appear to be sticky and rigid. The power relations were implicated in 
structure and structures were implicated in power relations (as seen by 
Giddens).  
 
The policy implementation approaches could also be divided into structural 
and individual. It can be argued that for complex issues like policy 
implementation, action is often required by a number of actors, who may see 
their interests as being at loggerheads with others, or who may not buy into 
the importance of an issue (to differing degrees) conflicting actors may base 
their position on equally conflicting visions of the problem and its solution 
(Johnson, 2015). In Pakistani context, the policy makers within themselves 
and with policy implementers had coalitions within their group and shared the 
same beliefs and perceptions. So at the same time there were coalitions, 
consensus and tensions at the same level which was a very interesting 
phenomenon that emerged. During the preliminary stages of data analysis, 
the conflict and tension among the key policy players were the main 
emerging themes, but the deeper analysis of the data showed that actually 
there were hidden networks which worked quietly behind the scenes. 
 
Pakistani political system is a classic example of Elitism where power is 
based on the unequal distribution of resources and that public has little 
influence on policy outcomes. And the policy process in general is seen as a 
wide and complex interaction between the interests, actors and institutions 
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rather than between institutions themselves. Institutions are also a dominant 
source of power along with the power elites occupying key positions in 
government and the military. Lasswell’s view of a ‘garrison state’ in which 
military, bureaucratic and technocratic elites rule could be applied on 
Pakistan only if the technocratic elites could be replaced by the politicians. 
The policy network concept could be applied to the policy sphere in Pakistan 
where the policy makers form their own networks or ‘Iron triangles’ and the 
relationships are more for interests and incentives which prove to be stable. 
 
Policy choices are made actually by politicians and bureaucrats who perceive 
themselves to be policy elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power 
that matter, not simply relative quantities of resources. Furthermore, those 
leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct 
national resources as they might wish. Power analysis must therefore also 
examine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, 
because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be 
allocated to different policies. It can be argued that certain structured 
interests, resources, powers, constraints and predicaments are built into the 
positions occupied by the policy makers. 
Complex systems are particularly sensitive to initial conditions which produce 
a long-term momentum or ‘path dependence’ (Cairney, 2012). The timing of 
decisions is crucial because it is usually the order of events that sets policy 
on a particular path. Inertia and unpredictability have a huge effect on 
policies which are very difficult to reverse. 
 
Interestingly it is often asked how path dependency could be applied to the 
policies as this concept is related to the institutions. After going through a 
wider literature on path dependency, it can be argued that the conceptual 
distinction between a policy and an institution is significant. But the use of 
path dependency in policy studies could provide two options. The first is to 
proceed by analogy from institutions to policy as the subject of path 
dependency and so allow the existing body of work in historical 
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institutionalism to be used to support theory-building and empirical testing. 
The second option would be to apply and theorize the concept in policy sui 
generis (Kay, 2005). 
 
A policy system is a relevant and valid unit of analysis for the application of 
path dependency but the empirical challenge remains: what specifically about 
a policy system is path dependent. Within a policy system there are several 
policy subsystems, each with their set of actors, organizations, goals and 
instruments (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). For example, within the health 
policy system there is the primary care policy subsystem, the public and 
private health policy subsystem. The development of policy subsystems may 
equally be understood, using path dependency, as the policy ‘whole’ itself.  
 
Most importantly in terms of understanding policy as path dependent, past 
policy decisions are institutions in terms of current policy decisions: they can 
act as structures that can limit or shape current policy options. The question 
of what it is about a policy that is path dependent does not admit a single 
answer, rather, it remains an open and empirical question for scholars 
applying the concept (Kay, 2005).Path dependency is an appealing concept 
for understanding public policy development. It provides a label for the 
empirical observations and intuitions that policies, once established, can be 
difficult to change. Recent examples of the use of path dependency to 
understanding policy development include health care policy in the US 
(Hacker, 2002) and the UK (Greener, 2002) and the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the Europe (Kay,  2003). 
 
If we go through the political history of Pakistan (as described in chapter two) 
it is evident that patronage and power have dominated the political scene 
since its inception. Besieged with an uncertainty about the future, the 
politicians in different periods of history have indulged in distribution of 
patronage to their supports and in turn increase their own power. The 
preoccupation with keeping power applied to both the military rulers and 
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elected regimes. The state patronage and coercion has led to concentration 
of economic and political power. The excessive use of discretion in case-by-
case policy making to favour narrow interest groups has sometimes derailed 
institutionalised decision-making. Personal, parochial and party loyalty 
considerations dominate decision making while institutions were  bypassed. 
 
In Pakistan, the debate over whether authoritarian or democratic regimes 
have delivered better results in terms of economic performance or otherwise 
has been quite fierce since General Khan took power in 1958. The spurts in 
economic growth during 1960s, 1980s and 2000s when the country was 
governed by the military dictators have led many to conclude that 
authoritarian regimes are better suited to bring about economic development. 
Path dependency pattern is seen here as well where the military regimes 
continued the previous military rulers’ policies and the civilian governments 
their civilian predecessors. The economic policies of major political parties 
who took turns ruling during the 1990s were similar. Both the civilian and 
military regimes have demonstrated the same characteristics and 
weaknesses of personality cult, leadership, centralized decision making, 
repression of opponents and cronyism. 
 
The same politics-policy nexus, patronage, cronyism, coalitions, path 
dependency and networks were mirrored in health policy subsystem. Some 
of the policies (as mentioned earlier) followed a path dependency as the 
power relations and underlying social structures remain path dependent as 
well. Be it the policy makers in the macro-political sphere or health policy 
subsystem the key players have demanded absolute loyalty and compliance 
within their institutions. 
 
The concept of neo-patrimonialism as witnessed in some of the African 
states (in chapter four) also helped to understand the political relationships in 
Pakistani context and how the state resources were being used to maintain 
personal links and connections. This in turn has led to distortion of power and 
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corrupt authorities in our political institutions. These inappropriate 
connections often result in corrupt and hybrid systems favouring nepotism 
and cronyism in the health policy subsystem as well.  
6.5 Conclusion  
This study has highlighted the complex nature of policy implementation and 
multiple influences over this process. Elitist Pakistani politics at the macro 
level is mirrored in the health policy subsystem where power, patronage, self-
interests, corruption, conflicts, coalitions, policy networks and historical inertia 
were seen. The structural factors alongside the agential power were quite 
evident. Institutions also played an important role. The relevant theoretical 
frameworks were applied to the findings of the study. This chapter will help in 
forming recommendations and conclusions for this study.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations  
This research has given a sound understanding of complexities of policy 
implementation in Pakistani context and the power play behind it. The 
researcher has also formed some ideas for further research in other low and 
middle income countries. 
7.1 Conclusions 
This study has led to four main conclusions which relate to power and modes 
of power, path dependency, policy implementation as a political game and 
the role played by political institutions respectively. 
 7.1.1 Power as an integral element of implementation 
First, policy implementation should always be understood in terms of the 
language of power. Power is recognized as a key influence over the 
implementation of health policies, yet it is a concept that is rarely unpacked in 
empirical analyses from LMICs settings. Health politics is best characterised 
in Marxist or Elitist terms, where power is concentrated, centralised and 
exercised continuously. Disproportionate power is wielded by the few who 
based on class and politics, act to maintain the hegemony of the capitalist 
class. In policy contexts, power is typically conceived of in a relational sense, 
i.e. particular policy actors are understood to exercise their ‘power over’ 
others.  Actors may exercise political power by bringing authority to bear, or 
by resisting the authority of others. The conventional instruments of 
institutional power range from coercion to inducement, depending on the 
choices and political resources available to authorities. Policy actors may 
also demonstrate power by influencing key policy decisions and/or by limiting 
the scope of other actors’ activities. 
 
The power concept is definitely multi-layered. Actors do have and exercise 
power, but are always embedded in historically and socially constructed 
structures, e.g. in terms of institutions and discourses. The two modes of 
power, formal power derived from institutional roles and structural power 
derived from network configurations, cannot be easily disentangled. 
Institutional and structural drivers seem to have a crucial impact on how an 
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actor is perceived in decision-making and implementation. A structural 
interest perspective is also concerned with the sources of power and the 
groups, which benefit from structure of the society. Their interests are served 
by the existing social, economic and political structures. This was seen in 
general macro-political sphere and mirrored in health policy sub-system. 
Power is not only exercised through decision making itself, but also by 
excluding issues from the political agenda, hence by non-decision making. 
Bureaucrats emerged as the veto players in the policy sphere with the non-
decision making power vested in them. None of the characteristics of 
Weberian bureaucracy were found in Pakistani bureaucracy in context of this 
study.        
7.1.2 Path dependency 
Second, the health sector processes are path dependent and the processes 
may move in the same direction as established power relations do not 
change. Policy choices are influenced by bureaucratic inertia and institutional 
constrains due to the structure of the rigid institutions. Policies remain in 
stasis for long periods due to the policy monopoly of certain actors. Path 
dependent power relations and their linkage to policy networks are the 
conundrums facing the Pakistani health policy system. The stalemate over 
some health and other policies was seen because of the elitist system of 
interest groups’ conflict over policy choices between numerous interests and 
institutions. 
7.1.3 Implementation as a political game 
Third, the policy implementation process is certainly a political and a 
technical issue. This process is shaped by the capacity of the government, 
system complexity, political patronage, the influence of diverse actors, the 
web of power relationships for self-interests and institutional rigidity in the 
policy subsystem. Actors have personal and positional resources, as well as 
those they can access through their ties with other actors. Actors are able to 
wield influence because they have resources embedded in positions within 
an organisation (which has power, wealth, and a reputation of its own), 
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because of their own personal resources and because of their ties to others 
who also have resources. 
 
There were visible policy-to-implementation gaps in the overall policy process 
which existed at different tiers of the government. Implementation was never 
seen as an integral part of the policy process rather a separate entity to be 
considered at the end. Policy implementation and politics had a visible nexus. 
There are a number of challenges which led to these gaps. These were 
identified as patronage, political interference at every level, historical inertia, 
structural constraints, capacity issues, lack of evidence based research, lack 
of accountability, lack of ownership, commitment, transparency and merit, 
corruption, nepotism and cronyism. 
 
The health policy sphere in Pakistan could be seen as an institution which is 
based less upon the notion of control as of structures which are composed of 
groups and individuals all seeking to maximize their power and influence. We 
may see this as an essentially political process involving different strategies 
for acquiring and maintaining power. Implementation from this perspective is 
about self-interested people ‘playing games’. 
    
7.1.4 Role of political institutions 
Fourth, the competitive, deep-rooted and elitist features of the Pakistan 
political system are generally not conducive in dealing with problems of policy 
implementation. The Pakistan government provides many avenues for 
interests to influence implementation and affords the opponents of 
implementation many opportunities to block action. The persistence of de 
facto political power emphasizes how the same elites are able to shape 
politics, even when certain aspects of specific political institutions change. A 
complementary mechanism, which we refer to as the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” 
following Robert Michels’ (1911) classic book, focuses on how changes in the 
identity of elites can go hand in hand with the same dysfunctional policies 
and political  institutions.  
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The reason for persistence is therefore not persistence of the elites, but the 
persistence of incentives, of whoever is in power to distort the system for 
their own interest. When the current elites are replaced by newcomers, 
sometimes with a popular mandate, and once these newcomers are in power 
they have no incentive to change and instead use the entrenchment provided 
by the existing political institutions for their own benefit.  It was also seen how 
the frequent changes in the identity of those who hold political power can go 
hand in hand with the continuation of some policies be it in the general 
political arena or health policy subsystem. Both political and technical 
problems may severely constrain the implementation of policies that attempt 
strong control over large complex political systems. 
7.2 Recommendations 
 7.2.1 Recommendation 1 
Clearer and more comprehensive understanding of power is needed to build-
up rich and nuanced description of the practices and effects of power in 
health policy implementation. The monopoly of power by the few in the ruling 
class should be broken. Political power holding should not be vested with just 
a few ruling elites; rather it should be re-distributed to accommodate all 
groups or constituents. It is therefore recommended that the presence of 
power structures must be complemented with an inclusive framework that 
defines the responsibilities of each of the actors. 
7.2.2 Recommendation 2 
Policy implementation should be considered as an integral part of the policy 
process right from the beginning and not as something to be dealt with at the 
end. All implementation problems are complex otherwise there would be 
fewer debates about policy issues and implementation gaps. Also, in any 
policy environment unanticipated events will emerge to challenge even the 
best policy ideas. However, it is certain that a certain level of equilibrium in 
the policy sphere would help to create more space to achieve better results. 
More open and transparent policy styles should be ensured. Renewed efforts 
to develop policy institutions are another way to reduce chaos in the policy 
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sphere. The monstrous evils of corruption, nepotism and patronage by 
political office holders should be viewed as an offence.     
     
7.2.3 Recommendation 3 
Institutions should be made flexible rather than rigid. Habitual path 
dependency should not be the norm. Inflexibility and political inefficiency 
should be dealt with. More efficient decisions should be taken at the right 
time when an opportunity arises. This can be done by identifying the various 
groups involved and what each stands to gain or lose, the decision-maker 
can determine not only the aggregate net benefits to society but also the 
distribution of these benefits to each group, including the noneconomic 
benefits. The analysis would provide information so that the policy-maker can 
identify implementation problems and predict the reactions of the affected 
groups. This method can help identify the incentives needed to ensure the 
successful completion of a policy. 
7.2.4 Recommendation 4 
The concept of policy stalemate warrants attention. It would contribute to 
understanding the process of implementation and its products (for example, 
how policy stalemate relates to implementation failure). It is advisable to 
examine institutional incentives and conditions for stalemate, the role of 
interest groups in stalemate and conditions under which stalemates end. A 
policy  re-design with alignment of interests, incentives, resources and actors 
should be in place. A programmed approach could be followed which could 
limit discretion, monitor behaviour and change incentives. Government efforts 
must be based on a consideration of the imperatives of implementation. They 
require a clear statutory basis, based upon general political support. A failure 
to consider the politics of implementation is likely to render any policy 
objective however important or worthwhile - weak and ineffective. 
7.3 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis has contributed to knowledge by highlighting the importance of 
Power in health policy sphere in several ways. Firstly, this study has 
analysed the role of key policy actors and has shown how the policy elites 
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have maintained their hegemony on the overall policy making/implementation 
process by using their power relations. There is a strong policy-politics 
nexus, and policy implementation is more of a political game where the 
unelected powers play their games for incentives and self–interests. 
 
Secondly, these power relations take the shape of policy networks or iron 
triangles in the longer run. Due to these networks, policy elites maintain 
closed, stable relationships and prevent new actors to enter and sometimes 
changes to happen. Finally, habitual routines are difficult to break Once 
agents habituate a certain option or policy, then, they would be simply 
uninterested in some other options and a behavioural lock-in occurs. This 
thinking would further reinforce the habituated option. The power relations 
follow path dependency and the rigid political institutions play their role in this 
stalemate. 
. 
Although this thesis is framed around Pakistani experience, its central 
messages might be relevant to health policy discussions in other low and 
middle-income settings, as it contributes to the general understanding of the 
underlying power nexus in policy implementation in health policy subsystem. 
All these novel but crucial aspects are yet under explored and under 
researched in LMICs settings. In addition, this thesis might be useful not only 
in contributing to the academic debate, but it can also provide insightful 
suggestions to policy actors and researchers alike. 
 
7.4 Need for further research 
More studies should be conducted on a much wider scale in the South Asian 
region on a similar pattern to investigate the power practices in policy 
implementation in health and other areas in the neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, the political histories and health policy trajectories could be 
followed for contrasts and comparisons with a focus on habitual path 
dependence and nature of the political systems. The same research could be 
repeated in the Eastern Mediterranean region (EMRO) as Pakistan is also a 
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member of this region. Later a book can be compiled under the title of Politics 
of Health in these regions. Most ambitiously, future research may strive 
towards a model that can explain the composition of policy elites and their 
roles in policy implementation, when existing elites persist, when elites 
change but institutions persist, and when institutions truly change.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  
 
 
 
 
 
My name is Rd. Fatima Bajwa and I am a PhD student from the School of Health 
Sciences at Queen Margaret University in Edinburgh.  As part of my degree course, 
I am undertaking a research project for my PhD. The title of my project is: How does 
governance influence the implementation of health policies in Pakistan? 
 
The purpose of the study is to look into the effects of governance on health policies 
in Pakistan at the national and provincial level. For this the politicians, bureaucrats 
and other government officials involved in decision-making would be interviewed at 
the national, provincial and district levels. At each level, the governance challenges 
would be discussed in detail with a particular focus on the health policies related to 
the population. I would like to talk to you about your experience in governance and 
health policy implementation issues in Pakistan. 
 
The interview should take less than an hour. I will be digitally recording the session 
because I do not want to miss any of your comments and the recordings would be 
destroyed as soon as possible after transcribing in order to ensure confidentiality.  
All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will 
only be shared with research team members and we will ensure that any information 
we include in our report does not identify you as the respondent. 
 
The findings of the project will be useful because it could come up with some policy 
recommendations for the decision makers in the sphere of decision-making focusing 
on the deployment and distribution of rural health workforce. The results may be 
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published in a journal or presented at a conference. All data will be anonymised as 
much as possible. Your name will be replaced with a participant number, and it will 
not be possible for you to be identified in any reporting of the data gathered. 
 
If you have read and understood this information sheet, any questions you had have 
been answered, and you would like to be a participant in the study, please now see 
the consent form. 
 
 
Contact details of the researcher 
Name of researcher: Dr Fatima Bajwa 
Address:  PhD Student, Division, School of Health Sciences IIHD 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
  Queen Margaret University Drive 
Musselburgh 
East Lothian EH21 6UU 
 
Email / Telephone: fbajwa@qmu.ac.uk  / 0131 474 0000 
 
Contact details of an Independent Researcher 
Name. Fiona o’ May  
Address: Research Fellow, School of Health sciences, IIHD 
                 Queen Margaret University, Musselburgh, Edinburgh Email/Telephone     
FO’May@qmu.ac.uk  
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Appendix 2 
Bloc of questions for policy makers (Politicians/Bureaucrats/District health 
officers)  
Theme 1: Role of actors in the policy process 
1. Can policy makers from the provinces influence policies at the national 
level and vice versa? 
2. Is there some international influence regarding the health policies? 
3. In your opinion who are the key factors influencing the making and 
implementing policies at various levels? 
4. How do you see your role in the whole process? 
 
Theme 2: Policy Process: 
1. Based on your experience, please describe how major policy 
decisions take place? 
2. How do you see your role in the whole process? 
3. What are the ways in which the public can know what is going on in 
the policy sphere? 
4. Can you quote any example in which the policy makers had to justify 
some of their policies to the stakeholders? 
5. Have any of your policies got onto the agenda? If yes, what were the 
reasons behind them? 
6. Based on your experience, how would you describe governance in 
general and for health sector in particular? 
 
Theme 3: Policy Implementation 
1. How does a new policy get communicated to you? Can you 
immediately implement everything?  If not, how do you 
prioritise? 
2. What are the barriers in their implementation according to 
you? 
3. Can you give some examples of the health policies which 
have been best implemented? 
4. Do you have any experience of the policies driven by political 
agendas in the provinces and the centre? If so, can these 
affect the policies at the district level? 
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Theme 4: Health Workforce 
1. How are the policies regarding health workforce formulated? 
2. What is the prominence of the rural areas in these policies? 
3. Could you please give an example of any major policy decision in this 
regard? 
4. How does recruitment and staffing take place? Can you give some 
examples of inadequate distribution in these areas? How can this be 
addressed? 
Theme 5: Centre/province co-ordination 
1. Have the provinces taken some independent decisions 
regarding health policy? 
2. Which provinces are doing better with regard to health 
workforce in rural areas? 
3. How could these policies be made more sustainable? 
4. How can the provinces get better support from the centre? 
5. Are there some ways in which the provinces can learn from 
each other’s experience especially in the heath sector? 
 
 
Bloc of questions for the users of the policy   
1. Do you think that public health services are doing their best 
to meet the needs of the people? Can you quote some 
examples? 
2. Who plays the main role in policy making in the country? 
3. How can the people have a say in the policy process? 
4. Do you have any experience of rural health facilities? 
5. What are the problems faced by the local people in different 
areas and how can these be overcome? 
6. Which provinces have better health facilities? 
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